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Abstract
Background and objectives: In Ontario, primary care reform was initiated in the
early 2000s with an aim to improve the quality of primary care. Hence, the provincial
government restructured family physicians’ remuneration package. Prior to the
reform, most physicians received majority of their income through fee-for-service
(FFS). In Ontario, Family Health Group (FHG) and Family Health Organization
(FHO) are dominant post-reform primary care models that remunerate family
physicians through blended FFS and blended capitation, respectively. In three studies,
we compared physicians in FHGs and FHOs in terms of their care provision for
persons with diabetes mellitus (1st study), congestive heart failure (CHF) (2nd study)
and chronic kidney disease (CKD) (3rd study).
Methods: All data were obtained from the ICES (formerly known as the Institute for
Clinical Evaluative Sciences). For the first and second studies, we employed
propensity score-based weights and fixed effects regressions on a balanced panel of
physicians spanning 10 years; all analyses were conducted at the physician level. In
these two studies, the comparison was between physicians in FHG who never
switched to FHO or other models (i.e., non-switchers); switchers were physicians who
switched from FHG to FHO. For the third study, we performed two cross-sectional
analyses at the physician level; lack of data availability for patients with CKD over
time deterred us from conducting longitudinal analyses as in the first two studies.
Results: We found that switching from FHG to FHO was associated with an
improvement in some aspects of diabetes care. We found that CHF care—in terms of
physicians’ follow-up of patients who are discharged—was not different between
switchers and non-switchers. We found that some aspects of CKD care were better
with physicians in FHG relative to their counterparts in FHO.
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Conclusions: Compared to blended FFS, blended capitation payment is associated
with a small but statistically significant improvement in some aspects of diabetes care.
Our findings suggest that follow-up care for patients with CHF is similar in Ontario’s
blended FFS and blended capitation models. Though we found that blended FFS is
associated with greater adherence to some CKD process measures, future studies
could employ longitudinal regressions to account for more confounding.
Keywords: primary care reform, fee-for-service, capitation, quality of care, physician
remuneration, pay-for-performance
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Summary for Lay Audience
In the early 2000s, the Canadian province of Ontario embarked on reforming
its system of primary care; a major aim of the reform was to improve the quality of
care that family physicians provide to their patients. To achieve this aim, the
government partially relied on changing family physicians’ remuneration and
introducing pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives.
Prior to the reform, most of Ontario’s family physicians were paid through
fee-for-service (FFS), a mode of remuneration where the unit of payment is the
service. The post-reform primary care models are partly characterized by blended
payment, which refers to a remuneration system based on multiple sources of
income—of which one source predominates. For instance, in blended FFS, physicians
are mainly remunerated through FFS and have secondary sources of income through
bonuses, P4P incentives, and premiums. Family Health Group (FHG) and Family
Health Organization (FHO) are two popular post-reform primary care models that pay
physicians through blended FFS and blended capitation, respectively. In capitation,
the unit of payment is a person. Over time, many physicians switched from FHG to
FHO (i.e., switchers); however, some remained in FHG (i.e., non-switchers).
The evidence on physician’s performance in FHGs and FHOs is limited; thus,
we examined the impact of these two payment models on physicians’ provision of
primary care services to Ontarians with diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure
(CHF), and chronic kidney disease (CKD). We also investigated patients’ health
outcomes.
We found that physicians’ switch from FHG to FHO was associated with
moderately better care for some diabetes-related services; there was no significant
difference between switchers and non-switchers in terms of the CHF care measures
iv

we examined. We also found that adherence to some CKD-related care processes was
higher for physicians in FHGs relative to their counterparts in FHOs. Collectively, our
studies provide some evidence to support that family physicians’ level of care can be
associated with how they are paid.
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Chapter 1
1

Introduction
1.1

The history of healthcare in Canada

In Canada, publicly funded healthcare is provided and financed through
provincial or territorial health insurance plans. The history of Canadian healthcare
system is eventful; the country came a long way to have a universal health insurance
system. In this section, a brief historical context is presented to outline the Canadian
government’s support for universal primary care.
Prior to the late 1940’s, Canada’s system of healthcare was mainly privatized
whereby Canadian residents’ access to medical care directly depended on their
affordability. Canada’s shift to a system where healthcare can be accessible without
out-of-pocket payments began in the province of Saskatchewan in 1947 through the
introduction of a public healthcare insurance plan for hospital services (Government
of Canada, 2018). The plan was called the Saskatchewan Hospital Services Plan, and
it was the first universal health insurance plan for hospital services in North America
(Lavoie, 2018). On July 1st 1962, this provincial plan was extended to cover physician
services in Canada through the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act
passed by the federal government in 1957 (Government of Canada, 2018; Office of
the Auditor General of Canada, 2002). In 1966, the federal government introduced the
Medical Care Act, which proffered to reimburse, or cost-share, medical services
provided by physicians outside the hospital setting. By 1972, each province’s and
territory’s health insurance plan covered outpatient physician services (Government
of Canada, 2018).
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In 1984, both the aforementioned federal acts that were introduced in 1957
and 1966 were amalgamated through the Canada Health Act (or the Act), which
ensures that the provincial and territorial governments deliver healthcare in
accordance with five principles: (1) accessibility, (2) portability, (3) universality, (4)
comprehensiveness and (5) public administration (Government of Canada, 1985).
Accessibility ensures that each province’s and territory’s insurance plan enable legal
residents to receive medical services without out-of-pocket payments for the insured
medical services. Portability ensures that Canadians are eligible for health insurance
even if they move from one province (or territory) to another. Universality ensures
that the health insurance plan of each province or territory financially covers 100% of
insured medical services under uniform terms and conditions. Comprehensiveness
refers to the plan’s coverage of services provided by hospitals, physicians, as well as
emergency dental services in hospitals. Public administration essentially means that
each province’s and territory’s insurance plan must be managed by a public
jurisdiction (Conference Board, 2013; Government of Canada, 1985, 2018; Office of
the Auditor General of Canada, 2002). It is important to note that the principle of
public administration under the Canada Health Act does not preclude the delivering
of health services privately because the Act merely dictates that the funding and/or
purchasing of care be under a public authority. Consequently, the vast majority of
family physicians provide their medical services in private practice settings. This is
also consistent with the fact that many hospitals—as well as companies for laboratory
services—are private organizations (Tindal, 1997, 2007).
The primary objective of the Canadian healthcare system is “to protect,
promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of Canadian residents, and to
facilitate reasonable access to medically necessary healthcare services without
2

financial barriers” (p. 5) (Minister of Justice, 2020). While the provincial government
is mainly responsible for the delivery of healthcare, there are certain populations for
whom the jurisdiction of healthcare is primarily under the federal government; these
groups of people include First Nations and Inuit, and members of naval services
(Conference Board, 2013).
The federal government’s main involvement with Canada’s decentralized
healthcare system is the provision of financial support to sustain the provincial and
territorial universal health insurance plans (Government of Canada, 2018). For
instance, the federal government established the Canada Health and Social Transfer
(CHST) in 1995, which was a block funding program that used federal funds and tax
transfers to financially support healthcare, post-secondary education, social services
and social assistance. In 2004, CHST was split into two programs, namely, Canada
Social Transfer (CST) and the Canada Health Transfer (CHT). The CST program
provides block funding for post-secondary education, social services and social
assistance. The CHT provides block funding for healthcare to all the provinces and
territories; furthermore, CHT is Canada’s largest federal transfer to provinces and
territories. The provinces and territories must adhere to the five principles of the
Canada Health Act mentioned earlier to receive financial support through the CHT
(Conference Board, 2013; Department of Finance-Government of Canada, 2011;
Government of Canada, 1985, 2018; Martin et al., 2018; Office of the Auditor
General of Canada, 2002).
1.2

Primary care

Primary care essentially refers to medical services individuals receive when
they first contact the healthcare system; such care is comprehensive, coordinated and
continuous. Primary care is comprehensive as it addresses most of an individual’s
3

health-related issues. Primary care is coordinated because it ensures that various
healthcare needs of a patient are met; for instance, if a patient is in need of mental
health services, the patient’s primary care physician (PCP) could refer her/him to a
psychologist. Primary care is continuous because it spans a patient’s lifetime (Hawk,
2002; Kroenke, 2004; Starfield, 1994). In Canada, the vast majority of primary care is
provided by PCPs; these healthcare practitioners are exclusively physicians who
specialize in family medicine. On the contrary, PCPs in other countries, including the
United States (US), can include specialists like pediatricians and geriatricians
(Canadian Medical Association, 1994). In the Canadian context, ‘family physician’
and ‘primary care physician’ are synonymous and, therefore, are used interchangeably
throughout this thesis.
Though the terms ‘primary care’ and ‘primary healthcare’ are distinct, they are
often used interchangeably in the health services research literature. While primary
care involves a patient’s first-contact interaction with a clinician, primary healthcare
involves a patient’s interaction with any sector of a healthcare system. For instance,
water sanitation does not pertain to primary care but, rather, pertains to primary
healthcare (Muldoon et al., 2006).
Fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation are the two dominant remuneration
mechanisms for primary care physicians; the unit of payment in FFS and capitation is
the ‘service’ and the ‘person’, respectively (Quinn, 2015).
A key advantage of FFS is that it rewards the provision of targeted and
specific services. However, one disadvantage of FFS is that certain functions of
primary care, such as coordination of care, are not directly rewarded under FFS; for
instance, under FFS, a clinician is not incentivized to spend his/her time on
coordinating non-reimbursable services such as non-face-to-face consultations via
4

phone or e-mail communication. Another disadvantage of FFS is that it, arguably,
rewards the overprovision of care to patients, where the extra medical services may be
unnecessary (Berenson & Rich, 2010; Simoens & Giuffrida, 2004).
A strength of capitation is that this remuneration mechanism incentivizes
physicians to increase their patients’ access to comprehensive care (Blomqvist &
Busby, 2012; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013). This motivation
for improving care access may not be as explicit in FFS where physicians can be
indifferent towards the number of patients they have—especially since the unit of
payment is the service and not a person. While physicians remunerated by FFS can
bill a single patient for numerous services, their capitated counterparts receive a fixed
income per patient per unit of time. Arguably, capitated physicians would be more
incentivized to provide better care quality to their patients than their FFS counterparts
so as to retain patients; unlike in capitation, disenrollment of a patient does not
necessarily translate to financial loss in FFS (Blomqvist & Busby, 2012; Kralj &
Kantarevic, 2013). A disadvantage of the capitation system is that inadequate casemix adjustment can result in under-provision of services or over-payment. For
instance, many capitated physicians with very sick patients can be underpaid for their
services, which, in turn, can incentivize them to offload their care to specialists
(Berenson & Rich, 2010; Sarma et al., 2018); capitation can also incentivize
physicians to select low-risk (i.e., healthy) patients, a phenomenon known as ‘creamskimming’.
Primary care reform
Care gaps in the pre-reform system of primary care were noted by many
including Commissioner Roy J. Romanow, and The Honourable Michael J. L. Kirby
(The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs Science and Technology, 2002;
5

Romanow, 2002). In October 2002, Kirby stated that the poor management of
patients’ information, weak emphasis on both health promotion and preventive care
can partly be attributed to the fact that primary care physicians practice in solo and
under fee-for-service remuneration. Kirby recommended that primary care physicians
should practice in groups rather than in solo, and that patients should be formally
enrolled to physicians. Romanow emphasized the need for a focus on the evidencebased quality aspect of care ranging from the determination of quality indicators to
the evaluation of care quality. Many of the recommendations of the Kirby and
Romanow reports have been implemented in Ontario through the introduction of new
primary care models.
In the early 2000s, most PCPs in Ontario were remunerated through FFS with
the exception of a small number of family physicians who practiced in Community
Health Centres (CHCs), Health Service Organizations (HSOs) and pilot Primary Care
Networks (PCNs) that were experimented in 1999; physicians in HSOs and PCNs
were paid through capitation, while PCPs in CHCs were remunerated through salary
(Henry et al., 2012). In 1996, both the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) and the
Ministry of Health and Long-term Care (MOHLTC) announced their collaboration to
reform primary care.
A key feature of these reformed models is the blended payment system for
primary care physicians whereby revenue is based on a composite of various forms of
remuneration—with one form being dominant. For instance, in blended FFS (also
known as enhanced FFS), the majority of income is through FFS, while minor sources
of revenue come from financial incentives such as bonuses and premiums. The
primary aim of the reform was to improve access to and quality of primary care in
Ontario; reforming physicians’ remuneration mechanism to blended payment was key
6

in the provincial government’s initiative for improving access and quality (Sweetman
& Buckley, 2014). The post-reform models of primary care delivery are not only
characterized by physicians’ reformed payment scheme but are also known for having
other features including patient rostering, the formal procedure whereby a patient is
officially enrolled to a physician. The main post-reform models for primary care
physicians include the Family Health Network (FHN), Family Health Group (FHG),
Comprehensive Care Model (CCM) and Family Health Organization (FHO)
(Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
The FHN was introduced in April 2002; this model requires at least three
physicians, and the remuneration mechanism for family physicians in a FHN is
blended capitation. For their enrolled patients, physicians in this model receive
capitation and FFS payments for capitated and non-capitated services, respectively.
While there is no enrollment limit, the per-patient capitation payments are reduced by
50% for each patient enrolled above an average of 2,400 patients per physician in the
group. The annual capitation rate, which is age and sex adjusted, had an average base
rate of $126.48 in 2014 (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
In July 2003, the provincial government introduced the FHG, whereby family
physicians’ remuneration mechanism is blended FFS, and this model also requires a
minimum of three physicians. Under the FHG model, physicians receive 100% FFS
payments, in addition to incentives and bonuses. While patient enrollment is optional
in FHG, it is encouraged as physicians can be entitled to some incentives for enrolled
patients; thus, formal patient enrollment encourages family physicians to meet certain
targets for patients (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
The CCM model was introduced in October 2005 and features of this model
are identical to the FHG with an exception of the minimum number of physicians
7

being one in a CCM. The CCM was designed for family physicians who wanted to
maintain solo practice and still be a under a payment model with features of a FHG
(Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
The FHO model was introduced in November 2006 and, like the FHG model,
a FHO requires a minimum of three family physicians. The remuneration scheme in a
FHO is blended capitation; like in a FHN, capitation payment per patient is reduced
by approximately half for each patient enrolled above an average of 2,400 patients per
physician in the group . In FHOs, the capitation payments per patient are age-and-sexadjusted, with an average base rate at $139.12 in 2014 for a slightly larger basket of
services than in FHN (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
These four post-reform primary care models give family physicians incentives
for providing after-hours care and preventive medical services; for instance, family
physicians in CCM, FHG, FHN and FHO can receive the ‘Colorectal Screening
Bonus (Q150)’ if they screen eligible enrolled patients aged between 50 and 74 years
for colorectal cancer (Ontario Medical Association, 2015).
Many family physicians in Family Health Groups switched to Family Health
Organizations—a major transition of PCPs between primary care models; in Ontario,
majority of PCPs now practice in either a FHG or FHO (Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013;
Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2018). The main difference between these
two primary care delivery models is that FFS and capitation is the dominant mode of
remuneration in FHGs and FHOs, respectively (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014). The
remuneration package of these two models constitutes identical pay-for-performance
(P4P) schemes; such schemes can be defined as financial rewards for physicians’
provision of evidence-based care (e.g., prescription of antihypertensive medication for
persons diagnosed with high blood pressure) and/or meeting of health outcomes (e.g.,
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lowered blood pressure for patients with hypertension) (Milstein & Schreyoegg,
2016). More description of the FHG and FHO models are provided in Table 1
(Goldblatt et al., 2018; Government of Ontario, 2014; McLeod et al., 2016; Ministry
of Health and Long-Term Care, 2007, 2011; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
Primary Health Care Team, 2008; Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2013;
Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
When the FHG and FHO models were introduced, the Ontario MOHLTC
designed contracts that detailed the entire remuneration structure of PCPs in the
respective models. With the passage of time, the FHG and FHO remuneration
schemes were slightly modified from the original contracts and information on such
modifications are available in several bulletins from the Ontario MOHLTC.
1.3

Quality of care

As mentioned earlier, a major aim of Ontario’s primary care reform was to
improve the quality of first-contact care. Donabedian explained that care quality is a
nonunitary concept as it can be defined from multiple perspectives (Donabedian,
1988, 2002). For example, patients’ and physicians’ conceptualization for quality of
care can be distinct: a clinician’s operationalization of care quality may correspond to
adherence to evidence-based recommendation—while that of a patient may
correspond to interpersonal communication (Donabedian, 1988; Haggerty, 2011). In
spite of care quality being a nonunitary phenomenon, Donabedian (1988) explained
that inferences about quality of care can be drawn from three metrics, namely,
structure, process and outcome measures.
Structure refers to infrastructural features in which care is occurring, and such
features include resources such as ‘size of medical staff’, and ‘possession of advanced
diagnostic and curative technologies’. Process represents the undertaking of a clinical
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action that is expected to produce beneficial outcomes in patients’ health; a classic
exemplar of process is the prescription of a drug whose use has been shown to result
in favourable outcomes. Finally, an outcome measure refers to an end result of care
and relates to some aspect of health (e.g., ‘mortality risk’ and ‘quality of life’). The
use of the Donabedian’s structure-process-outcome framework is widely used in the
health services literature. According to this framework, improving structure is
expected to result in better processes of care which, in turn, is expected to culminate
in better health outcomes (Ameh et al., 2017; Donabedian, 1988; Moore et al., 2015).
As per Donabedian’s framework, participating in a care process is ideally
expected to have a significant impact on outcome. For instance, the (prophylactic)
prescription of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs) or angiotensin II
receptor blockers (ARBs) classes of drugs for persons with diabetes mellitus is
exemplary of an ideal process measure as randomized, placebo-controlled trials have
shown that use of either ACEIs or ARBs is significantly associated with a delay in
nephropathy progression in persons with diabetes (Diabetes Canada Clinical Practice
Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018; Lewis et al., 2001; Ravid et al., 1993).
While many studies use elements Donabedian’s framework (i.e., structure,
process or outcome measures) for evaluating quality of care, studies’
operationalization of quality is often with limitations (Kiran et al., 2014; To et al.,
2015). For example, in Kiran et al.’s (2014) comparison of diabetes care quality
between various physician payment models, one of the quality indicators—as per care
processes—corresponded to proportion of patients who received lipid assessment at
least once annually. Under this binary definition, physicians who assessed patients’
lipid profile more frequently (e.g., four or five times) are not distinguished from those
who tested just twice. Though being diagnosed with diabetes was common to all
10

patients in Kiran et al.’s (2014) study, the specific needs of each patient is likely to
vary: some patients may have an indication for lipid assessment at least four times
annually (Diabetes Canada Clinical Practice Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018).
Donabedian (2002) alluded to such limitations when defining of quality indicators;
therefore, it is important that researchers be cognizant of such.
1.4

Overall thesis objective

The transition of Ontario’s family physicians from Family Health Groups to
Family Health Organizations represents a major switch of family physicians between
primary care models (Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013). Therefore, Ontario’s natural
experiment provides a unique opportunity to understand the behaviour of physicians
in FFS- and capitation-based models in terms of the provision of various processes of
care and resulting health outcomes. There are theoretical and empirical explanations
on how physician behaviour can be impacted by FFS or capitation. Using an
experimental economics approach, Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen (2011) found
that FFS reinforces overprovision of healthcare services, while capitation reinforces
underprovision of healthcare services. Furthermore, FFS and capitation have their
unique strengths with regards to improving quality of care (Hennig-Schmidt et al.,
2011); it is argued that FFS leads to better access to care, while capitation leads to
better continuity of care (Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Gosden et al., 2001; Kralj &
Kantarevic, 2013; Li et al., 2014). A capitation-based payment system is hypothesized
to improve quality of care and population health in the context of Ontario for two
important reasons. Firstly, capitation incentivizes optimal patient enrollment because
in the FHO model, a PCP’s capitation payment is reduced by 50% for every enrolled
patient above a roster size of 2,400 per physician in the group. Furthermore, the FHO
incentivizes the increase in access to care for the enrolled patient population because
11

PCPs in the FHO model are exclusively entitled to an “access bonus”, which is a
financial incentive for providing in-basket services to rostered patients. The incentive
for increasing access to comprehensive care is not as pronounced in blended FFS
compared to blended capitation; a FFS physician could be indifferent to the number of
patients they enroll if they can still bill for many services from fewer patients
(Blomqvist & Busby, 2012; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017). Secondly, capitation
incentivizes the retention of enrolled patients by keeping them as healthy as possible;
one way to achieve this could be adhering to the provision of preventive care services
as well as process measures that are pertinent to better disease management
(Blomqvist & Busby, 2012; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017).
The aforementioned reasons serve as the rationale for empirically
investigating whether patients receive better care from PCPs practicing in FHOs
compared to PCPs who remained in FHGs. The main objective of the thesis was to
compare the impact of physician remuneration mechanisms, namely, blended FFS and
blended capitation, on quality of care in chronic disease management and patients’
health outcomes (estimate of mortality risk, and avoidable hospitalizations). Three
separate studies were conducted to achieve this objective. The first study (Chapter 3)
investigated the impact of physicians’ switch from blended FFS to blended capitation
on processes of care and health outcomes (estimate of mortality risk, and avoidable
hospitalizations) for persons with diabetes mellitus. The second study (Chapter 4)
investigated the impact of the switch from blended FFS to blended capitation on
provision of post-discharge follow-up care and health outcomes for persons with
CHF. The third study (Chapter 5) investigated whether blended capitation—compared
to blended FFS—is associated with better CKD care quality as per CKD process
measures and patients’ estimate of mortality risk. For all three studies, we
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hypothesized that care provision is better under blended capitation than in under
blended FFS.
Relevant information regarding the pathophysiology of diabetes mellitus,
congestive heart failure and chronic kidney disease are briefly provided in the Chapter
7 (Supplementary Material for Introduction Chapter). The next chapter presents
findings of the literature on the association between physicians’ remuneration
mechanism and care quality of the three chronic conditions.
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Table 1 Family Health Group and Family Health Organization models.
Model
Family Health Group
Period introduced
July 2003
Minimum group size
Remuneration structure and features

Family Health Organization
November 2006

3
•
•

•

•

•

•

3

Income is primarily through fee-forservice.
Care is physician-led; members of a
FHG can included a limited number
of non-physicians (i.e., limited
interprofessional involvement).
While patient enrolment is not
required, certain types of payments
can only be received for rostered
patients.
Physicians are entitled to the
‘comprehensive care premium’,
whereby they receive 10% premium
for a repertoire of services provided
to enrolled patients.
Physicians are eligible to bill new
patient fee code, Q013A, for
rostering up to 60 new patients.
Physicians in this payment model
are eligible to claim pay-forperformance incentives such as the
14

•

•

•

•

•

Income is primarily through capitation for
capitated services provided to enrolled patients
(therefore patient enrolment is required to
receive income).
Care is physician-led; like in FHGs,
interprofessional involvement is limited—
except physicians who are part of a Family
Health Team.
The capitation payments are age-and-sexadjusted. For the 2014 fiscal year, the
capitation rate, on average, was $139.12;
however, this rate is reduced by 50% for every
rostered patient above a roster size of 2,400 per
physician in the group.
Physicians are entitled to “shadow billing
premium” for capitated services provided to
rostered patients. As per this premium,
physicians are remunerated 15% of the fee-forservice value of the capitated services.
Fee-for-service payments are received for:
non-enrolled patients and non-capitated

‘Diabetes Management Incentive
(Q040A)’, ‘Heart Failure
Management Incentive (Q050A)’
and ‘Smoking Cessation
Counselling premium (Q042)’.

•

•
•

•

•
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services. However, these payments are capped
at a certain amount; for instance, in the 2014
fiscal year, payments were capped at $52,883.
Physicians are entitled to “access bonus”
whereby physicians are remunerated 18.59%
of all capitation payment twice a year. Access
bonus is slightly higher for patients in longterm care.
Physicians are entitled to new patient fee
(Q013A) just like FHGs.
Unlike in the FHG model, physicians under
this model are not eligible for the
comprehensive care premium.
Unlike in the FHG model, physicians in this
model receive financial reward for completing
continuing medical education (through
seminars and conferences) (Q555). Hence the
Q555 incentive can be said to motivate
physicians to be current with the medical
literature.
Physicians are entitled to P4P incentives (such
as Q040A, Q042, and Q050A) just like in
FHG; see column for FHG for more details on
these.

• Mandatory.
• Mandatory.
Provision of after-hours care (Each
physician is required to cover one 3hour session of after-hours care per
week. Longer duration of blocks is to
be covered by larger number of
physicians. For example, groups of 10
to 19 physicians are to provide a total
number of 7 after-hours blocks, while
groups of 30 to 74 physicians are to
provide a total number of 10 afterhours blocks; physicians are entitled to
the after-hours premium (Q012A).)
Note: after-hours care refers to care that (1) starts any time between 5 and 7 pm on Monday to Thursday, (2) statutory holidays, and (3)
weekends.
Sources: Goldblatt et al., 2018; Government of Ontario, 2014; McLeod et al., 2016; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2007, 2011;
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Primary Health Care Team, 2008; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2013; Sweetman &
Buckley, 2014
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Chapter 2
2

Literature review: The relationship between physicians’ payment model and
care quality for diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure and chronic kidney
disease
2.1

The salience of physicians’ remuneration mechanism in quality of
primary care services

The objective of this thesis is to investigate the quality of care for diabetes
mellitus, chronic kidney disease (CKD), and congestive heart failure (CHF) in Ontario’s
Family Health Group and Family Health Organization primary care models. Investigating
the impact of remuneration models on care quality is a topic of great relevance for many
reasons.
Firstly, the provincial government partly relied on restructuring family
physicians’ mode of remuneration to improve access to and quality of care for residents
of Ontario. For instance, various P4P schemes in the post-reform blended payment
models, including FHGs and FHOs, were designed to incentivize family physicians to
meet health targets, improve preventive care services and provide care during after-hours
such as on weekends, statutory holidays and after 5 PM on weekdays (Sweetman &
Buckley, 2014).
Secondly, a lot of financial resources have been invested to sustain these postreform payment models; for example, in the 2007/08 fiscal year, family physicians in the
post-reform blended remuneration models received 25% more payment than their
counterparts in pure FFS (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2011). Furthermore,
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in the 2012/13 fiscal year, $4.2 billion was paid to Ontario’s PCPs, and $3.4 billion (i.e.,
approximately 80%) of this payment was made to family physicians in blended payment
models (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2013). To date, most of Ontario’s
primary care physicians practice either in a FHG or FHO; by September 1st 2017, 58%
and 29% of family physicians in the province were in FHOs and FHGs, respectively
(personal communication with Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-term Care).
Thirdly, there is mixed evidence regarding whether there is an association
between physicians’ payment scheme and quality of care provided (Jaakkimainen et al.,
2011; Kiran et al., 2014). While some studies find that family physicians under a
capitation-based scheme provide better care than their counterparts in a FFS-based
system, other studies found no association or the converse. For example, a study by
Jaakimainen, Barnsley, Klein-Geltink, Kopp, & Glazier, (2011) reported that physicians
in blended FFS and blended capitation were not different in their adherence to process
measures for diabetes, while the study by Kiran, Victor, Kopp, Shah, & Glazier, (2014)
found that physicians in blended capitation adhered more to diabetes process measures
compared to those in blended FFS.
Lastly, studying the relationship between physicians’ remuneration mechanism
and care quality for diabetes, congestive heart failure and chronic kidney disease is
relevant; each of the three poses an economic burden to healthcare, and negatively
impacts millions of individuals globally.
Diabetes affects at least 462 million people worldwide (Khan et al., 2020); in
Canada, the number of individuals diagnosed with this metabolic disorder has increased
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by more than twice since 2000 and, in 2015, 8.9% of the Canadian population (i.e., 3.34
million Canadians) was diagnosed with diabetes (Diabetes Canada, 2015, 2016; World
Health Organization, 2017). The mortality and morbidity associated with diabetes
mellitus is costly to healthcare systems worldwide (Zhang et al., 2010); long-term
consequences of this condition include foot ulcers, vision loss, depression, myocardial
infraction, end-stage renal disease, lower limb amputation, and stroke (George et al.,
2014; Government of Canada, 2011; Naslafkih & Sestier, 2003). Through joint efforts
with the Centre for Spatial Economics and Informetrica Limited (Diabetes Canada,
2009a), Diabetes Canada produced a report on costs (in 2009 Canadian dollars)
associated with diabetes, in each of the Canadian provinces—including Ontario (Diabetes
Canada, 2009b). According to this report, diabetes mellitus costed Ontario approximately
4.9 billion dollars in 2010, and the projected cost for 2020 is approximately 7 billion
dollars (Diabetes Canada, 2009b); hospitalizations and long-term disability each
accounted for a substantial amount of the costs; for example, the cost estimates of longterm disability for 2000, 2010 and 2020 were 463, 998 and 1,495 million dollars
respectively (Diabetes Canada, 2009b).
Congestive heart failure affects approximately 26 million people worldwide
(Savarese & Lund, 2017); furthermore, this condition is a leading cause of hospitalization
in Canada (Yeung et al., 2012). While Ontario may have witnessed a relative decline in
the rate of CHF-related hospitalizations, this chronic illness remains a major source of
economic burden (Tran et al., 2016; Wijeysundera et al., 2010). Tran et al., (2016)
performed a cost-analysis (in 2014 Canadian dollars) to determine the annual per patient
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hospital admission cost for CHF between the 2004 and 2013 fiscal years in Canada;
admission costs increased from $9,700 in 2004 to $11,000 per patient in 2013. The
authors projected that the cost of a person with CHF admitted to hospital would be
$14,000 per patient by 2030. Using provincial-level administrative databases,
Wijeysundera et al. (2010) performed a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) study that
compared the cost of CHF care in two settings, namely, the standard care setting (defined
as care provided by a single practitioner) and the CHF clinic setting (defined as care
provided with at least one physician, or nurse, with specialized training in CHF care).
This CEA used the perspective of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-term Care,
and the time horizon was 12 years. The cumulative lifetime discounted cost of CHF care
in the standard care and CHF clinic settings were $53,638 and $66,532 per patient,
respectively; CHF clinics costed $18,259 for each additional life-year gained; all cost
estimates were in 2008 Canadian dollars.
Approximately 700 million individuals are affected by chronic kidney disease
globally (Bikbov et al., 2020); in Canada, this condition affects at least 4 million
individuals (Bello et al., 2019b). The economic burden posed by chronic kidney disease
stems from the fact that the condition affects many persons of working age; an
individual’s income loss consequently translates to decreasing tax revenue. Persons
diagnosed with CKD receive disability payments from the government and/or private
insurers. Disability insurance costs for Canadians with advanced kidney failure is over
$200 million per annum in Canada with at least 70% of the cost being incurred by private
insurance (Manns et al., 2017). In 2015, $580 million was spent on kidney dialysis
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services in Ontario alone (Ontario Renal Network, 2016). Chronic kidney disease can
progress to end stage renal disease (ESRD) or renal failure; persons with ESRD require
kidney transplant or dialysis to remain alive (Molony & Craig, 2009). Hence,
management of CKD is beneficial as it can delay progression to ESRD.
In studies that investigated the relationship between physicians’ mode of
remuneration and quality of care metrics known as ‘process measures’ are often used to
compare care quality. As mentioned previously, delivery of a care process is expected to
result in an improvement in outcome. For example, a physician who prescribes ACEIs or
ARBs to a persons with diabetes is said to provide better care quality than their
counterpart who doesn’t because randomized controlled trials have shown that use of
ACEIs or ARBs significantly delays progression of nephropathy in this patient
population (Lewis et al., 2001; Ravid et al., 1993). There are clinical actions for which
the evidence to support an association with an improvement in health is absent, and
Donabedian (1988) stated that such clinical undertakings can still be deemed process
measures only if opinions from well-informed, authoritative entities endorse such clinical
behaviours as measures of care process. While counselling persons with diabetes on selfmanagement is considered a process measure merely on expert opinion (American
Diabetes Association, 2018), a clinician who delivers this care process is said to provide
better quality than their counterpart who doesn’t because counselling is likely to
indirectly result in better health outcomes for the patient.
Process measures relevant to the primary care management of diabetes mellitus
include testing of glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c), eye examination, lipid assessment,
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statin prescription, measurement of blood pressure and nephropathy screening; these care
processes are also congruent with clinical guidelines of Diabetes Canada. Many of the
process measures relevant to the primary care management of congestive heart failure are
drug-based, and these care processes are congruent with the Canadian Cardiovascular
Society (CCS) clinical guidelines (Ezekowitz et al., 2017). Process measures relevant to
the primary care management of chronic kidney disease include: testing of serum
creatinine and urine albumin-to-creatinine ratio (ACR), and prescription of ACEIs (or
ARBs) and statins (Tu et al., 2017); these quality indicators are congruent with clinical
guidelines of the Canadian Society of Nephrology (Levin et al., 2008). Relevant literature
on the process-outcome link for process measures related to the primary care
management of diabetes, congestive heart failure and chronic kidney disease is presented
in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.
The various measures for outcome of care include mortality risk and avoidable
hospitalizations (Ansari, 2007; Parchman & Culler, 1994; Starfield et al., 2005).
Mortality risk score (MRS) is an estimate of an individual’s all-cause risk of death within
one year as per an algorithm by Austin and Walraven (2011). An avoidable
hospitalization refers to hospitalization due to an ambulatory care sensitive conditions
which are conditions for which “timely and effective outpatient care can help to reduce
the risks of hospitalization by either preventing the onset of an illness or condition,
controlling an acute episodic illness or condition, or managing a chronic disease or
condition”(p.163)(Billings et al., 1993).
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In general, a physician’s remuneration package is often defined by the mode of
payment (e.g., fee-for-service, capitation or salary) and/or the presence of financial
incentives such as P4P schemes (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014). Such schemes were
designed to improve care in many ways; for one, it standardizes clinical practice by
motivating physicians to adhere to the same evidence-based care processes (Christianson
et al., 2006). For another, it aims to reduce care gaps; according to the literature, actual
levels of physicians’ adherence to evidence-based care processes are well below ideal
(Khadilkar et al., 2014; Ornstein & Jenkins, 1999; Shah et al., 2009; Shubrook et al.,
2010). For instance, a national registry in the United States found that: of the 603,014
patients with CHF who were eligible for prescription of mineralocorticoid receptor
antagonists (MRA) drugs, only 36.1% of them received MRAs (Zannad et al., 2012).
Similarly, results from the study by Oude Wesselink et al. (2015) support that there are
care gaps in management of chronic conditions. Using data on persons diagnosed with
diabetes mellitus from 18 primary care groups in Netherlands, this study found that the
adherence level greatly varied for different process measures: 91% (interquartile range
(IQR): 85% - 100%) of patients received annual HbA1c testing, 28% (IQR: 10% - 43%),
and 33% (IQR):12% - 49%) received annual eye and foot examination, respectively
(Oude Wesselink et al., 2015). The Guideline Adherence to Enhance Care (GUIDANCE)
study by Stone et al., (2013) had similar findings as Oude Wesselink et al. (2015). Stone
et al., (2013) assessed adherence levels for diabetes in primary and specialist care across
eight European countries, namely, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom and found that adherence level varied
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across process indicators: the adherence level of HbA1c testing was 97.6% (95%
confidence interval (CI): 97.3% - 98.0%), while that of ACR assessment was 59.4%
(95% CI: 58.3% - 60.5%) (Stone et al., 2013). Likewise, Khadilkar, Whitehead, Taljaard,
& Manuel (2014) evaluated the adherence level of diabetes process measures for
members of the Canadian Forces and found that adherence level of annual foot
examination was 15.9% (95% CI: 12.3% -19.5%), while that of HbA1c testing was 75.3%
(95% CI: 71.0% - 79.5%).
The remainder of this chapter presents findings from the literature related to the
relationship between physicians’ remuneration and care quality insofar as management of
diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure and chronic kidney are concerned.
Pay-for-performance incentives and care quality
The existing literature has mixed evidence regarding the impact of P4P programs
on care quality; while some studies found that the introduction of such incentives were
associated with an improvement in care quality, others found no such association.
Ryan, Krinsky, Kontopantelis, & Doran, (2016) examined the impact of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) on mortality reduction in the United Kingdom
(UK) population. The QOF is the largest primary care P4P program in the world, and was
introduced to UK’s primary care in 2004 (Pandya et al., 2018; Ryan et al., 2016). An aim
of this P4P incentive is to improve quality of care management for specific health
conditions including diabetes mellitus and chronic kidney disease. Using data between
1994 and 2010, Ryan et al. examined whether reduction in sex-adjusted and age-adjusted
mortality per 100,000 ensued after the QOF was introduced—and mortality was due to a
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composite of health conditions targeted by the QOF (Ryan et al., 2016). The authors
created a ‘synthetic control group consisting of 27 nations, which correspond to the UK
population without the introduction of the QOF. The authors’ post-intervention period
was 2004 – 2010 inclusive (i.e., 7 years after the introduction of QOF), and 1994 – 2003
served as the pre-intervention period. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis,
Ryan et al. (2016) found that the reduction in mortality that was observed was not
statistically significant, and therefore concluded that introduction of this P4P scheme was
not associated with reduction in population mortality due to the targeted conditions.
O’Connor et al. (2020) found that improvement in diabetes care in the Republic of
Ireland followed the introduction of the cycle of care (COC) program, a P4P scheme
designed exclusively for the management of diabetes mellitus. Under the COC, general
practitioners receive €30 for each registered patient, and are remunerated €100 per caput
annually for two patient visits (O’Connor et al., 2020). This financial incentive was
introduced to Ireland’s primary care on October 2015; the authors used the years 2014
and 2017 as the pre-COC and post-COC periods, respectively; and data from these
periods were obtained for 3,146 persons with type 2 diabetes. Results showed that rates
of testing for HbA1c, total cholesterol, creatinine, ACR ratio, and blood pressure
increased by 45%, 40%, 71%, 32%, and 37%, respectively. Moreover, the 2017 postCOC rates of these diabetes care process were comparable to those in the 2015-2016
United Kingdom National Diabetes Audit (UKNAD) post QOF. For instance, 95% of
persons with diabetes in the UK received HbA1c testing, and 98% of the patients in the
study by O’Connor et al. (2020) received this process measure.
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Numerous studies have investigated the effect of the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program (HRRP), a P4P program that was set up by the Centres for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2010 (Fischer et al., 2015; Wadhera et al., 2019). The
CMS is under the US Department of Health and Human Services, and oversees Medicare
and Medicaid—where the two are government-run programs that provide healthcare
coverage for American residents (Galan, 2020). The HRRP applies financial penalties to
hospitals with unexpectedly high rates of 30-day all-cause readmission after
hospitalization for specific conditions such as congestive heart failure, acute myocardial
infarction and pneumonia (Fischer et al., 2015; Wadhera et al., 2019). Though the HRRP
was announced in March 2010, it was implemented as of October 2012 (Desai et al.,
2016); a hospital is subject to the financial penalty only when its 30-day all-cause
readmission rates surpasses those of the nation, on average (Boccuti & Casillas, 2015);
patient demographics such as illness severity are accounted for when comparing hospital
readmission rates with national average estimates.
Using interrupted time series analyses on US-wide data, Desai et al. (2016)
investigated whether a reduction in the 30-day all-cause readmission rate—after
discharge from CHF-related hospitalizations—ensued between April 2010 and September
2012 (i.e., the time period between HRRP announcement and its implementation). The
authors compared this rate between 2,214 and 1,108 hospitals that were and were not
subject to the HRRP, respectively. Desai et al. (2016) found that the rate was
significantly (p<0.001) lower for hospitals subjected to the HRRP (Difference in
annualized rate of change= -1.25 %). However, this finding contrasts with conclusions of
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Mellor et al. (2017) who investigated the effect of the HRRP in hospitals across Virginia
state (Mellor et al., 2017). Using data from the years 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2014,
Mellor et al. (2017) found that the HRRP did not lower the risk of 30-day readmissions
after CHF-related discharges. This finding is congruent with results from the study by
McGarry et al. (2016) who evaluated the effect the HRRP in hospitals across New York
state in two post-HRRP periods; the first period was from the 4th quarter (i.e., between
October and December inclusive) of 2011 to the 4th quarter of 2012, while second period
was from the 1st quarter of 2013 to November 2013. The authors used DID analyses on
2008 to 2013 data, and their main outcome of interest was 30-day readmission rates after
discharges related to CHF, acute myocardial infraction and pneumonia (McGarry et al.,
2016). McGarry et al. (2016) found that, compared to a pre-HRRP period, there was no
change in the readmission rates in the first period, nor in the second period.
Findings from other international studies, such as the one by Lalloué et al. (2017),
have also contributed to the mixed body of evidence. The authors evaluated the effect a
P4P program for all acute care hospitals across France, namely, the Financial Incentive to
Quality Improvement (‘Incitation financière à l’amélioration de la qualité’ (IFAQ)). The
goal of IFAQ is to improve hospitals’ management of various conditions including renal
failure and acute stroke (Eckhardt et al., 2019). Under this program, only the top 20% of
healthcare providers with highest care performance are financially rewarded, and the
remuneration ranges between €15,000 and €500,000 (Eckhardt et al., 2019). Though
IFAQ was implemented in 2016, it was experimentally introduced in 2012; the work of
Lalloué et al. (2017) was a pilot study investigating the program’s impact in its
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experimental phase. The authors used 2009 to 2011 as the pre-intervention period; 2011
to 2013 represented the intervention period. In Lalloué et al. (2017), the treated and
control groups corresponded to the 185 and 192 hospitals that did and did not receive
IFAQ. The outcome was a weighted composite score of quality indicators—where higher
scores indicate better quality. Using a DID analysis, the authors found that introduction
of IFAQ did not impact quality (Lalloué et al., 2017).
As mentioned earlier, chronic kidney disease management is important as it
delays the condition’s progression to ESRD; as mentioned earlier, kidney transplantation
or dialysis is essential for persons with ESRD to remain alive (Molony & Craig, 2009).
The Taiwan National Health Insurance (TNHI), which is Taiwan’s mandatory, singlepayer health insurance system that covers 99% of the country’s residents, launched the
pre-ESRD P4P program in 2006 (Hsieh et al., 2017). The TNHI developed this program
to reduce the incidence of ESRD by improving quality of CKD care (hence the term ‘preESRD’). A feature of this P4P program is that a multidisciplinary team of healthcare
providers enrol persons with CKD who voluntarily chose to be enrolled for pre-ESRD
care; such teams are entitled to be remunerated an equivalent of US$40 for a patient’s
initial enrollment visit; an equivalent of US$20 is rewarded for each follow-up visit with
a patient. Furthermore, financial rewards are provided for attainment of targeted health
outcomes; for instance, a bonus payment is received if enrollees’ estimated glomerular
filtration rate (eGFR) is lowered to below 4 mL/min/1.73 m2 within one year after
enrolment to pre-ESRD program (Lin et al., 2018). Using retrospective cohort design, Lin
et al. (2018) examined the impact of the pre-ESRD P4P program on quality of CKD care
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and mortality. Subjects were patients who initiated dialysis between 2007 and 2009 and
eventually received dialysis for over three months; the P4P group constituted the
subpopulation of subjects enrolled in the pre-ESRD P4P program, while non-enrolees
corresponded to the non P4P group. Lin et al. (2018) found that the pre-ESRD P4P
program improved CKD care quality. In one year prior to dialysis, the frequency of
patients’ eGFR measurement was significantly higher (p<0.001) in the P4P group
(median=8, IQR: 5 – 12) than in the non-P4P group (median=5, IQR: 2 – 9). The authors
also found that, enrolees had a significantly lower 3-year mortality risk post-dialysis than
their counterparts who were not under the pre-ESRD program (Hazard Ratio (HR)=0.77,
95%CI: 0.73 – 0.82) (Lin et al., 2018).
While CKD was not initially among the targeted conditions of UK’s QOF, this
condition was included in this P4P scheme as of April 2006 (Karunaratne et al., 2013).
Not only is hypertension a major risk factor of CKD, it progresses the condition; and
ESRD is a consequence of this progression (Karunaratne et al., 2013). The impact of
QOF renal indicators on care quality for persons with CKD was examined by
Karunaratne et al. (2013). Given that hypertension is strongly related to CKD, some of
the QOF renal indicators are: the measurement of blood pressure, and its control through
effective management (i.e., attainment of 140/185 mmHg or less) (Karunaratne et al.,
2013). In regards to the introduction of UK’s QOF renal indicators, the authors’ preintervention period spanned April 1, 2004 and March 31, 2006; the first and second postintervention periods corresponded to April 1, 2006 to March 31, 2008, and April 1, 2008
to March 31, 2010 (Karunaratne et al., 2013). Karunaratne et al. (2013) concluded that
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the renal indicators of QOF improved CKD care in the two post intervention periods. For
instance, average blood pressure dropped from 143/78 mmHg in the pre-intervention
period to 140/76 mmHg in the first post intervention period (p<0.01) (Karunaratne et al.,
2013).
Richardson (2013) investigated the effect of the QOF program, on the quality of
primary care for CKD using two process indicators: blood pressure measurement within
15 months and prescription of ACEI/ARBs. Using April 2004 to November 2005 as the
pre-QOF period, the authors found that implementation of QOF was associated with a
2.7 percentage point increase (p<0.001) in practices’ adherence to the CKD process
indicators (Richardson, 2013).
Mode of payment and quality of care
While there is a plethora of studies on P4P schemes and care quality, far fewer
ones specifically evaluate the impact of mode of payment (e.g., FFS and capitation) on
physician’s quality of care. Some studies found that quality of care under FFS- and
capitation-based payments is different, while others found that care quality under the two
is same.
A cross-sectional analyses by Kiran, Victor, Kopp, Shah, & Glazier (2014) found
that the odds of an individual with diabetes receiving HbA1c testing, lipid measurement,
and eye examination in Ontario was significantly higher in blended capitation than in
blended fee-for-service (Odds Ratio (OR) =1.18, 95% CI :1.09 – 1.27). On the other
hand, Jaakkimainen et al. (2011) in their cross-sectional study found that physicians in
blended capitation and blended FFS were not significantly different in terms of their
30

adherence to process measures for diabetes. The varying conclusions could be due to the
two studies using different time periods (Jaakkimainen et al., 2011; Kiran et al., 2014).
For instance, the observation period used by Jaakkimainen et al. (2011) spanned 2004 to
2007, while Kiran et al. (2014) used 2006 to 2008 data. Furthermore, payment type was
defined differently between the two studies; blended capitation constituted solely FHNs
in Jaakkimainen et al. (2011), while Kiran et al. (2014) grouped FHOs and FHNs in their
definition of blended capitation.
Physicians under different remuneration mechanisms can respond differently to
the same financial incentive. The Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) is a P4P
scheme that financially rewards physicians for delivering care processes in accordance
with Diabetes Canada’s clinical guidelines. Using data from 2006 to 2010, Kantarevic &
Kralj (2013) found that patients enrolled to physicians in Family Health Organizations
were more likely to receive DMI services by 8.43% (p<0.01), compared to patients
enrolled to physicians in Family Health Groups; furthermore, physicians in FHOs were
more likely to participate in the DMI by 11.53% (p<0.01) compared to their counterparts
in FHGs (Kantarevic & Kralj, 2013).
The cross-sectional study by Jaakkimainen et al. (2011) compared care processes
by blended FFS and blended capitation physicians in terms of two CHF quality
indicators, namely, prescription of ACEIs or ARBs, and receipt of echocardiogram within
a year of CHF diagnosis. The study found that physicians under these two payment
schemes were not significantly different in terms of their adherence to these two CHF
process measures (Jaakkimainen et al., 2011). Using Ontario-specific data from 2005 to
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2006, cross-sectional analysis by Russell et al. (2009) found that physicians under FFSand capitation-based payment schemes were similar in terms of two CHF care processes,
namely, prescription of ACEIs or ARBs, and prescription of beta-blockers (Russell et al.,
2009).
Using a Cox proportional hazards regression, a study found that individuals with
CHF who received higher rates (defined as 32.4% – 37.9%) of physician follow-up
within 7 days of discharge, had a lower risk of all-cause 30-day readmission, compared to
their counterparts who received lower rates (less than 32.4%) of 7-day physician followup (HR=0.85, p<0.001) (Hernandez et al., 2010). Physicians’ follow-up visit, for persons
with CHF, within four weeks post-discharge is deemed a performance indicator by the
Canadian Cardiovascular Outcomes Research Team (CCORT) (Lee et al., 2003).
Furthermore, physician follow-up of patients with CHF within 7 days post-discharge is
also considered a performance indicator by ‘Health Quality Ontario’ (Health Quality
Ontario, 2018).
While quality of CKD care has been described in various jurisdictions (Bello et
al., 2019a; Eze, 2017; Gao, 2006; Nash et al., 2017), very few studies specifically
investigated the impact of physicians’ mode of remuneration on quality of CKD
management (Liddy, Singh, et al., 2011; Richardson, 2013). In a secondary analysis by
Liddy, Singh, et al. (2011), quality of CKD care was compared across 43, 27 and 12
Ontarian primary care practices constituted of family physicians in FFS, blended
capitation and salary remuneration systems, respectively. The data for the secondary
analyses came from a pragmatic trial named Improved delivery of cardiovascular care
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(IDOCC), which is an outreach facilitation designed to improve the delivery of evidencebased care in primary care practices across the eastern part of Ontario. Outreach
facilitation are educative programs for enhancing healthcare providers’ care performance
(Liddy, Hogg, et al., 2011). Quantification of eGFR per year was the only CKD quality
indicator examined, and this study found that there was no difference in the performance
of this indicator across the three payment systems. For instance, pairwise comparison of
the blended capitation vs. FFS practices found that the two were statistically similar for
eGFR measurement (OR=1.2, 95% CI: 0.6-2.3); nonetheless, the adherence level for this
process indicator was high in all three payment systems. For example, eGFR
measurement was performed for 1% (415/457), 93% (273/294), and 91% (107/117) of
patients in FFS, blended capitation and salary practices, respectively (Liddy, Singh, et al.,
2011).
The body of evidence pertaining to elements of physicians’ remuneration—such
as P4P schemes or mode of payment (e.g., FFS, and capitation)—and their quality of care
is inconclusive, and reasons for this mixed literature include different: study designs,
observation periods, definitions for controls, and jurisdiction of study population. Our
three studies specifically compare physicians’ payment mode (i.e., blended FFS and
blended capitation) on several processes of care and outcomes. Given that the FHG and
FHO models have the same P4P schemes (e.g., the Diabetes Management Incentive and
the Heart Failure Management Incentive), we argue that our comparisons also examine
whether impact of P4P schemes varies between a FFS or capitation environment. While
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the FHG and FHO models have P4P programs for diabetes and CHF care, these patient
enrollment models have no additional financial incentives for CKD care.
2.2

Appendix for Literature Review Chapter: Process-outcome link for
care processes related to management of diabetes mellitus, congestive
heart failure and chronic kidney disease

This section presents the detailed literature on the process-outcome relationship
for processes of care related to the primary care management of diabetes mellitus,
congestive heart failure and chronic kidney disease.
Diabetes mellitus
Glycated hemoglobin (or fructosamine) testing
Glycated hemoglobin testing has been recognized as the ‘gold standard’ for
measuring blood glucose concentration averaged over 120 days (Bunn, 1981; Klein et al.,
1987; Malik et al., 2000). While measuring plasma fructosamine is cheaper (and easier)
than measuring HbA1c, the former just reflects the average blood glucose concentration
over the preceding two weeks. Using persons with diabetes as cases and persons without
diabetes as controls, Malik et al. (2000) showed that while fructosamine testing is
positively correlated with HbA1c testing (Pearson’s correlation coefficient =0.6506,
p≤0.001), the sensitivity of the former was 29.7% as many patients who had normal
fructosamine levels, actually had abnormal levels of HbA1c. Thus, Malik et al. (2000)
concluded that plasma fructosamine testing is a poor substitute for HbA1c testing as it can
underestimate the proportion of individuals who actually have diabetes.
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A high HbA1c is a risk factor for developing complications related to diabetes
(Krishnamurti & Steffes, 2001). For instance, Klein, 1995; Klein, Klein, Moss, &
Cruickshanks, (1995) showed that, in type 2 diabetes, higher HbA1c levels at baseline
was significantly associated with a greater increase in 10-year incidence rate of
retinopathy (p<0.005). In addition, a high baseline level of HbA1c was also significantly
associated with (1) a greater 10-year incidence rate of proteinuria (p<0.0005), and (2)
greater risk for lower-extremity amputation (p<0.005) (Klein, 1995). For individuals with
type 2 diabetes, one percentage point increase in HbA1c level was significantly associated
with an increased risk of mortality due to ischemic heart disease (HR=1.10, 95% (CI:
1.04 - 1.1.7), and was also significantly associated with an increased risk of mortality due
to stroke (HR=1.17, 95% CI: 1.05 – 1.30) (Klein, 1995).
Thus, HbA1c testing is prognostically relevant for persons with diabetes because
developing very morbid conditions can be a long-term consequence of having increased
levels of HbA1c (Klein, 1995). Moreover, the Diabetes Canada clinical guidelines
recommend that HbA1c levels should be quantified twice and thrice annually for persons
with diabetes who have, and have not, achieved glycemic control, respectively (Diabetes
Canada Clinical Practice Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018).
Prescription of glucose lowering drugs
The United Kingdom Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS), a randomized
controlled trial that commenced in 1977, was designed to establish whether there is an
association between intensive control of blood glucose levels and the occurrence of
microvascular (or macrovascular) complications in individuals with type 2 diabetes (UK
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Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group, 1998b); subjects were randomized to
conventional treatment (i.e., dietary regimen) or intensive treatment (i.e., glucoselowering medications). Results showed that the median HbA1c levels was significantly
lower in the intensive treatment group (7.0%) compared to the conventional group (7.9%)
(p<0.0001). Furthermore, in the UKPDS, a diabetes-related endpoint was defined by the
occurrence of any one of the following outcomes: (1) sudden death, (2) fatal or non-fatal
myocardial infraction, (3) death from hyperglycemia or hypoglycemia, (4) congestive
heart failure, (5) angina, (6) vitreous hemorrhage, (7) renal failure, (8) stroke, (9)
amputation, (10) retinal photocoagulation or (11) blindness in one eye or cataract
extraction. The ‘complication-free interval’ was defined as the follow-up time to when
50% of the patients had at least one of the 11 aforementioned diabetes-related endpoints.
Survival analysis in the UKPDS showed that the complication-free interval was
significantly longer in the intensive treatment group (14 years) compared to the
conventional group (12.7 years) (p=0.029). So, the UKPDS provided strong evidence to
support that intensive glucose lowering, compared to dietary intervention, is associated
with a lower risk of developing a diabetes-related complications in persons with this
disease (UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group, 1998b).
There are various glucose-lowering drugs, where metformin is the first-line
therapy for individuals with type 2 diabetes (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017;
Nathan et al., 2009); results from UKPDS showed that, for persons with diabetes, the
relative risk (RR) of developing any diabetes-related complication with metformin
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compared to conventional therapy was 0.68 (95% CI: 0.53 - 0.87) (UK Prospective
Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group, 1998a)
Moreover, prescription of glucose-lowering drugs is also congruent with the
Diabetes Canada clinical guidelines for diabetes management (Diabetes Canada Clinical
Practice Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018).
Blood pressure measurement and control
Hypertension is the clinical term for the condition where an individual’s blood
pressure is abnormally elevated, and this condition is more common in persons with
diabetes than in individuals without the disease (Arauz-Pacheco et al., 2003; Ganesh &
Viswanathan, 2011). For a diagnosis of hypertension, a person must have a ‘sustained’
blood pressure recording of at least 140/90 mmHg; the 140 and 90 mmHg refers to
systolic and diastolic pressure, respectively (Arauz-Pacheco et al., 2003; de Boer et al.,
2017). Diagnosis of hypertension is always based on multiple blood pressure
measurements that are each at least 140/90 mmHg, to rule out ‘white coat
hypertension’—which is the term for the transient hypertension that results from merely
seeing a physician (hence the term ‘white coat’). In ‘white coat hypertension’, a
normotensive individual can record a measurement of 140/90 mmHg or greater—albeit
only when in a clinic environment (Daskalopoulou et al., 2015; de Boer et al., 2017).
Data from the UKPDS was analyzed to evaluate the relationship between systolic
blood pressure and the risk of developing any diabetes-related complication (Adler et al.,
2000). In Adler et al. (2000), the risk of developing any diabetes-related complication—
except for cataract extraction—significantly increased with increasing systolic blood
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pressure in persons with diabetes (p<0.0001). On average, every 10mmHg reduction in
updated mean systolic blood pressure was significantly associated with a 12% reduction
in risk of any diabetes-related complication (Adler et al., 2000). So, the UKPDS
established that the risk of developing any diabetes-related complication, for persons with
diabetes, is greater when they have hypertension, relative to if they were normotensive.
Angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors and angiotensin II receptor blockers are
the recommended pharmacological treatment for individuals with type 2 diabetes who
have hypertension; ARBs are prescribed if the person is intolerant of ACEIs
(Daskalopoulou et al., 2015; Ganesh & Viswanathan, 2011). The UKPDS investigated
whether tight control of blood pressure prevents macrovascular and microvascular
complications in persons with diabetes who have hypertension (UKPDS 38, 1998). These
subjects were randomized to ‘tight control’ or ‘less tight control’; from an ethics
perspective, the control subjects could not be randomized to no form of treatment (hence
the ‘less tight control’). The primary outcome was the risk of developing any diabetesrelated complication. Results showed that the risk of a person with diabetes and
hypertension developing any diabetes-related complication was significantly lower in the
tight control group compared to the less tight control group (HR=0.76, 95% CI: 0.62 0.92, p=0.0046). Furthermore, Kaplan-Meier estimates showed that, compared to less
tight control, tight control was associated with a 24% risk reduction in developing any
diabetes-related complication (95%CI: 8% - 38%, p=0.0046).
In addition, The Action to Control Cardiovascular Risk in Diabetes blood
pressure (ACCORD BP) study was a randomized trial that aimed to investigate whether
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there is a difference in health outcome between intensive blood pressure control or
standard blood pressure control in patients with type 2 diabetes; the primary outcome in
this trial was a composite of (1) non-fatal myocardial infarction, (2) non-fatal stroke or
(3) mortality from cardiovascular causes. Intensive and standard blood pressure control
referred to using antihypertensive treatment with a target of less than 120 mmHg and 140
mmHg systolic blood pressure, respectively (ACCORD Study Group et al., 2010). The
intensive and standard (i.e., control) groups achieved a mean systolic blood pressure of
119.3 mmHg (95%CI: 118.9 mmHg - 119.7 mmHg) and 133.5 mmHg (95% CI: 133.1
mmHg - 133.8 mmHg), respectively. The risk of developing the primary outcome in the
intensive and standard therapy groups were not significantly different (HR=0.88, 95%CI:
0.73 - 1.06, p=0.20); nonetheless, the rate of non-fatal stroke was significantly higher in
the standard therapy group (HR= 0.63, 95% CI: 0.41 - 0.96, p=0.03) (ACCORD Study
Group et al., 2010).
As per the Diabetes Canada clinical guidelines for diabetes management, persons
with diabetes who have hypertension should aim to have their blood pressure at 130/80
mmHg or below. The guidelines also recommend that patients who have not been
diagnosed with hypertension should be tested for it once a year; the frequency of testing
should be more for individuals with diabetes who are already hypertensive (Diabetes
Canada Clinical Practice Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018).
Body mass index measurement
An underestimated condition of clinical and public health importance is obesity,
which is defined as the condition where an individual’s excess level of adiposity is
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pathological. Obesity can be measured using body mass index (BMI); a person’s BMI is
derived by dividing their weight (in kilograms) by the squared value of his/her height (in
metres2). Obesity is defined as having a BMI of greater than 30kg/m2 (Ofei, 2005).
Although many studies on obesity use this metric to define obesity, it is important to
know that this measure of adiposity is far from ideal because it does not account for an
individual’s body fat distribution; independent of a person’s height and total body weight,
fat distribution significantly impacts health. Abdominal fat (or abdominal obesity) can be
measured using waist circumference. For men, abdominal obesity is defined as having a
waist circumference (WC) of greater than 40 inches (or 101.6cm); for women, it is
defined as having a WC of greater than 35 inches (or 88.9cm) (Krentz, 2005). Wang,
Rimm, Stampfer, Willett, & Hu, (2005) compared the predictive power of BMI and WC
in diagnosing type 2 diabetes mellitus in men and found that both BMI and WC were
strong predictors for developing the metabolic disorder. However, WC was a relatively
stronger predictor than BMI (Wang et al., 2005). There exists a strong correlation
between obesity and type 2 diabetes; Kwon, Kim, Park, Park, & Cho (2017) performed a
meta-analysis that quantified the association between BMI and risk of all-cause mortality,
as well as risk of cardiovascular-specific mortality, in persons with diabetes. The authors
also examined whether there is a dose-response effect of BMI. Using a random-effects
model for their meta-analysis, Kwon et al. (2017) showed that the risk of all-cause
mortality decreased with increasing BMI up to 28kg/m2; however, the risk of all-cause
mortality increased as BMI exceeded 30kg/m2, and this significant (p<0.001) U-shaped
relationship between all-cause mortality risk and BMI had a BMI nadir of 28kg/m2 –
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30kg/m2. Likewise, the authors also found a significant non-linear relationship (p<0.001)
between BMI and risk of cardiovascular-specific mortality in persons with diabetes;
cardiovascular-specific mortality decreased as BMI increased from 22kg/m2 to 29kg/m2;
however, the risk of cardiovascular-specific mortality increased as BMI exceeded
31kg/m2 (Kwon et al., 2017). This U-shaped relationship between BMI and risk of
cardiovascular mortality had a BMI nadir from 29kg/m2 – 31kg/m2.Thus, findings from
Kwon et al. (2017) support that being underweight or overweight is associated with
higher mortality risk than being normal weight; simply put, the authors showed that the
risk of developing cardiovascular health problems is least when an individual’s BMI falls
within normal range (i.e., 18.5kg/m2 - 24.9kg/m2). The Diabetes Canada clinical
guidelines recommend that healthcare providers work with persons with diabetes in
achieving weight loss towards a normal BMI range (Diabetes Canada Clinical Practice
Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018).
Smoking cessation counselling
The literature supports that smoking is an established risk factor for developing
type 2 diabetes (Le Boudec et al., 2016); in addition, smoking is strongly associated with
other chronic conditions such as cardiovascular disease (Iino et al., 2004). Furthermore, a
systematic review and meta-analysis study showed that the risk of developing type 2
diabetes was greater in active smokers compared to persons who never smoked (Pan et
al., 2015). Moreover, counselling on smoking cessation is recommended by Diabetes
Canada for individuals with type 2 diabetes (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017).
Nephropathy screening and treatment
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According to expert opinion from Diabetes Canada, individuals with type 2
diabetes should annually be screened for nephropathy (i.e., the clinical term that
corresponds to kidney damage) as the metabolic disorder increases a person’s risk of
having kidney problems (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017). To screen for
nephropathy, random urine ACR and serum creatinine can be converted to estimated
glomerular filtration rate, a metric that corresponds to functioning of kidneys; a diagnosis
of chronic kidney disease is made when an individual’s random ACR is greater than
2.0mg/mmol and/ or eGFR less than 60mL/min/1.73m2 in at least 2 of 3 samples over a
three-month period (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017).
Randomized, placebo-controlled trials have shown that ACEIs and ARBs are
significantly associated with delayed progression of nephropathy in persons with diabetes
( Lewis et al., 2001; Ravid et al., 1993). In Ravid et al. (1993), normotensive people who
have diabetes were randomized to either placebo or ACEIs, and the absolute risk
reduction in overt proteinuria (i.e., a condition that is indicative of an unhealthy kidney)
for the ACEI group, compared to the placebo group, was 30% (95% CI: 15% - 45%);
furthermore, the ACEI group had significantly better renal function than the placebo
group (p<0.05). In Lewis et al. (2001), results from a randomized, placebo-controlled
trial showed that ARB use in persons with diabetes was associated with lower risk of
doubling in serum creatinine (RR= 0.71, 95% CI: 0.54 - 0.92, p=0.009), where doubling
of serum creatinine is often used as marker for worsening kidney function.
Foot examination
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Ulceration and amputation of the feet are one of the morbid consequences of
uncontrolled type 2 diabetes (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017). Lower-extremity
amputation affects up to 15% of people who have diabetes (Scott, 2013). Using a casecontrol study design, Mayfield, Reiber, Nelson, & Greene (2000) investigated whether
there is a preventive effect of foot examination in Pima Indians; this ethnic group is
known to have the highest prevalence of diabetes mellitus compared to any other
population (Baier & Hanson, 2004; Booth et al., 2017; Mayfield et al., 2000). Cases and
controls were identified from January 1st, 1985 to December 31st, 1992; cases were Pima
Indians who had foot amputations, while controls where their counterparts who did not
have it. All subjects’ information were abstracted from medical charts (Mayfield et al.,
2000). Mayfield et al. (2000) hypothesized that any form of foot examination lowered the
odds of having a foot amputation; however, the authors’ results were not statistically
significant, (OR = 0.55, 95% CI: 0.17-1.70, p=0.31). Despite an absence of evidence
suggesting that foot examination significantly reduces the risk of foot amputation, expert
opinion from Diabetes Canada recommends that individuals with diabetes should
undergo a foot examination annually (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017).
Eye examination
Klein, Klein, Moss, Davis, & DeMets (1989) determined the four-year incidence
of retinopathy for individuals with type 2 diabetes in The Wisconsin Epidemiologic Study
of Diabetic Retinopathy (WESDR) study. The four-year incidence (95% CI) of any form
of retinopathy (or progression of retinopathy) among people with diabetes who were and
weren’t on insulin therapy was 47.4% (95% CI: 39.5% - 55.3%) and 34.4% (95% CI:
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29.2% - 39.6%), respectively (Klein et al., 1989); these results are congruent with
findings from other studies which showed that insulin use was associated with a higher
occurrence of diabetic retinopathy relative to no insulin use (Zhao et al., 2014). Finding
from the WESDR study has been used by various scientific associations, including
Diabetes Canada, to support the practice of performing eye examinations on individuals
with diabetes (Canadian Diabetes Association, 2017).
In addition, The Liverpool Diabetic Eye Study, which was a prospective cohort
study, showed that the yearly incidence of any form of retinopathy increased from
baseline for people with diabetes; the cumulative incidence in year 1 and year 4 were
5.3% (95% CI:4.6% -6.0%) and 25.2% (95% CI:23.3% -27.1%), respectively (Younis et
al., 2003). According to Diabetes Canada, eye examinations should generally be
performed annually in individuals with type 2 diabetes (Canadian Diabetes Association,
2017).
Lipid assessment and statin prescription
Type 2 diabetes mellitus increases an individual’s risk of stroke and coronary
heart disease by 2 to 4-fold (Colhoun et al., 2004). The Collaborative Atorvastatin
Diabetes Study (CARDS) was a randomized, placebo-controlled trial that aimed to
investigate the effect of statin drugs in the primary prevention of cardiovascular diseases
for individuals with type 2 diabetes. In the CARDS, use of statin—compared to
placebo—was associated with a significantly lower risk of developing a stroke (HR=
0.52, 95% CI: 0.31-0.89) and acute coronary events (HR= 0.64, 95% CI: 0.45-0.91)
(Colhoun et al., 2004). Thus, findings from Colhoun et al. (2004) serve as evidence to
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support the prophylactic use of statins for people with diabetes; furthermore, expert
opinion supports that individuals with the metabolic disorder should have their lipid
profile measured at least once yearly (Diabetes Canada Clinical Practice Guidelines
Expert Committee, 2018).
Congestive heart failure
In the literature, congestive heart failure—or simply heart failure—can exist in
two forms, namely, heart failure with reduced ejection fraction (HFrEF) or heart failure
with preserved ejection fraction (HFpEF). These two forms of CHF are distinct in terms
of their pathophysiology and prognosis (Borlaug, 2013). Process of care for CHF is
defined more precisely for HFrEF than for HFpEF (Ponikowski et al., 2016), and the
process indicators discussed herein pertain to HFrEF.
The following process measures, relevant for a primary care context, are: (1)
prescription of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors, or angiotensin II receptor
blockers, or hydralazine with isorbide dinitrate (H-ISDN), or angiotensin neprilysin
inhibitors (ARNIs), (2) prescription of beta blockers (BB), (3) prescription of digoxin, (4)
digoxin monitoring, (5) prescription of anticoagulants, (6) prescription of aldosterone
receptor antagonists (ARAs), (7) prescription of diuretics, (8) evaluation of left
ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF), (9) cardiovascular physical examination, (10) no
prescription of type I antiarrhythmic drugs, (11) no prescription of calcium channel
blockers, (12) no prescription of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) and
(13) patient counselling. Herein, we present some evidence on the process-outcome link
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for all these indicators; furthermore, these care processes are congruent with the
Canadian Cardiovascular Society clinical guidelines (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors
The Studies of Left Ventricular Dysfunction (SOLVD) study, a randomized
double-blind, placebo-controlled trial showed that the risk of all-cause mortality was
significantly lower in the persons with CHF who used ACEIs compared to their
counterparts who used placebo (Risk Reduction=17%, 95% CI: 5% – 27%) in a 48month follow-up period. Furthermore, compared to the placebo group, the risk of
hospitalization or mortality due to heart failure was significantly lower in the ACEI group
(Risk Reduction= 27%, 95% CI: 18% – 34%). This study has been among the highly
cited sources of high-quality evidence to support the prescription of ACEIs for people
who have CHF (SOLVD investigators, 1991).
In terms of natural history of CHF, patients are characterized by two unfavourable
outcomes, namely, (1) left ventricular dilation and (2) systolic dysfunction. Konstam et
al. (1992) investigated the patient population in the SOLVD trial (i.e., persons with CHF)
to determine the effect of chronic use of ACEIs on progression of systolic function and
left ventricular dilation, and the study by Konstam et al. (1992) showed that chronic use
of ACEI therapy prevents or reverses progression of CHF. In the ACEI group, LVEF was
25% ± 7% at baseline and increased to 29% ± 8% at 1 year follow-up (p=0.01); in the
placebo group, LVEF was 25% ± 5% at baseline but 24% ± 8% at 1 year follow-up and
the difference was statistically non-significant (Konstam et al., 1992).
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The CCS clinical guidelines recommends that persons with CHF be treated with ACEI
(Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of angiotensin II receptor blockers
A substantial proportion of persons with CHF exhibit symptoms of ACEI
intolerance, such as painful coughs; thus, Angiotensin II Receptor Blockers are an
alternative therapy for this population of persons with CHF (Granger et al., 2003). The
Candesartan in Heart Failure-Assessment of Reduction in Mortality and Morbidity
(CHARM) study (Swedberg et al., 1999) was a program of randomized trials aimed to
investigate the prognostic effects of ARB use in persons with CHF; CHARM constituted
three independent, parallel, placebo-controlled randomized trials for three types of
patients: (1) patients with LVEF ≤40% and who were on ACEI (the CHARM-Added
trial), (2) patients with LVEF ≤40% and who were ACEI intolerant (the CHARMAlternative trial), and (3) patients with LVEF > 40% and who were not treated with
ACEI (the CHARM-Preserved trial). Patients were randomized to either placebo or ARB
in all the three CHARM trials; the overarching hypothesis in these three studies was that
use of ARBs is associated with a reduced risk of all-cause mortality in the three
populations of CHF. The median follow-up period was 37.7 months, and findings from
the overall CHARM trial (i.e., all three populations of CHF combined) demonstrated that
the risk of all-cause mortality was significantly lower in ARB group compared to the
placebo group (HR= 0.90, 95% CI: 0.80 – 0.99). The significantly lower risk of all-cause
mortality in the ARB group was attributed to this group having a significantly lower risk
of (cardiovascular disease (CVD)-specific mortality compared to placebo (HR= 0.87,
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95% CI: 0.78 – 0.96). In addition, the risk of hospitalization due to CHF was also lower
in the ARB group compared to placebo group (HR= 0.77, 95% CI: 0.70 – 0.84) (Pfeffer
et al., 2003; Swedberg et al., 1999).
As per the CCS clinical guidelines, persons with CHF are recommended to be
treated with ARB if they are ACEI intolerant (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of angiotensin neprilysin inhibitors
The first angiotensin neprilysin inhibitor to be tested in patients with CHF was
referred to as LCZ696 in the Prospective comparison of ARNI with ACEI to Determine
Impact on Global Mortality and morbidity in Heart Failure (PARADIGM-HF) study
(McMurray et al., 2013). The PARADIGM-HF trial was a randomized, double-blind,
parallel-group, active-controlled trial, that compared the effects of LCZ696 and ACEI in
persons with CHF; the median follow-up period was 27 months. LCZ696 use was
significantly associated with more favourable clinical outcomes than use of ACEI as the
risk of cardiovascular mortality was significantly lower in the ARNI group compared to
the ACEI group (HR= 0.80, 95% CI: 0.71 – 0.89); likewise, the risk of all-cause
mortality was significantly lower (HR= 0.84, 95% CI: 0.76 – 0.93); the risk of
hospitalization due to CHF was significantly lower as well (HR= 0.79, 95% CI: 0.71 –
0.89). The therapeutic use of ARNI for persons with CHF was approved in Canada by
2015.
Prescription of hydralazine and isorbide dinitrate
The African American Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT)—the first randomized trial,
for CHF, that defined its study subjects by race—investigated the effect of CHF
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pharmacotherapy on persons who identified as being of Black race (Taylor et al., 2002).
This study was a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial where subjects (i.e.,
persons of Black race) on standard therapy (i.e., ACEIs), were randomized to either
placebo or the combination drug hydralazine with isorbide dinitrate. A strong rationale
for the conduct of the A-HeFT trial was based on the literature which supports that
persons of African American ancestry, on average, do not respond favourably to first-line
CHF pharmacotherapy (i.e., ACEIs) the way individuals of Caucasian race—on
average—would. For instance, in the SOLVD trial, there was an excess of mortality and
hospitalizations in the subgroup of individuals who were of African American ancestry
(Taylor et al., 2002). Another rationale for the conduct of the A-HeFT trial was the fact
that persons of African American ancestry, in general, are under-represented in many
randomized trials, as well as observational studies (Sankaré et al., 2015; Taylor et al.,
2002).
The primary outcome in the A-HeFT trial was a composite score of weighted
values for: (i) all-cause mortality, (ii) hospitalization due to CHF at 18-months of followup and (iii) change in Quality of Life (QoL) scores at six months of follow up; a more
positive composite score indicated more favourable clinical outcomes. The A-HeFT trial
was terminated early because the mortality rate was significantly higher in the placebo
group compared to H-ISDN group. There was no loss to follow-up in this trial, and the
mean follow-up period was 10 months. At trial termination, the composite score in the HISDN group was significantly more positive than the composite score in the placebo
group (p=0.01). Furthermore, each of the three individual components of the composite
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score was significantly more favourable in the H-ISDN group compared to the placebo
group. Relative to the placebo group, subjects on H-ISDN had a significantly lower allcause mortality risk (p=0.02), significantly lower risk of first hospitalization due to CHF
(p= 0.001) and a significantly higher QoL score at six months (p=0.02) (Taylor et al.,
2004).
The CCS clinical guidelines recommends that the combination drug H-ISDN be
used for persons with CHF who are of Black race and have advanced symptoms. This
guideline also recommends H-ISDN for all persons with CHF who are intolerant to
ACEI, ARB or ARNI due to renal pathology or hyperkalemia (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of beta blockers
A randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial by Packer et al. (1996)
investigated the safety of beta blockers in CHF; persons with CHF on standard therapy
(such as ACEIs, diuretics, etc.) were randomized either to receive either placebo or a beta
blocker. Results from this trial showed that use of beta blocker was associated with
significantly lower risk of all-cause mortality (Risk Reduction= 65%, 95% CI: 39% –
80%) (M Packer et al., 1996).
In addition, the CCS clinical guidelines recommends that persons with CHF be
prescribed beta blockers in addition to standard therapy (e.g., on ACEIs or ARBs or
ARNIs) (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of aldosterone receptor antagonists
Aldosterone receptor antagonists, which are also referred to as mineralocorticoid
receptor antagonists, have been shown to be associated with favourable outcomes in
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patients with CHF (Zannad et al., 2012). The Randomized Aldactone Evaluation Study
(RALES) trial was the first randomized trial to investigate the effect of MRAs on
morbidity and mortality in persons with CHF (Pitt et al., 1999). In this trial, subjects on
standard therapy (including ACEIs), were randomized to MRA or placebo; the RALES
trial was halted as favourable outcomes associated with MRA use had already been
observed after a mean follow-up period of 24 months. The risk of mortality due to
progressive heart failure was lower in the MRA group compared to the placebo group
(Relative risk= 0.64, 95% CI: 0.51 – 0.80); similarly, the risk of hospitalization due to
worsening heart failure was lower in the MRA group (RR=0.65, 95% CI: 0.54 – 0.77).
The CCS clinical guidelines recommend that persons with CHF be treated with
MRAs, in addition to standard therapy (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of digoxin
For over 200 years, use of digoxin has been indicated for individuals with CHF
who have a normal sinus rhythm, lower heart rate and increased myocardial contractility
(Sebastiano et al., 2015). Over the past several decades, the safety and efficacy of
Digoxin has been scrutinized especially since the advent of first-line therapies such as
ACEIs (Sebastiano et al., 2015). In the Randomized Assessments of [the effect of]
Digoxin on Inhibitors of the Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme (RADIANCE) study, a
randomized trial by Packer et al. (1993), persons with CHF, who were on ACEI and
diuretics, were randomized to receive either digoxin or placebo. The RADIANCE trial
showed that the relative risk of worsening heart failure was higher in the placebo group
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compared to the digoxin group (RR=5.9, 95% CI: 2.1 – 17.2, p<0.001) during a followup period of 12 weeks (Packer et al., 1993).
Like the RADIANCE study, another randomized trial by the Digitalis
Investigation Group (1997) investigated the prognostic effect of digoxin during a 52month follow-up (Digitalis Investigation Group, 1997); persons with CHF who had
normal sinus rhythm were randomized to receive either digoxin or placebo. This trial
found a trend where mortality due to worsening heart failure was greater in the placebo
group compared to the digoxin group (p=0.06); hospitalizations due to worsening heart
failure was significantly lower in the digoxin group compared to the placebo group
(Digitalis Investigation Group, 1997). Using propensity score matching on retrospective
data, Al-khateeb et al. (2017) found that use of digoxin—compared to no use of
digoxin—is associated with unfavourable patient outcomes in a contemporary CHF
cohort. Digoxin use was associated with an increase in all-cause mortality (HR= 1.74;
95% CI: 1.20 to 2.38; p<0.0001) (Al-khateeb et al., 2017). The authors argued that a lack
of digoxin monitoring could be a reason for the higher mortality observed with its use
(Al-khateeb et al., 2017) .
Adams et al. (2014) published a perspective regarding digoxin use and concluded
that the decline in digoxin use in over the past 20 years could be a result of the Digitalis
Investigation Group (DIG) trial demonstrating neutral effects on mortality and some
studies pointing towards possible harm from digoxin use in persons with CHF. Adams et
al. (2014) emphasized that digoxin use be considered given that it is inexpensive and
possibly being more therapeutic at lower doses (Adams et al., 2014).
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Kongkaew, Sakunrag, & Jianmongkol (2012) performed a systematic review of
observational studies, on the prevalence of Digoxin compliance in persons with only
CHF, only AF, and the two conditions; the authors reported that the prevalence of
Digoxin non-compliance is quiet substantial in patients with CHF and/or AF. The pooled
mean non-compliance prevalence rate was 25.10% (95% CI: 12.20% - 37.90%). Thus,
non-compliance for digoxin could partly explain the conflicting findings regarding its use
in the literature (Kongkaew et al., 2012).
As per the CCS clinical guidelines, digoxin can be considered for persons with
CHF with sinus rhythm and whose symptoms range between moderate and severe
(Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Digoxin monitoring
In general, the aim of therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) is to avoid drug toxicity
and increase drug efficiency in patients (Matzuk et al., 1991). Digoxin is a therapeutic
agent that has a narrow therapeutic range of 0.5-0.8 ng/ml (Rosenberg & Federiuk, 2003);
as a result, digoxin is supposed to be frequently monitored for both inpatients and
outpatients (Matzuk et al., 1991). It is also important to note that the serum concentration
of 0.5-0.8 ng/ml is a general therapeutic range because the therapeutic range varies from
patient to patient; simply put, a concentration that is toxic for one patient may fall within
the ‘therapeutic range’ of another. In addition, Matzuk et al. (1991) suggested that TDM
of digoxin could be cost-efficient to a health care system as regular monitoring can
reduce hospitalizations due to unfavourable outcomes from drug toxicity (Matzuk et al.,
1991).
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The CCS clinical guidelines for CHF recommends that patients be monitored
regularly for toxicity of digoxin (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of anticoagulants
Congestive heart failure is associated with (1) being in a hypercoagulable state
and (2) higher mortality due to atherothrombotic events, and, therefore, use of
anticoagulants has been indicated for persons with CHF (Homma et al., 2012). Use of
anticoagulants (such as warfarin) in CHF has been a subject of investigation for at least a
half a century (Bhatia et al., 2009).
Bhatia et al. (2009) reported how clinical suggestions regarding anticoagulant use
were inconsistent across various clinical expert groups—such as those affiliated with the
American Heart Association, Heart Failure Society of America, and American College of
Chest Physicians. Bhatia et al. (2009) reviewed the literature on whether the use of
anticoagulants for CHF is associated with favourable or unfavourable patient outcomes,
and the authors found that some studies support use of it, while others show no benefit of
persons with CHF using it. In the literature, use of anticoagulants is associated with
reduced rates of embolic events and reduced rates of mortality; however in many of those
studies, subjects had atrial fibrillation and clinically significant valvular disease (Homma
et al., 2012).
Aspirin is a pharmacological agent with anticoagulant properties, and its use in
CHF has also been controversial in the literature (Bermingham et al., 2014; Massie,
2005). In the Warfarin versus Aspirin in Reduced Cardiac Ejection Fraction (WARCEF)
study, a randomized, multi-centre, double-blind trial, the efficacy of Warfarin was
54

investigated in persons with CHF who had sinus rhythm; the trial excluded CHF patients
with atrial fibrillation (Homma et al., 2012). This trial showed that the risk of ischemic
stroke was significantly lower in the warfarin group compared to the aspirin group (HR=
0.52, 95% CI: 0.33 – 0.82). For other patient outcomes such as risk of all-cause mortality
and risk of hospitalization, the WARCEF trial showed that there were no significant
differences between the two groups for these two treatments (Homma et al., 2012).
Two other randomized trials also investigated and compared the effect of aspirin
and warfarin on health outcome for persons with CHF and who have sinus rhythm,
namely the Warfarin/Aspirin Study in Heart Failure (WASH) and Warfarin and
Antiplatelet Therapy in Chronic Heart Failure (WATCH) trials (Bermingham et al.,
2014). Bermingham et al. (2014) reported how the WASH and WATCH trials reported
excess of hospitalization with aspirin use (Cleland et al., 2004; Massie et al., 2009); the
authors used propensity score methods to investigate the effect of low dose aspirin on risk
of mortality, as well as risk of hospitalization in persons with CHF; patients were
categorized as low-dose aspirin users (75mg aspirin daily), high-dose aspirin users
(greater than 75mg aspirin daily) and non-aspirin users. Multivariable analyses in the
study by Bermingham et al. (2014) showed that the risk of mortality was lower in the
low-dose aspirin group compared to high-dose group (HR=0.57, 95% CI: 0.35 – 0.92);
furthermore, the risk of mortality in the low dose aspirin group was lower than in the
non-aspirin use group (HR=0.58, 95% CI: 0.46 -0.74) (Bermingham et al., 2014).
Multivariable analyses showed that the risk of mortality was not statistically different
between the high-dose and no aspirin group (HR=0.98, 95% CI: 0.59 -1.63). The risk of
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hospitalization due to CHF was lower in the low-dose aspirin users compared to no
aspirin use (HR= 0.70, 95% CI: 0.54 – 0.90). The risk of hospitalization due to CHF was
lower in the high-dose aspirin users compared to no aspirin users (HR=0.50, 95% CI:
0.27 – 0.92). The risk of hospitalization when comparing low dose aspirin use with high
dose aspirin use was not statistically different (HR= 1.27, 95% CI: 0.70 – 2.30). Thus,
findings from Bermingham et al. (2014) support that use of aspirin at low-doses is
beneficial, and that the prognostic impact of aspirin is dependent on its dose—as would
any pharmacological agent.
The CCS clinical guidelines recommend that low dose of aspirin be used for
persons with CHF who have a clear indication for the prevention of secondary
atherosclerotic cardiovascular events; the guideline recommends against the use of
aspirin in persons with CHF with sinus rhythm (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Prescription of diuretics
Diuretics reduce pulmonary congestion and, therefore, using them provides
symptomatic relief for persons with CHF (Faris et al., 2002). A meta-analysis of four
randomized trials showed that the odds of worsening heart failure was lower for persons
with CHF taking diuretics compared to their counterparts on placebo (pooled OR= 0.31,
95% CI: 0.15 – 0.62) (Faris et al., 2002).
However, findings from Pellicori et al. (2016) contradicted findings from Faris et
al. (2002); while findings from the former supported the use of diuretics for persons with
CHF is beneficial, results from the latter showed that using diuretics is associated with
unfavourable outcomes in this patient population. Pellicori et al. (2016) performed a
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prospective cohort study to investigate the effect of diuretic use on the (1) risk of allcause mortality or (2) hospitalization due to CHF in persons with CHF. The authors
defined an adverse event to be the occurrence of either of these two outcomes (Pellicori
et al., 2016). Using a follow–up period of 5 years, survival analyses showed that use of
diuretics, at any dose (i.e., at least 10 mg), was associated with a higher risk of adverse
events compared to not using diuretics (HR=2.18, 95% CI:1.62 – 2.95); higher doses of
diuretics (i.e., greater than 40mg vs. no diuretic) further increased the risk of an adverse
event (HR= 2.95, 95% CI: 2.13 – 4.10) (Pellicori et al., 2016).
Furthermore, clinical guidelines for heart failure also allude to the cautious use of
diuretics (Ponikowski et al., 2016); as per the CCS clinical guidelines, diuretics are
recommended for persons with CHF if there is a need to control peripheral edema and/or
congestion (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Evaluation of left ventricular ejection fraction
When managing CHF, it is important to evaluate physiological measurements,
such as left ventricular ejection fraction (Edvardsen et al., 2006). Using a cohort study
design, Niebauer, Clark, Anker, & Coats, (1999) investigated the prognostic value of
LVEF in persons with CHF who have very low ejection fraction (EF) (i.e., EF≤20%); the
study was censored at 3 years of follow-up to mimic a clinically relevant time span. The
subjects were divided into 2 groups of EF where individuals in one group had an EF that
ranged between 11% and 20%, while members of the other group had EF≤10% (Niebauer
et al., 1999). These two groups were similar in baseline characteristics. The study showed
that, within each year, the risk of mortality was not significantly different among the two
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groups, and Niebauer et al. (1999) concluded that LVEF was a not a predictor of
mortality.
Curtis et al. (2003) analyzed data from the DIG trial, which was a randomized
trial that investigated the effect of digitalis (a pharmacological agent) on hospitalization
and mortality in persons with CHF who have stable sinus rhythm. This trial enrolled
subjects with varying EF and thus Curtis et al. (2003) was able to investigate the
prognostic value of evaluating LVEF in persons with CHF. Curtis et al. (2003) divided
the subjects according to six clinically meaningful ranges of EF: (1) EF≤ 15%, (2) EF=
16% - 25%, (3) EF= 26% - 35%, (4) EF=36% - 45%, (5) EF= 46% - 55% and (6) EF >
55%. All-cause mortality and death due to worsening HF were the outcomes and the
median follow-up period was 37 months. The study showed that mortality rates
increased, linearly, among patients whose EF value were within the first four ranges; e.g.,
the mortality rate in the LVEF ≤ 15% group and LVEF= 36% - 45% group, were 51.7%
and 25.6%, respectively, (p<0.001). However, mortality rates were not statistically
different for patients in the EF groups above 45% (Curtis et al., 2003). Thus, findings
from this study supports that evaluation of LVEF is of prognostic value as this
physiological measurement can predict health outcome.
Curtis et al. (2003) stated that prognostic value of LVEF in CHF declines once EF
falls below 25%, and this statement is congruent with the findings from Niebauer et al.
(1999)—where the previous study showed that there is no difference in mortality rates
between persons with CHF who have LVEF of 11% - 20% or LVEF ≤ 10%.
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The CCS clinical guidelines suggest that LVEF be measured once to thrice a year
in persons with CHF to monitor if ventricular function is improving or worsening
(Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Cardiovascular physical examination
In a cardiovascular physical examination, cardinal signs of heart failure, such as
elevated jugular venous pressure (JVP) and an S3 gallop (which is also referred to as a
third heartbeat sound), can be identified. Rame, Dries, & Drazner, (2003) discussed how
physicians nowadays, in general, are not performing cardiac physical examination. The
authors explained that the replacement of such examinations with newer technologies
resulted in fewer educators who can teach medical students how to conduct a
cardiovascular physical examination (Rame et al., 2003).
To identify whether S3 gallop or elevated JVP (i.e., two measures derived from a
cardiovascular physical examination) have a prognostic value in CHF, Rame et al. (2003)
performed a post hoc analysis on data from the SOLVD trial (Rame et al., 2003), a
randomized, placebo-controlled study that compared the effect of ACEI vs. placebo in
persons with CHF. The SOLVD trial had data on whether its subjects had both elevated
JVP and S3 gallop. Post hoc analysis showed that patients with an S3 gallop or elevated
JVP were significantly at a higher risk for unfavourable patient outcomes than patients
without these physical examination signs. For instance, the risk of all-cause mortality was
higher in patients with an elevated JVP (relative risk= 1.52, 95% CI: 1.27 – 1.82,
p<0.001) and an S3 gallop (relative risk= 1.35, 95% CI: 1.47 – 2.17, p<0.001). The risk of
heart failure-related hospitalization was higher in subjects with an elevated JVP (relative
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risk= 1.78, 95% CI: 1.47–2.17, p<0.001); likewise, the risk of heart failure-related
hospitalization was higher in those with an S3 gallop (relative risk= 1.70, 95% CI= 1.46–
1.97, p<0.001). Thus cardiovascular physical examination can enhance risk stratification
for persons with CHF (Rame et al., 2003).
Like Rame et al. (2003), Caldentey et al. (2014) investigated the prognostic value
of cardiovascular physical examination in a contemporary cohort of persons with CHF
who had a history of atrial fibrillation. The authors conducted a post hoc analysis on data
from a randomized study, namely the Atrial Fibrillation and Congestive Heart Failure
(AF-CHF) trial (Caldentey et al., 2014). Univariate analysis showed that an S3 gallop was
significantly associated with an increased risk of (1) all-cause mortality, (2)
cardiovascular mortality and (3) hospitalization due to CHF; upon multivariate analyses,
the statistical significance for all these three outcomes was lost—though a non-significant
trend of increased risk was maintained (Caldentey et al., 2014). The loss in statistical
significance could be due to a reduction in statistical power—where multivariate analyses
requires a greater sample size to maintain the same level of Type II error. Nonetheless,
multivariate analyses from this study showed that pulmonary rales (another
cardiovascular physical examination sign) was significantly associated with an increased
risk of (1) cardiovascular mortality (HR=1.43, 95%CI: 1.09 – 1.88, p=0.0097), (2) allcause mortality (HR= 1.32, 95% CI: 1.03 – 1.69, p=0.0286) and (3) hospitalization due to
CHF (HR=1.42, 95%CI: 1.05 – 1.90, p=0.0211) (Caldentey et al., 2014).
Notwithstanding the emerging technologies used for the diagnosis and prognosis
of cardiovascular ailments, Suh, Wong, & Krishnan, (2008) support that the practice of
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cardiovascular physical examination and documentation of medical history should not be
undermined. Furthermore, the authors produced a case report where interpretation of 12lead electrocardiogram (ECG), from an 80-yeard old male diagnosed with CHF, led to
accurate diagnosis; through the ‘older technology’, physicians were able to identify a
specific cardiomyopathy known as pacemaker syndrome, and this diagnosis led to
identifying a suitable therapeutic intervention (Suh et al., 2008).
The CCS clinical guidelines strongly endorses that persons with CHF undergo
cardiac physical examination (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
No prescription of type 1 antiarrhythmic drugs
Arrhythmia, the irregular rhythm of heart beat, is common in individuals
diagnosed with CHF, and it can lead to sudden mortality in persons with CHF (Køber et
al., 2008). Several types of antiarrhythmic drugs can be used to manage arrhythmia.
For instance, type 3 antiarrhythmic drugs have been associated with favourable
patient outcomes in persons diagnosed with CHF; for example, a multi-center,
prospective, randomized trial investigated the prophylactic effect of a low dose type 3
antiarrhythmic drug on mortality risk in patients who have no symptom of arrhythmia
(Doval et al., 1994). In the trial, patients with severe CHF were randomized to receive
either (1) standard therapy (i.e., ACEI) or (2) type 3 antiarrhythmic drug in low dose in
addition to standard therapy. The total mortality and hospitalization due to CHF was
significantly less for the group on the type 3 drug compared to the standard therapy group
(Doval et al., 1994).
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On the contrary, type 1 antiarrhythmic drugs have been associated with
unfavourable patient outcomes in CHF; evidence regarding the management of CHF with
type 1 antiarrhythmic drugs is mixed as the literature is filled with conflicting findings.
The Antiarrhythmic Trial with Dronedarone in Moderate to Severe CHF
Evaluating Morbidity Decrease (ANDROMEDA) study, a randomized, double-blind,
placebo-controlled trial, compared the effect of type 1 antiarrhythmic drug vs. placebo on
morbidity and mortality in persons with CHF. This trial showed that use of type 1
antiarrhythmic drug was significantly associated with all-cause mortality (HR= 2.19,
95% CI: 1.06 to 4.52, p=0.03), within a time period of 210 days (Køber et al., 2008).
While the findings from the ANDROMEDA study showed that use of type 1
antiarrhythmic drug is significantly associated with an higher risk of mortality, a post hoc
analyses of A Placebo-Controlled, Double-Blind, Parallel Arm Trial to Assess the
Efficacy of Dronedarone 400 mg bid for the Prevention of Cardiovascular
Hospitalization or Death from Any Cause in Patients with Atrial Fibrillation/Atrial
Flutter (ATHENA) study showed that use of type 1 antiarrhythmic drug is not associated
with an increased risk of mortality in patients with atrial fibrillation (AF) and CHF
(Hohnloser et al., 2009).
Such discrepancies in literature can be reconciled by understanding that, in many
studies pertaining to CHF, the study population may differ (e.g., CHF only vs. CHF with
AF). So, the nuances in how the trials defined their patient population, along with varying
inclusion and exclusion criteria, may partly account for these discrepant findings.

62

Chatterjee, Ghosh, Lichstein, Aikat, & Mukherjee, (2012) performed a systematic
review and meta-analysis on the cardiovascular effects of type 1 antiarrhythmic drug in
CHF or atrial fibrillation; data from the ATHENA (Hohnloser et al., 2009) and
ANDROMEDA (Køber et al., 2008) trials were included in this meta-analysis. The metaanalysis showed that type 1 antiarrhythmic drug use was non-significantly associated
with higher risk of all-cause and cardiovascular-specific mortality in patients with CHF
or AF. However, when Chatterjee et al. (2012) removed data from the ATHENA study,
type 1 antiarrhythmic use became significantly associated with higher risk of all-cause
mortality and cardiovascular specific mortality in persons with CHF or AF (Chatterjee et
al., 2012).
The only drug that the CCS clinical guidelines recommend for persons with CHF
who have arrhythmia is “Amiodarone”, which is a type 3 antiarrhythmic drug (Ezekowitz
et al., 2017).
No prescription of calcium channel blockers
According to an evidence-based review of CHF pharmacotherapies (Raj &
Adhyaru, 2016), calcium channel blockers should not be recommended for persons with
CHF because the evidence shows that use of them are either non-significantly associated
with slight benefits, or associated with unfavourable health outcomes.
The Mortality Assessment in Congestive Heart Failure Trial (MACH-1) (Levine
et al., 2000) was a randomized, multicenter, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial that
aimed to investigate the effect of using calcium channel blockers (CCBs) vs. placebo on
the risk of mortality and heart failure-related hospitalization in persons with CHF. The
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trial showed that there was no significant difference between CCB and placebo use for
these outcomes. However, in the first three months, there was a trend where the risk of
all-cause mortality was higher in the CCB group compared to placebo (Levine et al.,
2000).
Cleophas & van Marum, (2001) performed a meta-analysis of randomized trials
that compared the effect of placebo and second generation CCBs on mortality and
morbidity for persons with CHF. The authors showed that there was a non-significant
trend where use of the second generation calcium channel blockers was associated with
more favourable outcome, such as lower mortality risk and increased exercise tolerance
(Cleophas & van Marum, 2001).
The CCS clinical guidelines strongly recommend against persons with CHF using
CCBs (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
No prescription of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
Evidence to support that the use of NSAIDs is associated with an increased risk of
being diagnosed with CHF had existed since the late 1980’s (Vandenouweland et al.,
1988). In Vandenouweland et al. (1988), use of NSAID medication shortly preceded a
diagnosis of CHF in elderly patients with locomotor diseases. The risk of developing
such diseases increases with age; oftentimes, the elderly were prescribed NSAIDs (for
symptoms of pain), and a common side effect is fluid retention (Vandenouweland et al.,
1988).
In 2002, Feenstra, Heerdink, Grobbee, & Stricker, (2002) reported relevant
findings from the Rotterdam Study, a population-based prospective cohort study on the
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prevalence, incidence and determinants of various diseases in the elderly. The authors
investigated whether (1) use of NSAIDs is significantly associated with first occurrence
of CHF and (2) whether use of NSAIDs is significantly associated with worsening of
already existing CHF (Feenstra et al., 2002). The cohort study showed that the relative
risk of first occurrence of CHF with NSAIDs use is 1.1 (95% CI: 0.7-1.7) within a mean
(± standard deviation (SD)) follow-up period of 6 years (±1.6 years); however, the
relative risk for hospitalization due to heart failure in patients already diagnosed with
CHF was 9.9 (95% CI: 1.7-57.8) within a mean (± SD) follow-up period of 6 years (±1.6
years) (Feenstra et al., 2002). This finding from the Rotterdam Study supports that use of
NSAIDs is not significantly associated with a diagnosis of CHF, but is significantly
associated with hospitalization due to heart failure for persons who already have CHF
(Feenstra et al., 2002). Similarly, findings from Gislason et al. (2009) support that use of
NSAIDs is significantly associated with an increased risk of heart failure-related
hospitalization for persons with CHF (Feenstra et al., 2002; Gislason et al., 2009).
The CCS clinical guidelines strongly recommends against persons with CHF
using NSAIDs (Ezekowitz et al., 2017).
Patient counselling for healthy lifestyle choices
Optimal management of CHF includes patient counselling; persons with CHF can
learn about self-care when counselled by a healthcare professional (Koelling et al., 2005).
Through counselling, patients can understand the significance of self-care practices like
medication adherence, daily monitoring of sodium intake, and so on. Moreover, a
substantial proportion of hospitalizations that occur in this patient population is attributed
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to medication non-adherence—where the noncompliant behaviour may result from a lack
of knowledge (Annema et al., 2009; Koelling et al., 2005).
Vinluan, Wittman, & Morisky, (2015) used a randomized, prospective, open trial
to investigate whether persons with CHF aged 65 years and above had better medication
adherence when they received either pharmacist counselling (i.e., intervention group) or
regular care (i.e., control group), at discharge. In the intervention group, counselling was
much more comprehensive and engaging than in the control group. This open trial
showed that medication adherence was higher in the intervention group at day 30 (100%
vs. 86%) and day 60 (100% vs. 83%). By day 90, the two groups were similar in terms of
compliance (50% vs. 50%). The study showed that, at day 30, more patients were
readmitted to hospital in the control group relative to the intervention group (0% vs.
11%); however, at day 60, more patients were readmitted in the intervention group,
relative to the control group (29% vs. 11 %). At day 90, the readmission rates were the
same in both groups (0% vs. 0%).
Vinluan et al. (2015) also reported information on mortality. At day 30, the
mortality rate in intervention and control groups were 0% and 22% respectively. The
mortality rate was 0% in both arms at day 60 and day 90 (Vinluan et al., 2015). Given
that mortality was observed only in the control at Day 30, the higher hospitalization rate
seen in the intervention group (i.e., the 29% vs. 11%) at day 60, could be due to the fact
that the two comparison groups were not completely equal in terms of observable and
unobservable prognostic factors after the control group (which is already small to start
with) was short of two of subjects (due to death).
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Findings from Vinluan et al. (2015) are congruent with previous findings from the
study by Koelling et al. (2005) where persons with CHF were randomized to either
standard discharge education (i.e., control group) or patient-targeted HF counselling in
addition to the standard education (i.e., the intervention group). The relative risk of death
or hospitalization in the intervention group was 0.66 (95% CI: 0.46 to 0.95, p=0.025)
(Koelling et al., 2005).
The Heart Failure Adherence and Retention Randomized Behavioral Trial
(HART) was another trial that also investigated effect of counselling on mortality or
hospitalization rate at follow-up (Powell et al., 2010). Unlike Vinluan et al. (2015) and
Koelling et al. (2005), findings from the HART trial showed that counselling had no
significant effect. This discrepancy could be explained by the different trials having
different times to follow-up.
Notwithstanding the mixed evidence for patient counselling, healthcare providers
are advised to provide counselling to persons with CHF. The CCS clinical guidelines
strongly endorses that persons with CHF receive counselling for lifestyle choices ranging
from smoking cessation to preconception counselling for women with CHF (Ezekowitz et
al., 2017).
Chronic kidney disease
Process of care indicators for chronic kidney disease in the primary care setting
were recently established by Tu et al. (2017). The authors argued that, in Canadian
primary care, CKD was receiving less attention than other health conditions (Tu et al.,
2017). Seventeen quality indicators were developed by Tu et al. (2017), and we
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investigated four of these, namely, testing of (1) creatinine and (2) albumin-to-creatinine
ratio; prescription of (3) ACEIs (or ARBs) and (4) statins. Many—if not most—cases of
chronic kidney disease are secondary to diabetes mellitus (Arora et al., 2013) and,
therefore, many of the process measures for diabetes care are synonymous with CKD
management. Herein, we present some evidence on the process-outcome link for CKD
process measures; and these quality indicators are congruent with clinical guidelines of
professional associations such as the Canadian Society of Nephrology (Levin et al.,
2008).
Testing of creatinine and albumin-to-creatinine ratio
The quantification of an individual’s eGFR (i.e., a measure of renal functioning)
requires, among other things, measurement of their serum creatinine level ( Lewis, 2012;
National Kidney Foundation, 2019a). A person’s albumin-to-creatinine ratio is a measure
of the protein content in their urine, and ACR can be used to detect proteinuria, a
condition characterized by abnormally high urinary protein; proteinuria is suggestive of
nephropathy (National Kidney Foundation, 2019b). Thus creatinine testing and ACR
quantification are care processes for monitoring CKD (Qaseem et al., 2013). Qaseem,
Hopkins, Sweet, Starkey, & Shekelle (2013) stated that no RCT had been conducted to
compare the prognostic effects of routinely monitoring CKD. Nonetheless, the Canadian
Society of Nephrology recommends that individuals with CKD should be monitored for
proteinuria (Levin et al., 2008).
Prescription of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors or angiotensin II receptor
blockers
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Evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have shown that use of
ACEIs or ARBs by persons with CKD results in favourable health outcomes (Lewis et
al., 2001; Maschio et al., 1996). For instance, Maschio et al. (1996) investigated the
effect of ACEIs on progression of renal insufficiency in persons with CKD, and the
primary outcome of this RCT was time to ‘doubling of serum creatinine’, an indicator of
decreasing eGFR, which, in turn, is suggestive of worsening kidney functioning
(Lambers Heerspink et al., 2011). Kaplan-Meier estimates showed that, 26 of 180 (i.e.,
14%), and 42 of 176 (i.e., 24%) of subjects with moderate renal insufficiency, attained
the primary outcome in the ACEI and placebo groups, respectively, within three years
(p=0.01).
Lewis et al. (2001) investigated the effect of ARBs on the progression of renal
damage in persons who have type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and some form of
nephropathy. Results showed that, in this study population, use ARBs—compared to
placebo—was associated with a significantly (p=0.009) lower risk of doubling of serum
creatinine (Relative risk=0.71, 95% CI: 0.54 - 0.92); the mean duration of follow-up was
approximately 2.6 years (E. Lewis et al., 2001). Moreover, the Canadian Society of
Nephrology recommends that persons with CKD—with or without diabetes—should be
placed on ACEIs; if intolerance for ACEIs is evident, then ARBs should be
recommended (Levin et al., 2008).
Prescription of statins
Fassett, Ball, Robertson, Geraghty, & Coombes (2008) investigated the effect of
statins on the progression of renal disease for persons with CKD. The authors’ primary
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outcome was rate of decline in eGFR (Fassett et al., 2008). Results from this RCT
showed a trend where the statin drug was non-significantly associated with a slower rate
of decline in eGFR (Fassett et al., 2010). However, a post-hoc analysis study found that,
compared to dietary intervention alone, use of statins in addition to the nutritional control
was significantly (p<0.01) associated with a lower risk of CVD development in persons
with Stage 3 CKD and of Japanese ethnicity (HR=0.45, 95% CI: 0.30 – 0.69) (Nakamura
et al., 2009). In addition, the Canadian Society of Nephrology recommends that persons
with CKD be placed on statin therapy (Levin et al., 2008).
No prescription of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory class of drugs are commonly used by the elderly
population for pain relief (Chang et al., 2015; Gooch et al., 2007). Evidence on the
association between NSAID use and decline in renal function is mixed as some studies
support that the use of NSAIDs is harmful to renal health (Chang et al., 2015; Gooch et
al., 2007), while other studies show that using NSAIDs is neither beneficial nor harmful
to renal health (Curhan et al., 2004; Rexrode et al., 2001). In spite of the mixed evidence,
expert opinion supports that the use of NSAIDs should be avoided for persons with CKD
(Tu et al., 2017).
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3

Quality of diabetes care in blended fee-for-service and blended capitation
payment systems: evidence from Ontario, Canada

A version of this chapter has been published as: Bamimore, M. A., Devlin, R. A., Zaric,
G. S., Garg, A. X., & Sarma, S. (2020). Quality of diabetes care in blended fee-forservice and blended capitation payment systems. Canadian Journal of Diabetes.
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3.1

Introduction

One goal of primary care reform in many developed countries is to improve the
delivery of high quality patient care (Roland & Campbell, 2014). In Canada, the province
of Ontario witnessed primary care reform in the early 2000’s, rolling out primary care
models with various remuneration schemes for family physicians. Among such models
are the blended FFS Family Health Group and the blended capitation Family Health
Organization, introduced in 2003 and 2006, respectively (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
Prior to the reform, over 90 per cent of family physicians in Ontario were paid through
pure FFS (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014); today, most are paid either by blended FFS or by
blended capitation. These new models are characterized by formal patient enrollment, the
mandatory provision of after-hours care, and a variety of P4P schemes including the
DMI. The DMI rewards physicians $60 per patient per annum for organizing, rendering
and documenting care processes that meet the clinical guidelines of Diabetes Canada.
Essential care services of the DMI include testing glycated hemoglobin, measuring lipid
profile, screening for nephropathy, retinopathy, and prescribing statins (Diabetes Canada
Clinical Practice Guidelines Expert Committee, 2018; Kantarevic & Kralj, 2013).
The evidence on the relationship between physicians’ remuneration and quality of
diabetes care is mixed. The effect of P4P incentives on physicians’ provision of diabetes
care is, by and large, inconclusive as some studies failed to find any effect (Chien et al.,
2012; Dimitrovová et al., 2020; Gupta & Ayles, 2019; Jaakkimainen et al., 2011;
Lavergne et al., 2018; Pawaskar et al., 2010), while others found increases in diabetes-
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related services under P4P schemes (Chen et al., 2010; Kiran et al., 2014, 2015; A. Scott
et al., 2009).
Scott et al. (2009) used an Australian panel data set spanning 2002 to 2007, and
found that general practitioners in the ‘Practice Incentive Program’ P4P scheme were
20% more likely to order an HbA1c test for their patients with diabetes compared to
physicians who are not in the program. In a similar vein, Chen et al. (2010) used a
Hawaiian panel data set from 1999 to 2006, and found that persons with diabetes cared
by P4P participating physicians were more likely to receive at least two HbA1c tests and
one lipid assessment per year relative to non-P4P participating physicians. O’Connor et
al. (2020) found P4P schemes improved quality of diabetes care in Ireland. A review by
Gupta and Ayles (2019) found that, in Taiwan, P4P incentives increased physicians’ care
continuity for persons with diabetes. This review also reported that P4P incentives were
associated with a reduction in 5-year risk of all-cause mortality (Gupta & Ayles, 2019). A
more recent paper again using Taiwanese data corroborated these findings (Kung et al.,
2020).
Kontopantelis et al. (2013), using a pre-post analyses on patient-level data from
148 UK primary care practices between 2000 and 2006, found that the quality of diabetes
management improved after introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (i.e., a
P4P program) in 2004. In this study, care quality for diabetes was a composite score of 17
indicators related to the management of diabetes; they found that the quality of care
improved by 14.2% in the year this P4P was introduced; however, three years after, the
magnitude of this improvement fell (Kontopantelis et al., 2013).
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Not all of the literature has concluded that diabetes P4P measures improved care.
Ryan, Krinsky, Kontopantelis, & Doran, (2016) found that P4P schemes did not impact
mortality risk. Difference-in-differences analyses by Chien et al. (2012) found no
improvement in diabetes care processes, including HbA1c testing and eye examination,
after the introduction of the Hudson Health Plan, a P4P plan serving a region of New
York (United States). A similar study from Colorado (United States) also found that the
P4P scheme did not improve lipid testing or dilated eye exams (Rosenthal et al., 2016).
Using 2000 to 2015 data from Portugal, Dimitrovová, Perelman and Serrano-Alarcón
(2020) concluded that the addition of a P4P incentive for diabetes care did not reduce
diabetes-related avoidable hospitalizations. Pawaskar et al. (2010) found that persons
with diabetes under pure capitation payment plans were more likely to be hospitalized
relative to those under pure FFS payment plans in the United States.
Three studies using data in Ontario are particularly relevant for our paper.
Jaakkimainen et al. (2011) using administrative data from 2004 to 2007 reported no
difference in the annual eye examination and prescription of statins between family
physicians remunerated through blended FFS and blended capitation. By contrast, a
cross-sectional study by Kiran et al. (2014) found that the likelihood of individuals with
diabetes receiving eye examination, HbA1c testing and lipid measurement altogether was
greater in blended capitation than in blended FFS. Kiran et al. (2015) found that patients
with blended capitation physicians were more likely to get recommended tests for
diabetes care.
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The goal of our paper is to examine whether physicians switching from FHGs to
FHOs behave differently when it comes to diabetes management. By using a longer
follow-up, more outcome variables and sophisticated empirical methods, we contribute to
the literature on the impact of physician remuneration on diabetes care. It is important,
however, to understand why the FHG and FHO models may affect quality of care
differently. Because capitated physicians receive a fixed payment per patient per time,
they arguably have the financial flexibility to coordinate care and ensure continuity of
care, leading us to hypothesize that physicians switching from the FHG to the FHO
model would increase adherence to diabetes care. The health economics literature further
suggests that blended capitation provides better incentives for primary care physicians
than pure FFS for the efficient supply of health services (Christianson & Conrad, 2012;
Eggleston, 2005; McGuire, 2011). In Ontario’s FHO, capitation adjusts for the age and
sex of enrolled patients, but not comorbidity – meaning that ‘sicker’ individuals may be
eschewed by capitated physicians (the ‘cream skimming’ phenomenon), which would
mitigate against the positive incentive effects of capitation. Our empirical strategy
controls the average health of patients in order to deal with this potential issue. Moreover,
various P4P incentives and access bonus (incentive to ensure that enrolled patients do not
seek in-basket services from physicians outside of the practice) are designed to attenuate
cream-skimming behavior in FHOs.
3.2

Methods

Study design
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We used a retrospective cohort study design, with observations between April 1st,
2006 and March 31st, 2016. Our sample is comprised of physicians practicing in FHGs
and FHOs, and their patients diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. At the baseline (April 1st,
2006), all physicians were in FHGs; we defined a ‘switcher’ as a FHG physician who
switched to a FHO at any point within the study period and remained in the FHO after
switching. A ‘non-switcher’ is a FHG physician who remained in this model throughout
the study period. We examined whether switching from FHG to FHO affected
physicians’ behaviour in terms of six processes of care for diabetes management: HbA1c
testing, lipid profile testing, nephropathy screening, eye examination, prescription of
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors or angiotensin II receptor blockers, and
prescription of statins. These indicators are consistent with Diabetes Canada clinical
practice guidelines (Diabetes Canada Clinical Practice Guidelines Expert Committee,
2018). We also investigated the impact of switching on patients’ mortality risk score, and
their risk of hospitalization for an ambulatory care sensitive condition (ACSC) related to
diabetes; by definition, ACSCs are avoidable in persons aged below 75 years if
ambulatory care is efficient (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2020a).
Data Sources
All data were obtained from the ICES which houses numerous Ontario health
administrative databases. Persons with diabetes mellitus were identified through the
Ontario Diabetes Dataset (ODD), a validated database with a sensitivity and specificity of
86.1% and 97.1%, respectively (Hux et al., 2002; Lipscombe & Hux, 2007). Although
ODD excludes gestational diabetes, it does not distinguish between the type 1 and type 2
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forms; most individuals identified in ODD would be type 2 since we included patients
whose diagnosis of diabetes mellitus occurred at age 30 years or above (Kiran et al.,
2014). Patients enrolled to physicians in FHGs and FHOs were identified through the
client agency program enrollment database. The ICES physician database and corporate
provider database provided physician characteristics and their practice model. The
registered persons database provided patient characteristics. The income quintile was
based on the census dissemination area-level data (Statistics Canada, 2015). Laboratory
testing and prescription services were identified using the Ontario Health Insurance Plan
(OHIP) database and Ontario Drug Benefit claims database.
Outcome Variables
Outcome variables were defined for each year. Each of the six processes of care
was quantified as a proportion using OHIP billing codes (Appendix Table A1.2). For the
laboratory-based indicators (HbA1c testing, lipid assessment and nephropathy screening)
and eye examination, the denominator value represented the total number of a physician’s
patients with diabetes who were alive in the given year, and the numerator is a subset of
the denominator population that received the respective process care at least once in that
year. For the two drug-based indicators (ACEI/ARB, and statin prescription), the
denominator was the total number of a physician’s patients who were alive and aged at
least 65 years in the given year; the numerator represented the subset of the denominator
population who filled the prescription at least once in the respective year.
An individual’s mortality risk score corresponds to his/her one-year risk of allcause mortality based on the algorithm of Austin and Walraven. An ACSC
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hospitalization due to diabetes refers to a hospital admission that occurs in persons aged
below 75 years and is associated with a diabetes-related hospitalization (codes in
Appendix Table A1.3). Appendix A contains detailed information on data sources and
variable definitions.
Statistical analyses
All analyses were conducted at the physician-level, hence, all patient-level
information were aggregated to the physician-level. We excluded physicians who were
not present every year (e.g., retirees and new graduates were excluded), yielding a
balanced panel of 2,120 physicians. Following previous research, physicians with fewer
than 20 patients with diabetes were excluded to focus on physicians with a stable practice
of patients with diabetes who are likely to be up to date with the best practices for
diabetes management (Daneman et al., 2013).
Since the choice to remain in a FHG, or switch to a FHO, was voluntary,
switchers may be different from non-switchers leading to a selection bias that could
influence the outcomes. We employed a two-stage estimation procedure to deal with
selection bias. The first stage accounts for the differences between switchers and nonswitchers using an inverse-probability-weighted technique based on estimated propensity
scores. This approach ensures that the two groups of physicians were similar in terms of
their observable characteristics at baseline (i.e., before switching to FHO). The second
stage estimates the impact of switching from FHG to FHO on processes of care for
diabetes and related outcomes using inverse-probability-weighted fixed-effects
regressions. This two-stage estimation approach has been employed in recent
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publications to study the impact of reform on other outcomes (Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013;
Sarma et al., 2018; Somé et al., 2019).
Propensity score model
We begin with estimating a propensity score model using a logistic regression. A
general guideline is to include covariates in a propensity score model that are likely to be
associated with both the outcome and exposure variable (Guo & Fraser, 2015;
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Following the literature, we include: physicians’ expected
income gain by switching from FHG to FHO and its squared term, age, international
medical graduate status (graduates outside of Canada and the United States), group size,
number of enrolled patients, physician sex, average age of patients in the physician’s
practice, proportion of female patients in the practice, patients’ average comorbidity
score based on the Johns Hopkins Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (ADG), proportion of
patients from low income area, proportion of patients living in rural areas, and the
outcome variables in the baseline year (Kantarevic et al., 2011; Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013;
Sarma et al., 2018).
The estimated value of a FHG physician’s income after joining a FHO is the
expected gain in income from switching. To assist FHG physicians in deciding whether
to join a FHO, the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care provided them with an
estimate of their potential gain in income (Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013; Sarma et al., 2018).
The estimated income gain is based on the services a FHG physician provided to their
enrolled and non-enrolled patients in the 12 months preceding April 1st, 2006. The
estimated potential income in an FHO used the following: (i) income from capitation rate
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of $144.08 multiplied by the age-sex modifier for enrolled patients as of April 1st 2006,
(ii) income from shadow billing, which was 10% of FFS value for in-basket services in
2006, (iii) income from providing out-of-basket services to both enrolled and nonenrolled patients based on 100% of FFS value, (iv) income from the “hard cap” based on
100% of FFS value for in-basket services to non-enrolled patients up to $47,500, and (v)
special payments for providing hospital services, obstetrical care, home visits and
prenatal care (Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013; Sarma et al., 2018). Out-of-basket services refer
to services that are not under the capitation basket. Inclusion of the expected gain in
income is a crucial variable in the propensity score model as this variable influences a
FHG physician’s decision on whether or not switch to FHO.
Once the propensity score model was estimated, we used the estimated propensity
scores (“predicted probabilities”) to construct weights based on kernel matching. Since
our objective is to estimate the effect of switching to a FHO, every switcher physician
was given a weight of one and the non-switcher physicians were weighted based on the
distance between their propensity scores and that of a switcher physician within a
bandwidth of 0.06 (Garrido et al., 2014; Guo & Fraser, 2015). Physicians who did not fall
within these criteria (i.e., outside the range of common support) were excluded. We used
t-tests and the standardized bias to assess the balance of covariates (Harder et al., 2010).
Finally, given that the misspecification of a propensity score model and covariate
imbalance can result in biased estimates, we used two alternative weighting procedures as
robustness checks: the covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS) (Imai & Ratkovic,
2014) and entropy balancing (EB) weights (Hainmueller, 2012).
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Fixed-effects regressions
Fixed-effects regressions account for unmeasured time-invariant confounding by
controlling for variations by physicians not captured by included covariates (Allison,
2009; Wooldridge, 2010). For each of the eight quality indicators, we ran both
unweighted and inverse-probability-weighted pooled and fixed-effects regressions; the
weights were derived from kernel, CBPS and EB weighting. The process indicators were
analysed using a random-effects model with group means, equivalent to a fixed-effects
regression (Papke, 1996); mortality risk score, a continuous variable, was analyzed using
a linear weighted fixed-effects regression (Sarma et al., 2018); and diabetes-related
ACSC hospitalizations were analysed using a weighted fixed-effects Poisson regression.
The equation below describes the linear fixed-effects regression:
Yit = αi + δFHOit + βXit + εit.
Here Yit represents the outcome variable of physician i in time period t, FHO is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if physician i switched to FHO at time t and zero if
remained in FHG; δ is the estimated coefficient of interest capturing the effect of a
physician’s switch to FHO on Y; Xit is the vector of covariates previously listed; αi
captures unmeasured time-invariant physician-specific factors and εit is the error term.
We use fractional years to account for the duration a switcher was in the FHO model
during the first year of switch.
Sub-group analyses were undertaken separately by sex of the physician, their age
(below 55 and 55+ years at the baseline), and by four switching cohorts (2008-2009;
2010-2011; 2012-2013; 2014-2015). The purpose of these subgroup analyses was to
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identify whether the effect of switching to FHO was different across various subpopulations of physicians. All analyses employed the statistical software Stata version
15.1 (StataCorp, 2017).
Ethics
The use of data in this project was authorized under section 45 of Ontario’s
Personal Health Information Protection Act, which does not require review by a Research
Ethics Board.
3.3

Results

We observed 2,120 physicians over 10 years (21,200 physician-year
observations): 1,291 switchers and 829 non-switchers; a simple flow chart for the
derivation of the final sample size of physicians is depicted in Appendix B Figure B.0.
Table B1.0 in Appendix B presents the mean values of explanatory and outcome
variables for switchers and non-switchers across all years. Prior to kernel weighting, all
covariates were significantly different between switchers and non-switchers except
physician’s sex. Non-significant p-values, and a standardized bias of no greater than 7%
were revealed for all covariates after weighting (Table 3.1). The robustness of these
results was confirmed with CBPS and EB weights (Tables B1.1 and B1.2 in Appendix
B). In addition, graphs of propensity scores as well as standardized difference in means
and variance ratios confirmed reasonable covariate balance between the switchers and
non-switchers after weighting (Figures B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B).
Our inverse-probability-weighted fixed-effects estimates found that the marginal
effects of switching to FHO increased a physician’s HbA1c testing, lipid assessment,
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nephropathy screening and statin prescription, at least once a year, by 2.75% (95% CI:
1.89%, 3.60%), 2.57% (CI: 1.72%, 3.44%), 2.76% (CI: 1.86%, 3.49%) and 1.08% (CI:
0.56%, 1.69%), respectively. These results reveal substantially more patients receiving
care from switchers: based on 2,131,830 total diabetes patient-year observations in FHOs
in our data with 1,081,528 of them over 65 years, switching from FHG to FHO resulted
in 58,625 (CI: 40,291, 76,745) more patients receiving HbA1c testing, 54,788 (CI:
36,667, 73,121) more patients receiving lipid assessment, 58,838 (CI: 41,570, 76,106)
more patients receiving nephropathy screening and 11,680 (CI: 5,515, 17,953) more
patients receiving statin prescription over 10 years. On average, switchers’ patients had a
0.197 lower mortality risk score (CI: -0.33, -0.060) (Table 3.2), suggesting that the risk of
dying within one-year was reduced by approximately 0.0124% (CI: 0.0123%, 0.0126%)
or 265 (CI: 262, 268) fewer total deaths in switchers’ patients. The risk of ACSC
hospitalizations was not different between switchers’ and non-switchers’ patients (Table
3.2). The corresponding results based on CBPS and EB weighted results were
qualitatively similar.
For physicians who were male, female, younger (aged below 55 in 2006), and
older (aged 55+ years in 2006), switching to FHO was associated with more HbA1c
testing, lipid assessments, nephropathy screening and statin prescriptions (Table 3.3,
Tables B1.3-B1.6 in Appendix B). While the effect of switching to FHO was slightly
higher in male physicians (3.0%) relative to females (1.7%) for HbA1c testing, lipid
assessments (2.6% vs. 2.4%) and nephropathy screenings (2.9% vs. 2.4%), the respective
confidence intervals overlapped (Table 3.3). Similarly, the effect of switching on statin
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prescription was higher for females compared to males (1.4% vs. 1.0%), but the
respective confidence intervals overlapped (Table 3.3). In the four subgroups of
physicians (male, female, young and old), we found no difference for eye examinations
and ACEI/ARB prescriptions (Table 3.3); except for female physicians, we found no
difference in patients’ risk of ACSC hospitalizations. For female physicians, switching to
FHO was associated with a decreased risk of ACSC hospitalizations (relative risk=0.610,
CI: 0.403, 0.912) (Table 3.3), and this finding was corroborated by both CBPS and EB
results (Table B1.4 in Appendix B). The effect of switching to FHO was associated with
a statistically significant decrease in the mean mortality risk score of patients of male
physicians and older physicians; the impact of switching to FHO on mortality risk score
was non-significant for physicians who were female or younger (Table 3.3).
Switching to FHO was associated with an increase in HbA1c testing, lipid
assessment and nephropathy screening for both early and late switchers compared to nonswitchers. Though the effect on these three care processes was slightly greater for the
early switchers, there was considerable overlap in the respective confidence intervals
(Table 3.4, Table B1.7 in Appendix B). The impact of switching to the blended capitation
model on statin prescription was associated with a significant increase only for early
switchers; no effect was observed for late switchers, and these two groups of switchers
were statistically similar for ACEI/ARB prescriptions and ACSC hospitalizations. The
impact of switching to FHO was associated with a slight decrease in eye examinations
only for late switchers between 2012 and 2013. Significantly lower mortality risk scores
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for patients were found for early switchers and switchers between 2010 and 2011 (Table
3.4, Table B1.7 in Appendix B).
3.4

Discussion

In Ontario, relative to those who remained in a FHG, family physicians who
switched to the FHO model had an increase in HbA1c testing, lipid assessment,
nephropathy screening, and statin prescription for individuals with diabetes. Patients of
these switchers had a lower mortality risk compared to patients of physicians who
remained in FHG. However, switchers and non-switchers were not different in terms of
annual eye examinations, ACEI/ARB prescription and patients’ risk of ACSC
hospitalizations. Patients of physicians who switched to FHO between 2012 and 2013
had slightly fewer eye examinations than non-switchers’ patients; patients of female
switchers, on average, had marginally lower ACSC hospitalizations relative to nonswitchers’ patients. We also implemented a before-and-after analysis using only the
switchers’ data, and these results were in the similar direction with relatively higher
effects compared to our main analysis (Table B1.8 in Appendix B).
Our study has various strengths. Compared to previous literature, our
identification strategy allows for stronger conclusions. For instance, the studies by Kiran
et al. (2014) and Jaakkimainen et al. (2011) compared care quality in different payment
models using cross-sectional regressions and did not account for time-invariant
physician-specific confounding; nor did these studies address potential selection into
physician practice models. Our two groups of practice models were based on similar
observed characteristics and outcomes at the baseline; in our study, blended capitation
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and blended FFS each constituted only one practice model, unlike Kiran et al. (2014)
where, blended capitation included FHOs and Family Health Networks. Our longer
follow-up period allowed physicians time to adjust to the new remuneration scheme,
arguably capturing a more accurate measure of physicians’ behaviour in these models.
Our study has some limitations. Given that we conducted binary analyses for care
processes (i.e., ‘no’ vs. ‘at least one’ HbA1c testing), our notion of quality—for the
process measures investigated—essentially corresponded to the provision vs. non
provision of care. Although laboratory services identified through OHIP include services
provided in hospitals, it may not be captured completely. It is possible that some patients
were given a laboratory requisition, but they did not follow through. For the prescriptionbased process indicators, the information in the Ontario Drug Benefit database captures
patients’ records of prescriptions filled by patients who are aged 65 years or older. It is
possible, therefore, that a physician prescribed medications which the patient did not fill;
moreover, we could not capture the prescriptions of those under 65 years of age (Cheung
et al., 2017). A proportion of FHO physicians are also part of the family health team and
the effects found in our study can be interpreted as the combined effect of blended
capitation and team-based primary care. While process and outcome indicators are
established metrics for measuring care quality (Ameh et al., 2017; Donabedian, 1988;
Moore et al., 2015), they have limitations: more testing and prescriptions are not always
synonymous with better care, and health outcomes such as risk of mortality and
hospitalization can be influenced by factors beyond physician (life style choices and
economic circumstances). Our identification strategy that combines propensity-score
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based weights with fixed-effects regression cannot definitively confirm a causal effect of
remuneration on quality of care because of the potential for residual confounding.
Nonetheless, including the expected income gain of switching to FHO and its squared
term along with a rich set of physician- and patient-characteristics in the propensity score
model combined with the inverse-probability-weighted fixed-effects regressions arguably
minimize the influence of residual confounding.
Our work suggests important positive influences of P4P incentives for diabetes
management in a blended capitation payment system, consistent with some of the
findings of previous work. We can explain some of the discrepancies between our paper
and those of other papers. For instance, our conclusions for eye examinations are
inconsistent with Kiran et al. (2014); their study was based on data over two years (20062008), while ours used a decade of data. Our inverse-probability-weighted strategy
accounts for potential differences between the two groups before switching to FHO.
Finally, policy-level factors can reconcile the discrepancy between Kiran et al. (2014)
and our study. Prior to November 1st, 2004, retinal examinations were covered by the
OHIP for Ontario residents of any age, but, after that date it was delisted with the
exception of individuals with diabetes. The delisting of eye examination for non-diabetes
patients was associated with unintended consequences of decline in eye examination for
persons with diabetes (Kiran et al., 2013).
In the absence of randomization, propensity score-based inverse-probabilityweighted fixed-effects regressions is a reasonable approach to identify associations that
are closer to causal. With this identification strategy on a balanced panel of family
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physicians spanning over a decade, our study provides stronger empirical evidence that
the switching of Ontario’s family physicians from Family Health Groups to Family
Health Organizations increased physicians’ adherence to many process measures for
diabetes management. Future studies can use Ontario’s natural experiment setting to
investigate the effect of physicians’ switching from a blended FFS to a blended capitation
model on quality of care indicators for other patient populations.
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Table 3.1 Means and standardized bias results before and after kernel weighting
Means and standardized bias prior to kernel weighting
Covariate

Means and standardized bias after kernel weighting
p-

FHO

FHG

Bias

t-statistic

p-value

FHO

FHG

Bias

t-statistic

137.13

108.15

34.3

24.74

0

137.13

137.21

-0.1

-0.02

0.98

(Expected income gain)2

25022

19737

17.1

12.19

0

25022

25294

-0.9

-0.23

0.82

Age (years)

54.43

56.55

-23.2

-16.56

0

49.93

50.43

-5.5

-1.5

0.14

Age2

3041.9

3283.5

-23.8

-17.01

0

2564.1

2614.2

-4.9

-1.49

0.14

Female (proportion)

0.27

0.26

1.2

0.84

0.4

0.27

0.26

0.8

0.2

0.85

IMG ( proportion)

0.13

0.22

-24.6

-17.92

0

0.13

0.13

-0.2

-0.05

0.97

Group size

31.65

54.04

-35.1

-25.7

0

39.33

41.31

-3.1

-0.89

0.38

Number of enrolled patients

1744.6

1856.3

-14.7

-10.7

0

1811.5

1802.1

1.2

0.33

0.75

Female (proportion)

0.52

0.51

4.8

3.44

0.01

0.52

0.52

0.8

0.19

0.85

Rural areas (proportion)

0.11

0.06

28

19.26

0

0.11

0.11

-1.1

-0.22

0.83

Average age (in years)

42.56

41.67

15.3

10.93

0

40.25

40.38

-2.2

-0.6

0.55

0.36

0.4

-26.6

-19.08

0

0.37

0.38

-2.9

-0.77

0.44

3.23

3.39

-38.7

-27.74

0

3.34

3.34

-0.8

-0.2

0.85

0.61

0.59

15

10.68

0

0.57

0.56

5.7

1.37

0.17

value

Physicians’ characteristics
Expected income gain (in
thousand $)

Patients’ characteristics

Low income quintile
(proportion)
Average ADG
Outcome variables
HbA1c testing (proportion)
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Lipid assessment

0.57

0.57

0.3

0.18

0.86

0.55

0.54

6.8

1.65

0.1

0.66

0.64

13.4

9.5

0

0.64

0.63

4.5

1.05

0.3

0.05

0.05

-12.7

-9.11

0

0.05

0.05

1.4

0.37

0.72

0.65

0.63

16

11.4

0

0.69

0.69

0.2

0.06

0.96

0.71

0.7

10.2

7.32

0

0.66

0.65

4.8

1.08

0.28

Mortality risk score

51.03

49.98

23.6

17.15

0

49.72

49.84

-2.9

-0.74

0.47

ACSC hospitalization

0.162

0.173

-2.3

-1.68

0.094

0.192

0.189

0.8

0.17

0.86

(proportion)
Nephropathy screening
(proportion)
Eye examination
(proportion)
ACEI or ARB prescription
(proportion)
Statin prescription
(proportion)

Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated Diagnosis
Groups (Johns Hopkins), HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin, ACEI: Angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors, ARB: Angiotensin II receptor blocker,
ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition due to diabetes.
FHO represents physicians who switched from FHG to FHO at any point within the observation period; FHG represents physicians who remained in a
FHG model throughout the study period.
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Table 3.2 Effect of switching to FHO on process of care and health outcomes for persons with diabetes mellitus
Outcome variablea

Pooled
Unweighted

HbA1c testing (%)

Lipid assessment (%)

Nephropathy screening (%)

Eye examination (%)

ACEI or ARB prescription (%)

Statin prescription (%)

Mean mortality risk score

Risk ACSC hospitalization

Fixed-effects
Kernel

Unweighted

Kernel

3.86***

4.00***

2.62***

2.75***

(2.58 - 5.15)

(2.23 - 5.77)

(1.95 - 3.29)

(1.89 - 3.60)

3.09***

4.25***

2.67***

2.57***

(1.85 - 4.32)

(2.58 - 5.93)

(2.00 - 3.34)

(1.72 -3.43)

3.85***

4.07***

2.73***

2.76***

(2.65 - 5.06)

(2.36 - 5.78)

(2.09 - 3.37)

(1.95 - 3.57)

-0.0912

0.412**

0.0196

-0.0622

(-0.429 - 0.247)

(0.0901 - 0.734)

(-0.162 - 0.201)

(-0.240 - 0.115)

0.757**

0.251

-0.221

0.403

(9.87e-03 - 1.50)

(-0.635 - 1.14)

(-0.730 - 0.288)

(-0.199 - 1.01)

2.09***

1.38***

0.926***

1.08***

(1.28 - 2.90)

(0.397 - 2.36)

(0.441 - 1.41)

(0.508 - 1.66)

0.0628

-0.207

-0.384***

-0.197***

(-0.161 - 0.287)

(-0.495 - 0.0806)

(-0.497 - -0.270)

(-0.334 - -0.0597)

1.069

1.008

0.998

1.004

(0.960 - 1.192)

(0.883 - 1.151)

(0.865 - 1.152)

(0.850 - 1.186)

Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II
receptor blocker, FHO: Family Health Organization; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, FHO: Family Health Organization
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

91

a

This table reports the average marginal effects of a physician’s switch from FHG to FHO on processes of care. For example, results show that

switching from FHG to FHO increases a physician’s ordering at least one HbA1c test by 2.75% per physician per year. This table also reports patients’
risk of diabetes-related ACSC hospitalization and patients’ mean mortality risk score of those who switched from FHG to FHO.
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Table 3.3 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcomes for various subgroups of physicians
Outcome variablea
HbA1c testing (%)

Lipid assessment (%)

Nephropathy screening (%)

Eye examination (%)

ACEI or ARB prescription (%)

Statin prescription (%)

Mean mortality risk score

Risk of ACSC hospitalization

n

Subgroup
Male

Female

Younger

Older

3.03***

1.68**

2.08***

3.67***

(2.01 - 4.06)

(0.287 - 3.07)

(0.983 - 3.19)

(2.12 - 5.22)

2.59***

2.38***

2.26***

3.00***

(1.58 - 3.60)

(0.859 - 3.90)

(1.14 - 3.37)

(1.44 - 4.55)

2.91***

2.43***

2.36***

3.29***

(1.85 - 3.96)

(1.02 - 3.84)

(1.32 - 3.41)

(1.80 - 4.78)

-0..118

0.104

-0.142

0.0515

(-0.323 - 0.0865)

(-0.238 - 0.446)

(-0.354 - 0.0702)

(-0.260 - 0.363)

0.285

0.612

0.491

0.135

(-0.382 - 0.951)

(-0.742 - 1.97)

(-0.273 - 1.26)

(-0.823 - 1.09)

0.942***

1.40**

0.822**

1.41***

(0.311 - 1.57)

(0.166 - 2.64)

(0.0936 - 1.55)

(0.516 - 2.31)

-0.252***

-0.069

-0.134

-0.321***

(-0.412 - -0.0920)

(-0.331 - 0.193)

(-0.306 - 0.0386)

(-0.537 - -0.104)

1.089

0.610**

0.991

1.055

(0.910 - 1.304)

(0.403 - 0.921)

(0.799 - 1.229)

(0.811 - 1.373)

15,660

5,540

13,510

7,690

Abbreviations: HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker, FHO: Family
Health Organization, ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition due to diabetes, n: physician-year observations.
Notes:
Only results from kernel weighted fixed effects regression are reported in this table
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*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses.
a

For the four subgroups of physicians, this table reports the average marginal effects of a physician’s switch from FHG to FHO on processes of care.

This table also reports patients’ risk of diabetes-related ACSC hospitalization and patients’ mean mortality risk score under the four subgroups of
switchers and non-switchers.
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Table 3.4 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcomes for different cohorts of switchers
Outcome variablea

switched between 2008

switched between 2010

switched between 2012

switched between 2014

and 2009

and 2011

and 2013

and 2015

2.70***

1.30***

2.07***

0.552

(1.98 - 3.41)

(0.472 - 2.13)

(0.857 - 3.29)

(-1.68 - 2.78)

2.88***

1.20***

1.18*

0.314

(2.13 - 3.63)

(0.339 - 2.07)

(-0.129 - 2.49)

(-2.06 - 2.69)

Nephropathy screening

2.60***

1.51***

(%)b

(1.89 - 3.30)

(0.727 - 2.29)

Eye examination (%)

-0.081

-0.242

-0.455***

0.313

(-0.269 - 0.107)

(-0.536 - 0.0509)

(-0.748 - -0.162)

(-0.0869 - 0.713)

ACEI or ARB

-0.0265

0.11

0.106

0.791

prescription (%)

(-0.561 - 0.508)

(-0.535 - 0.755)

(-0.719 - 0.932)

(-0.352 - 1.93)

Statin prescription (%)

1.51***

0.336

-0.683

-0.403

(1.03 - 1.99)

(-0.261 - 0.934)

(-1.50 - 0.132)

(-1.35 - 0.545)

-0.375***

-0.364***

-0.159

0.0853

(-0.503 - -0.247)

(-0.514 - -0.214)

(-0.373 - 0.0542)

(-0.179 - 0.350)

Risk of ACSC

1.089

0.923

1.158

0.977

hospitalization

(0.910 - 1.302)

(0.699 - 1.218)

(0.700 - 1.917)

(0.369 - 2.588)

n

19,071

11,410

5,840

2,991

HbA1c testing (%)

Lipid assessment (%)

Mean mortality risk score
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Abbreviations: HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker, FHO: Family
Health Organization, ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, n: sample size
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses.
-Only results from kernel weighted fixed effects regression are reported in this table.
a

This table reports the average marginal effects of a physician switching from FHG to FHO in each cohort of switchers on processes of care relative to

non-switchers. This table also reports patients’ risk of diabetes-related ACSC hospitalizations and patients’ mean mortality risk of each cohort of
switchers relative to non-switchers.
b

Estimates for nephropathy screening could not be computed for physicians who switched as of 2012 because the main independent variable predicted

outcome perfectly.
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Appendix A (for Chapter 3)
A1.1 Schematic for creation of study population
We identified all Ontario primary care physicians (PCPs) in FHGs as of April 1st, 2006 and followed these doctors and their enrolled
patients diagnosed with diabetes; doctors and patients were followed until March 31st, 2016. Within this observation period of ten years, we
identified the physicians who remained in FHGs throughout (i.e., non-switchers) and those who switched FHOs, and remained in it after
switching (i.e., switchers)

Exclusion for patients with diabetes:
for PCPs:
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patients diagnosed with
-Missing/ invalid IKN
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A1.2 Data sources for variables
The Client Agency Program Enrollment (CAPE) database records patients registered with a physician who practices in any of the
patient enrolment models (Glazier et al., 2012); we used CAPE to identify patients who are either enrolled with a FHG or FHO
physician. We used the Ontario Diabetes Dataset to identify individuals diagnosed with diabetes mellitus; ODD is a registry of
Ontarians diagnosed with diabetes mellitus since 1991. The algorithm for identifying individuals with diabetes in the ODD is the
occurrence of the following within two years: at least one hospital discharge with a diabetes diagnosis or at least two physician service
claims with a diabetes diagnosis. ODD had been validated and has a sensitivity of 86.1%, a specificity of 97.1% and a positive
predictive value of 80% (Hux et al., 2002; Lipscombe & Hux, 2007). While ODD excludes individuals with gestational diabetes, ODD
does not distinguish between type 1 and type 2 diabetes mellitus; nevertheless, the vast majority of individuals identified in ODD
would be persons with type 2 diabetes (Kiran et al., 2014). Demographic information, such as sex, date of birth, and payment model
type for primary care physicians are obtained from the Corporate Provider Database (CPDB) (Lofters et al., 2013; Ontario Ministry of
Health and Long Term Care, 2017). The Canadian Institute for Health Information - Hospital Discharge Abstract Database (CIHIDAD or simply DAD) contains clinical and administrative inpatient information for individuals who are discharged from hospitals. As
of 2002, DAD uses the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012). We
used DAD for identifying ACSC hospitalizations due to diabetes mellitus. The ICES Physician Database (IPDB) contains encrypted
physician numbers, yearly demographic information, and some practice characteristics on all physicians in Ontario. We used IPDB to
identify physicians’ characteristics, including age, sex, year of graduation, and country of medical education (i.e., international
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medical graduate or Canadian medical graduate). The Canadian Institutes for Health Information-National Ambulatory Care
Reporting System (CIHI-NACRS or simply NACRS) contains information on outpatient visits to hospital and community-based
ambulatory care facilities such as emergency departments (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012). We used information from OHIP,
DAD and NACRS for mortality risk score. The Ontario Drug Benefit Claims Database (ODB) contains claims data for prescription
medications covered by the Ontario Drug Benefit Program, which is a provincial program that provides coverage for various
prescription medications to Ontarians aged 65 years and above, as well as to social assistance recipients (Gandhi, 2016). We used
ODB for identifying prescription-based process measures (i.e., ACEI/ARB and statin prescriptions). The Ontario Health Insurance
Plan Database contains claims data of all insured services provided by licensed healthcare providers (including primary care
physicians) to Ontario residents eligible for the provincial healthcare coverage. Information recorded under OHIP includes the type of
service provided, the person who provided the service, the person who received the service, the date the service was provided, and the
fee code(s) associated with the service (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012). We used OHIP to identify laboratory-based process
measures (i.e., HbA1c testing, lipid assessment, nephropathy screening and eye examination). The Registered Persons Database
(RPDB) is a registry that houses demographic information for Ontarians with provincial healthcare coverage; the information includes
individuals’ sex, date of birth, and date of death (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012). We used RPDB to identify patients’
characteristics, including age and sex. Postal codes from the RPDB is used to obtain census dissemination area level income quantile.
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Table A1.1 Eligible patient population and outcome for quality indicators
Quality indicator
Eligible patient population
(i.e., denominator)

HbA1c testing

Lipid assessment

Nephropathy screening

Eye examination

Prescription of ACEI or
ARBs

Outcome (i.e., numerator)

For each year, only include patients
For each year, include patients who received
diagnosed with diabetes and who are
HbA1c testing at least once
alive in that year
Data sources: ODD, RPDB, OHIP
For each year, only include patients
For each year, include patients who received
diagnosed with diabetes and who are
testing for lipid profile at least once
alive in that year
Data sources: ODD, RPDB, OHIP
For each year, only include patients
diagnosed with diabetes and who are
alive in that year

For each year, include patients who received
ACR testing and creatinine testing at least
once
Data sources: ODD, OHIP, RPDB

For each year, only include patients
For each year, include patients who had
diagnosed with diabetes and who are
retinal eye examination done at least once
alive in that year
Data sources: ODD, OHIP,RPDB
For each year, only include patients
diagnosed with diabetes and who are
For each year, include patients who received
alive in that year. Also, only include
a prescription for ACEI or ARB at least
patients who are aged 65 years or older
once
Data sources: ODD, ODB, RPDB
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Prescription of statins

Risk of hospitalization for
diabetes mellitus as an
ambulatory care sensitive
condition (ACSC)

For each year, only include patients
diagnosed with diabetes and who are
For each year, include patients who received
alive in that year. Also, only include
a statin prescription at least once
patients who are aged 65 years or older
Data sources: ODB, ODD, RPDB
For each year:
-identify inpatients records from acute care hospitals with diabetes as the most
responsible diagnosis
-only include diabetes patients who are below 75 years of age
-only include diabetes patients who are alive within that year
Data sources: DAD, NACRS, ODD

For each year, calculate patients’ mortality risk score as per the algorithm by Austin
and Walraven (2011) (Austin & Walraven, 2011)
Data Sources: RPDB, OHIP, DAD, NACRS
Abbreviations: CAPE: Client Agency Program Enrollment Registry, CPDB: Corporate Provider Database, DAD:
Canadian Institute for Health Information - Hospital Discharge Abstract Database, ICES: Institute for Clinical
Evaluative Sciences, IPDB: ICES Physician Database, NACRS: National Ambulatory Care Reporting System, ODB:
Ontario Drug Benefit Claims Database, ODD: Ontario Diabetes Dataset, OHIP: Ontario Health Insurance Plan
Database, RPDB: Registered Persons Database, ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, HbA1c: glycated
haemoglobin, ACR: albumin-to-creatinine ratio, ACEI: Angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: Angiotensin
II receptor blockers
Notes:
The first six outcomes were quantified as proportions; avoidable diabetes-related hospitalizations (i.e., the seventh
outcome variable) were quantified as counts, and mortality risk score (i.e., the eighth outcome variable) were
quantified as means.
Mortality risk score
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Table A1.2 Codes for identifying diabetes process measures
Variable
Code(s)*
HbA1c testing
L093
Lipid testing
L055, L117, L243
Nephropathy screening: creatinine testing
L065,L067,L068
Nephropathy screening: ACR testing
G009, G010, L253, L254
Eye examination
V406, A234, A233, V409, A235, V404, A112, A115, A239, A236,
G460, A110, A252, A254, A230, A237, G461, A250, A111, A114
Note:
*The code(s) correspond to fee codes in the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) database
Abbreviation: ACR: Albumin-to-Creatinine Ratio, HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin
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Table A1.3 ICD-10-CA codes for ACSC hospitalization due to diabetes mellitus
Codes
E10.0, E10.1^, E.10.9, E11.9, E13.0, E13.9, E14.0, E14.63, E14.9, E11.0^, E11.1^, E13.0^, E13.1^,
E14.0^, E14.1^, E10.2^, E10.3^, E10.4^, E10.5^, E10.6^, E10.7^, E11.2^, E11.3^, E11.4^, E11.5^,
E11.6^, E11.7^, E13.2^, E13.3^, E13.4^, E13.5^, E13.6^, E13.7^, E14.2^, E14.3^, E14.4^, E14.5^,
E14.6^, E14.7^
Abbreviation: ICD-10-CA: International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th edition), Canada, ACSC:
ambulatory care sensitive condition.
References: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/82-622-x/2011007/definition-eng.htm ,
http://cmajopen.ca/content/suppl/2017/10/06/5.4.E746.DC1/2017-0007-2-at.pdf
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Appendix B (for Chapter 3)

Total number of switchers and non-switchers across the observation period of 10
years = 3,716
All 3,716 physicians are in the Family Health Group model at the baseline.
Overtime, 1,942 of 3716 physicians switched to Family Health Organization and
remained in a FHO.

Analyses were conducted on a balanced panel; only physicians present in every year
were included; also only physician with a minimum of 20 eligible patients for the
receipt of lab-based and prescription-based indicators were included. Thus, 1596
physicians were excluded to achieve a balanced panel with each physician having at
least 20 patients.

There are 2,120 physicians present in every year, and all of them within the range of
common support. There are 829 and 1291 non-switchers and switchers, respectively.

Figure B.0 Simple schematic for derivation of final sample size
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Table B1.0 Mean values of outcome and explanatory variables for the switchers (n= 1,291) and non-switchers (n= 829)
Variable
Switcher
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Outcome variables
HbA1c testing
0
0.548
0.555
0.579
0.585
0.593
0.596
0.578
0.593
0.596
1
0.563
0.57
0.592
0.603
0.617
0.621
0.606
0.625
0.634
Lipid
0
0.557
0.563
0.57
0.571
0.58
0.576
0.546
0.557
0.556
assessment
1
0.545
0.553
0.563
0.571
0.583
0.583
0.551
0.563
0.563
Nephropathy
0
0.627
0.629
0.64
0.642
0.647
0.648
0.627
0.637
0.634
screening
1
0.631
0.637
0.647
0.658
0.67
0.676
0.655
0.666
0.667
Eye
0
0.059
0.054
0.051
0.048
0.049
0.046
0.043
0.043
0.042
examination
1
0.049
0.045
0.045
0.043
0.043
0.041
0.038
0.039
0.037
ACEI or ARB
0
0.66
0.66
0.652
0.641
0.641
0.621
0.607
0.6
0.591
prescription
1
0.682
0.68
0.67
0.656
0.653
0.636
0.622
0.616
0.607
Statin
0
0.636
0.66
0.679
0.695
0.708
0.712
0.712
0.717
0.718
prescription
1
0.654
0.681
0.696
0.712
0.72
0.723
0.721
0.721
0.722
Mortality risk
0
48.39
48.59
48.91
49.27
49.63
50
50.37
50.86
51.47
score
1
49.72
49.83
50.09
50.44
50.67
51.08
51.4
51.77
52.26
ACSC
0
0
0.179
0.174
0.141
0.195
0.189
0.193
0.187
0.162
hospitalization
1
1
0.192
0.160
0.136
0.182
0.161
0.175
0.139
0.143
a
Physician characteristics
0
52.042 53.042 54.042 55.042 56.042 57.042 58.042 59.042 60.042
Age (in years)
1
49.925 50.925 51.925 52.925 53.925 54.925 55.925 56.925 57.925
0
0.259
0.259
0.259
0.259
0.259
0.259
0.259
0.259
0.259
Female
(proportion)
1
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.264
Group size
0
50.057 50.016 62.162 64.868 62.956 56.536 52.222 50.489 46.602
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2015
0.59
0.63
0.542
0.548
0.627
0.663
0.043
0.038
0.585
0.604
0.722
0.724
52.3
53.09
0.141
0.177
61.042
58.925
0.259
0.264
44.441

1
0
1
0

39.323
0.22
0.128
1858

39.313
0.22
0.128
1930

49.644
0.22
0.128
1938

47.059
0.22
0.128
1932

39.138
0.22
0.128
1895

25.316
0.22
0.128
1870

21.216
0.22
0.128
1843

20.8
0.22
0.128
1800

17.88
0.22
0.128
1772

16.808
0.22
0.128
1731

IMG
(proportion)
Number of
enrolled
patients
1
1812
1864
1861
1811
1772
1739
1703
1665
1634
1591
Patients’ characteristics
0
0.514
0.512
0.51
0.508
0.506
0.505
0.504
0.504
0.503
0.501
Female
(proportion)
1
0.516
0.514
0.513
0.513
0.512
0.511
0.511
0.51
0.509
0.507
0
0.052
0.051
0.051
0.051
0.051
0.051
0.052
0.052
0.052
0.053
Rural
(proportion)
1
0.103
0.102
0.102
0.102
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.101
0.101
0
39.317 39.795 40.301 40.769 41.276 41.829 42.406 43.056 43.645 44.228
Mean age (in
years)
1
40.25
40.677 41.129
41.69
42.213 42.777 43.358 43.953 44.504 45.036
Low income
0
0.41
0.403
0.398
0.394
0.391
0.389
0.387
0.386
0.383
0.377
quintile
(proportion)
1
0.366
0.362
0.357
0.354
0.35
0.349
0.348
0.347
0.345
0.339
0
3.411
3.38
3.315
3.382
3.418
3.407
3.451
3.394
3.354
3.388
ADG
1
3.337
3.295
3.23
3.279
3.268
3.232
3.243
3.149
3.103
3.121
Abbreviations: IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (Johns Hopkins), ACSC: ambulatory
care sensitive condition, HbA1c: glycated haemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II
receptor blocker
Notes:
0=non-switchers, 1=switchers
a
Expected income gain for switchers and non-switchers, in 2006, were 137,133 and 108,148 dollars, respectively
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Table B1.1 Results from Covariate Balancing Propensity Score weighting
Means and standardized bias after CBPS weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias reduction
Physician’s characteristics
Expected income gain (in thousand $)
137.13
137.13
100
2
(Expected income gain)
25022
25022
100
Age (years)
49.924
49.924
100
2
Age
2564.1
2564.1
100
Female (%)
0.26336
0.26336
100
IMG (%)
39.322
39.322
100
Group size
0.12703
0.12703
100
Number of enrolled patients
1811.5
1811.5
100
Patients’ characteristics
Female (%)
0.51563
0.51563
100
Rural areas (%)
0.10259
0.10259
100
Average age (in years)
40.249
40.249
100
Low income quintile (%)
0.36592
0.36593
100
Average ADG
3.3363
3.3363
100
Outcome variables
HbA1c testing
0.56204
0.56204
100
Lipid assessment
0.54453
0.54453
100
Nephropathy screening
0.63066
0.63066
100
Eye examination
0.04893
0.04893
100
ACEI or ARB prescription
0.68157
0.68157
100
Statin prescription
0.65352
0.65352
100
Mortality risk score
49.711
49.711
100
ACSC hospitalization due to diabetes
0.192
0.192
100

107

t--statistic

p-value

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated Diagnosis Groups
(Johns Hopkins), ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, HbA1c: glycated haemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin
converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
FHO represents physicians who switched from FHG to FHO at any point within the observation period; FHG represents physicians who remained in a FHG
model throughout the observation period.
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Table B1.2 Results from Entropy Balancing weighting
Means and standardized bias after EB weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias reduction
Physician’s characteristics
Expected income
137.13
137.14
100
gain (in thousand $)
(Expected income
25022
25022
100
gain)2
Age (years)
49.924
49.925
100
2
Age
2564.1
2564.2
100
Female (%)
0.26336
0.26323
97.5
IMG (%)
39.322
39.323
100
Group size
0.12703
0.12696
99.9
Number of enrolled
1811.5
1811.6
99.9
patients
Patients’ characteristics
Female (%)
0.51563
0.51564
99.6
Rural areas (%)
0.10259
0.10259
100
Average age (in
40.249
40.25
99.9
years)
Low income quintile
0.36592
0.36593
100
(%)
Average AGD
3.3363
3.3364
99.9
Outcome variables
HbA1c testing
0.56204
0.56205
99.9
Lipid assessment
0.54453
0.54454
99.9
Nephropathy
0.63066
0.63067
99.7
screening
Eye examination
0.04893
0.04893
100
ACEI or ARB
0.68157
0.68158
99.9
prescription
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t-statistic

p-value

0

0.997

0

1

0
0
0.01
0
0.01

0.998
0.998
0.994
1
0.995

0

0.999

0
0

0.998
1

0

0.997

0

0.999

0

0.997

0
0

0.999
0.999

0

0.999

0

1

0

0.997

Statin prescription
0.65352
0.65354
99.9
0
0.998
Mortality risk score
49.711
49.712
99.9
-0.01
0.995
ACSC hospitalization
0.192
0.192
100
0
1
due to diabetes
Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated
Diagnosis Groups (Johns Hopkins), EB: entropy balancing, HbA1c: glycated haemoglobin, ACEI: Angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor,
ARB: Angiotensin II receptor blockers
FHO represents physicians who switched from FHG to FHO at any point within the observation period; FHG represents physicians who
remained in a FHG throughout the observation period.
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Figure B.1 Distribution of propensity scores before and after kernel weighting.
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Figure B.2 Standardized mean difference and variance ratio for covariates from the unmatched
(i.e., raw) and matched samples.
Abbreviations: IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated Diagnosis Groups
(Johns Hopkins), HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin, ACEI: Angiotensin converting enzyme
inhibitors, ARB: Angiotensin II receptor blocker, ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition
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Table B1.3 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcomes, for male physicians
Outcome Variable
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
HbA1c testing

0.0248***

0.0259***

0.0261***

0.0256***

Lipid assessment

(0.0168 - 0.0327)
0.0248***

(0.0158 - 0.0360)
0.0259***

(0.0159 - 0.0363)
0.0261***

(0.0140 - 0.0373)
0.0256***

Nephropathy screening

(0.0168 - 0.0327)
0.0266***

(0.0158 - 0.0360)
0.0291***

(0.0159 - 0.0363)
0.0284***

(0.0140 - 0.0373)
0.0305***

Eye examination

(0.0184 - 0.0348)
-0.000222

(0.0185 - 0.0396)
-0.00118

(0.0179 - 0.0389)
-0.000974

(0.0180 - 0.0430)
-0.000351

ACEI or ARB prescription

(-0.00227 - 0.00183)
-0.00439

(-0.00323 - 0.000865)
0.00285

(-0.00301 - 0.00107)
0.0037

(-0.00265 - 0.00195)
0.00688*

Statin prescription

(-0.0101 - 0.00131)
0.00815***

(-0.00382 - 0.00951)
0.00942***

(-0.00300 - 0.0104)
0.00994***

(-0.000370 - 0.0141)
0.0114***

Mortality risk score

(0.00279 - 0.0135)
-0.425***

(0.00311 - 0.0157)
-0.252***

(0.00377 - 0.0161)
-0.211**

(0.00400 - 0.0188)
-0.346***

ACSC hospitalization due to
diabetes

(-0.556 - -0.293)
1.081
(0.926 - 1.262)

(-0.412 - -0.0920)
1.089
(0.910 - 1.304)

(-0.403 - -0.0199)
1.115
(0.931 - 1.336)

(-0.510 - -0.182)
1.098
(0.884 - 1.365)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses; effects and
corresponding 95% CI are reported as proportions.
Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO:
Family Health Organization; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, FHO: Family Health Organization, HbA1c: glycated haemoglobin,
ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
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Table B1.4 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcome, for female physicians
Outcome variable
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
HbA1c testing
Lipid assessment
Nephropathy screening
Eye examination
ACEI or ARB prescription
Statin prescription
Mortality risk score

0.0190***

0.0168**

0.0160**

0.0223***

(0.00650 - 0.0316)
0.0307***
(0.0188 - 0.0426)
0.0297***
(0.0181 - 0.0413)
0.00169
(-0.00195 - 0.00533)
0.00347
(-0.00745 - 0.0144)
0.0115**
(0.000954 - 0.0221)
-0.285**
(-0.515 - -0.0540)
0.612**
(0.417 - 0.897)

(0.00287 - 0.0307)
0.0238***
(0.00859 - 0.0390)
0.0243***
(0.0102 - 0.0384)
0.00104
(-0.00238 - 0.00446)
0.00612
(-0.00742 - 0.0197)
0.0140**
(0.00166 - 0.0264)
-0.069
(-0.331 - 0.193)
0.610**
(0.403 - 0.921)

(0.00213 - 0.0299)
0.0238***
(0.00914 - 0.0385)
0.0239***
(0.0102 - 0.0376)
0.00129
(-0.00220 - 0.00478)
0.0059
(-0.00764 - 0.0194)
0.0145**
(0.00218 - 0.0268)
-0.108
(-0.367 - 0.151)
0.621**
(0.413 - 0.932)

(0.00736 - 0.0372)
0.0277***
(0.0139 - 0.0416)
0.0289***
(0.0159 - 0.0420)
-0.00105
(-0.00615 - 0.00404)
-0.00322
(-0.0303 - 0.0238)
0.0166**
(0.00382 - 0.0294)
0.0685
(-0.357 - 0.494)
0.608**
(0.406 - 0.910)

ACSC hospitalization due
to diabetes
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses; effects
and corresponding 95% CI are reported as proportions. Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate
balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition,
FHO: Family Health Organization, HbA1c: glycated haemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II
receptor blocker
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Table B1.5 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcome, for physicians aged below
55 years
Outcome variable
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
HbA1c testing
0.0184***
0.0208***
0.0196***
0.0235***
(0.00988 - 0.0268)
(0.00983 - 0.0319)
(0.00860 - 0.0306)
(0.0129 - 0.0342)
Lipid assessment
0.0225***
0.0226***
0.0217***
0.0237***
(0.0138 - 0.0311)
(0.0114 - 0.0337)
(0.0103 - 0.0332)
(0.0126 - 0.0349)
Nephropathy screening
0.0222***
0.0236***
0.0222***
0.0278***
(0.0140 - 0.0304)
(0.0132 - 0.0341)
(0.0116 - 0.0329)
(0.0173 - 0.0382)
Eye examination
-0.00111
-0.00142
-0.00132
-0.00162
(-0.00321 (-0.00354 (-0.00346 (-0.00432 - 0.00108)
0.000997)
0.000702)
0.000821)
ACEI or ARB prescription
-0.00245
0.00491
0.00464
0.00272
(-0.00867 - 0.00377) (-0.00273 - 0.0126)
(-0.00300 - 0.0123)
(-0.00958 - 0.0150)
Statin prescription
0.00569*
0.00822**
0.00820**
0.0115***
(-0.000380 - 0.0118) (0.000936 - 0.0155) (0.00103 - 0.0154)
(0.00350 - 0.0194)
Mortality risk score
-0.314***
-0.134
-0.0885
-0.116
(-0.453 - -0.175)
(-0.306 - 0.0386)
(-0.287 - 0.110)
(-0.331 - 0.0998)
ACSC hospitalization due to
0.952
0.991
1.038
1.043
diabetes
(0.793 - 1.143)
(0.799 - 1.229)
(0.836 - 1.290)
(0.810 - 1.343)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in
parentheses ; effects and corresponding 95% CI are reported as proportions.Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE:
fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, FHO: Family Health Organization, HbA1c: glycated haemoglobin, ACEI:
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
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Table B1.6 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcome, for physicians aged 55
years and above
Outcome variable
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
HbA1c testing

0.0376***
(0.0255 - 0.0498)

0.0367***
(0.0212 - 0.0522)

0.0384***
(0.0233 - 0.0536)

Lipid assessment

0.0340***
(0.0218 - 0.0462)

0.0300***
(0.0144 - 0.0455)

0.0320***
(0.0168 - 0.0471)

Nephropathy screening

0.0342***
(0.0226 - 0.0459)

0.0329***
(0.0180 - 0.0478)

0.0331***
(0.0185 - 0.0477)

Eye examination

0.00205
(-0.00125 - 0.00536)

0.000774
(-0.00236 - 0.00391)

ACEI or ARB prescription

-0.00239
(-0.0113 - 0.00649)

Statin prescription

0.0150***
(0.00690 - 0.0230)

0.000515
(-0.00260 0.00363)
0.00135
(-0.00823 0.0109)
0.0141***
(0.00516 - 0.0231)

Mortality risk score

-0.518***
(-0.711 - -0.324)

-0.321***
(-0.537 - -0.104)

-0.381***
(-0.591 - -0.172)

ACSC hospitalization due to
diabetes

1.091
(0.863 - 1.380)

1.055
(0.811 - 1.373)

1.051
(0.809 - 1.365)

0.00319
(-0.00617 - 0.0126)
0.0158***
(0.00702 - 0.0245)

0.0433***
(0.0229 0.0637)
0.0328***
(0.0136 0.0520)
0.0338***
(0.0141 0.0535)
0.00193
(-0.00154 0.00541)
0.00776
(-0.00162 0.0171
0.0150***
(0.00422 0.0259)
-0.463***
(-0.702 - 0.224)
1.016
(0.751 - 1.375)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses; effects and
corresponding 95% CI are reported as proportions.
Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family
Health Organization; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, FHO: Family Health Organization, HbA1 c: glycated haemoglobin, ACEI:
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
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Table B1.7 Effect of switching to FHO on process of diabetes care and patients’ health outcome, for physicians who
switched in between 2008 & 2009, 2010 & 2011, 2012 & 2013 and 2014 &2015
switched in between 2008 & 2009 (N=19,071)
Outcome
Unweighted
variable
HbA1c testing
0.0252***
(0.0186 - 0.0318)
Lipid assessment 0.0244***
(0.0177 - 0.0311)
Nephropathy
0.0247***
screening
(0.0183 - 0.0310)
Eye examination -0.000189
(-0.00201 - 0.00163)

Kernel

CBPS

EB

0.0270***
(0.0198 - 0.0341)
0.0288***
(0.0213 - 0.0363)
0.0260***
(0.0189 - 0.0330)
-0.00081
(-0.00269 - 0.00107)

0.0358***
(0.0243 - 0.0472)
0.0353***
(0.0236 - 0.0471)
0.0324***
(0.0209 - 0.0439)
0.0004
(-0.00166 - 0.00246)

-0.375***
(-0.503 - -0.247)
1.089
(0.910 - 1.302)

0.0275***
(0.0204 - 0.0347)
0.0284***
(0.0209 - 0.0360)
0.0260***
(0.0190 - 0.0331)
-0.000777
(-0.00265 0.00110)
-0.000294
(-0.00557 0.00499)
0.0148***
(0.01000 0.0196)
-0.367***
(-0.494 - -0.241)
1.103
(0.920 - 1.323)

0.0130***

0.0131***

0.0123***

ACEI or ARB
prescription

-0.00225
(-0.00719 - 0.00270)

-0.000265
(-0.00561 - 0.00508)

Statin
prescription

0.00748***
(0.00294 - 0.0120)

0.0151***
(0.0103 - 0.0199)

Mortality risk
-0.374***
score
(-0.487 - -0.261)
ACSC
1.046
hospitalization
(0.895 - 1.222)
due to diabetes
switched between 2010 & 2011 (N=11,410)
HbA1c testing
0.0162***
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-0.000617
(-0.00694 - 0.00570)
0.0140***
(0.00882 - 0.0192)
-0.416***
(-0.571 - -0.262)
1.071
(0.875 - 1.311)

(0.00832 - 0.0240)

(0.00472 - 0.0213)

Lipid assessment

0.0126***
(0.00445 - 0.0208)

0.0120***
(0.00339 - 0.0207)

Nephropathy
screening

0.0147***
(0.00730 - 0.0222)

0.0151***
(0.00727 - 0.0229)

Eye examination

-0.00146
(-0.00380 - 0.000874)

-0.00242
(-0.00536 - 0.000509)

ACEI or ARB
prescription

0.00158
(-0.00431 - 0.00747)

0.0011
(-0.00535 - 0.00755)

Statin
prescription

-0.00136

0.00336

(-0.00686 - 0.00414)

(-0.00261 - 0.00934)

Mortality risk
-0.299***
score
(-0.441 - -0.157)
ACSC
1.03
hospitalization
(0.808 - 1.314)
due to diabetes
switched between 2012 & 2013 (N=5,840)
HbA1c testing
0.0227***
(0.0119 - 0.0335)
Lipid assessment 0.0136**
(0.00190 - 0.0252)

-0.364***
(-0.514 - -0.214)
0.923
(0.699 - 1.218)

0.0207***
(0.00857 - 0.0329)
0.0118*
(-0.00129 - 0.0249)
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(0.00471 0.0214)
0.0122***
(0.00346 0.0208)
0.0153***
(0.00742 0.0231)
-0.00228
(-0.00525 0.000687)
0.00125
(-0.00527 0.00777)
0.00336

(0.00393 - 0.0206)

(-0.00263 0.00936)
-0.362***
(-0.512 - -0.211)
0.929
(0.702 - 1.229)

(-0.00430 - 0.00774)

0.0223***
(0.0101 - 0.0345)
0.0136**
(0.000430 0.0267)

0.0178***
(0.00490 - 0.0307)
0.0134*
(-0.000146 - 0.0270)

0.0115**
(0.00269 - 0.0203)
0.0145***
(0.00668 - 0.0224)
-0.00225
(-0.00518 - 0.000680)
0.00112
(-0.00549 - 0.00773)
0.00172

-0.343***
(-0.495 - -0.190)
0.925
(0.700 - 1.223)

Nephropathy
screening
Eye examination

-0.00206
(-0.00500 - 0.000874)

-0.00455***
(-0.00748 - -0.00162)

ACEI or ARB
prescription

-0.000438
(-0.00798 - 0.00710)

0.00106
(-0.00719 - 0.00932)

Statin
prescription

-0.00696*

-0.00683

(-0.0140 - 5.33e-05)

(-0.0150 - 0.00132)

-0.00473***
(-0.00767 - 0.00179)
0.00203
(-0.00636 0.0104)
-0.00683

-0.00448***
(-0.00768 - -0.00127)

(-0.0123 - 0.00535)

0.00445
(-0.00480 - 0.0137)
-0.00346

Mortality risk
-0.147
score
(-0.337 - 0.0422)
ACSC
1.262
hospitalization
(0.814 - 1.957)
due to diabetes
switched between 2014 & 2015 (N=2,991)
HbA1c testing
0.0162*
(-0.00289 - 0.0354)
Lipid assessment 0.0193*
(-0.000835 - 0.0394)
Nephropathy
screening

-0.159
(-0.373 - 0.0542)
1.158
(0.700 - 1.917)

(-0.0150 0.00132)
-0.136
(-0.352 - 0.0796)
1.191
(0.718 - 1.976)

0.00552
(-0.0168 - 0.0278)
0.00314
(-0.0206 - 0.0269)

0.00705
(-0.0154 - 0.0295)
0.00397
(-0.0199 - 0.0278)

0.00776
(-0.0156 - 0.0311)
0.00385
(-0.0205 - 0.0282)

Eye examination

0.00357
(-0.000764 - 0.00790)

0.00313
(-0.000869 - 0.00713)

0.0028
(-0.00113 - 0.00673)

ACEI or ARB
prescription

0.00649
(-0.00325 - 0.0162)

0.00791
(-0.00352 - 0.0193)

0.00264
(-0.00134 0.00662)
0.00827
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-0.124
(-0.353 - 0.105)
1.004
(0.596 - 1.690)

0.00681
(-0.00452 - 0.0181)

Statin
prescription

-0.00843*
(-0.0174 - 0.000573)

-0.00403
(-0.0135 - 0.00545)

Mortality risk
score
ACSC
hospitalization
due to diabetes

0.0473
(-0.213 - 0.307)
1.073
(0.484 - 2.378)

0.0853
(-0.179 - 0.350)
0.977
(0.369 - 2.588)

(-0.00297 0.0195)
-0.00431
(-0.0137 0.00510)
0.0777
(-0.190 - 0.346)
0.958
(0.361 - 2.540)

-0.00526
(-0.0151 - 0.00455)
0.155
(-0.120 - 0.430)
0.929
(0.351 - 2.460)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses; effects
and corresponding 95% CI are reported as proportions.
Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing,
FHO: Family Health Organization; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, FHO: Family Health Organization, HbA1 c: glycated
haemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
N=total number of observations
Estimates for nephropathy screening could not be computed for physicians who switched as of 2012 because the main independent
variable predicted outcome perfectly.
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Table B1.8 Effect of switching to FHO on process of care and health outcomes for persons with diabetes mellitus: Results
of before-and-after analyses
Outcome variable (n=12,910)
Pooled
Fixed effects
HbA1c testing (%)

Lipid assessment (%)

Nephropathy screening (%)

Eye examination (%)

ACEI or ARB prescription (%)

Statin prescription (%)

Mean mortality risk score

3.43***

2.27***

(1.94 - 4.93)

(1.57 - 2.96)

4.18***

3.09***

(2.71 - 5.64)

(2.36 - 3.82)

3.67***

2.29***

(2.23 - 5.10)

(1.60 - 2.98)

0.233

-0.125

(-0.171 - 0.637)

(-0.321 - 0.0709)

-0.615

-0.0567

(-1.57 - 0.336)

(-0.563 - 0.450)

1.39***

2.19***

(0.366 - 2.42)

(1.71 - 2.66)

-0.153

-0.368***
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Risk ACSC hospitalization due to diabetes

(-0.407 - 0.101)

(-0.478 - -0.259)

1.191**

0.988

(1.011 - 1.402)

(0.825 - 1.183)

Abbreviations: HbA1c: glycated hemoglobin, ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor
blocker, FHO: Family Health Organization; ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition, n: sample size.
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in
parentheses
This table reports the effect of switching from FHG to FHO on processes of care and patients’ health outcomes.
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Chapter 4
4

Impact of family physician payment schemes on follow-up care, mortality
risk and avoidable hospitalizations in patients with congestive heart failure

A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication as: Bamimore MA, Devlin
RA, Zaric GS, Garg AX and Sarma S. Impact of family physician payment schemes on
follow-up care, mortality risk and avoidable hospitalizations in patients with congestive
heart failure.
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4.1

Introduction

In the past two decades, many developed countries have reformed primary care in
order to improve access to primary care services, (OECD, 2016) especially better
management of chronic diseases (Li et al., 2014; OECD, 2016; Roland & Campbell,
2014). Many of the reform proposals involved changes in physician remuneration from
pure payment systems of FFS, capitation or salary to blended remuneration (Gosden et
al., 2001; Newhouse, 1996; Robinson, 2001). Blended remuneration schemes combine
elements of pure payment systems with pay-for-performance incentives to address
weaknesses in pure payment systems.
The province of Ontario introduced primary care reforms in the early 2000s that
restructured how family physicians were paid and to provide better chronic disease
management and preventive care to the targeted populations (Hutchison & Glazier, 2013;
Sweetman & Buckley, 2014). Prior to the reform, over 90 per cent of Ontario’s family
physicians received most of their income through FFS payments (Sweetman & Buckley,
2014), now over two-thirds are remunerated through blended payment schemes.
Family Health Groups and Family Health Organizations are the two dominant postreform blended payment models available to primary care physicians in Ontario. The
FHG, introduced in July 2003, is a blended FFS scheme and the FHO, introduced in
November 2006, is a blended capitation scheme (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014). In FHO,
physicians receive capitation payments adjusted for age and sex to provide a core basket
of services to enrolled patients. They also receive 15% of the FFS payment for each inbasket service provided to these patients, and 100% of the FFS payment for services
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provided outside of the basket and for all services to non-enrolled patients up to an
annual limit. FHG physicians are primarily paid by FFS plus a small capitation payment.
Physicians in both models are eligible to claim the same pay-for-performance incentives
in the areas of illness prevention and chronic disease management (diabetes and
congestive heart failure), and are required to provide a minimum of 3-hours/week afterhours care (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014).
Both FHGs and FHOs include a pay-for-performance program known as the ‘Heart
Failure Management Incentive’ which rewards physicians $125 per enrolled patient per
annum for providing congestive heart failure care in accordance with the practice
guidelines of the Canadian Cardiovascular Society (Ezekowitz et al., 2017). The Heart
Failure Management Incentive requires that physicians provide patient counselling,
conduct physical examinations, and prescribe the following first-line pharmacological
therapy for patients whose ejection fraction is 40% or below: angiotensin converting
enzyme inhibitors (or angiotensin II receptor blockers for those who are ACEI
intolerant), and beta blockers; loop diuretics, mineralocorticoid receptor antagonists, and
digoxin are recommended for symptom relief. Furthermore, it suggests the prophylactic
use of acetylsalicylic acid, and recommends the prescription of appropriate
anticoagulants for those diagnosed with atrial fibrillation (Ministry of Health and LongTerm Care Primary Health Care Team, 2008). These care elements of the Heart Failure
Management Incentive have been linked to better patient outcomes (Granger et al., 2003;
Milton Packer et al., 1996; Pitt et al., 1999).
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The main question addressed in this paper is whether the outcome of the Heart
Failure Management Incentive program is affected by whether it is grafted onto a blended
FFS (FHG) or a blended capitation (FHO) environment. Health economics theory
suggests that capitation provides better incentives for the efficient delivery of health
services than pure FFS (Christianson & Conrad, 2012; Eggleston, 2005; McGuire, 2011).
The empirical literature suggests a relationship between physician remuneration and
quality of patient care (Kiran et al., 2014; Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013); some studies found
that P4P programs result in decreased hospital readmissions (Desai et al., 2016; Lalloué
et al., 2017), while studies by Mellor et al. (2017) and McGarry et al. (2016) found that
such outcomes are not affected by P4P schemes. Capitation payments have been found to
improve continuity of care (like follow-ups post hospitalization) and preventative care,
relative to FFS (Blomqvist & Busby, 2012; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Kralj & Kantarevic,
2013). This result arises partly because capitated physicians rely on a stable roster of
patients for most of their income, fostering strong physician-patient relationships. A
priori, one might think that CHF patients would be better served by the Heart Failure
Management Incentive program under blended capitation (FHO) relative to those in
blended FFS (FHG).
Two studies to date have examined some elements of this problem (Jaakkimainen
et al., 2011; Russell et al., 2009). Russell et al. (2009) employed a cross-sectional
analysis and found no difference in specific prescription behaviour between family
physicians in FFS- and capitation-based schemes; the same result was echoed by
Jaakkimainen et al. (2011) also with cross-sectional data. But the Heart Failure
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Management Incentive involves much more than prescription behaviour. The availability
of more and better data allows for a more rigorous investigation into this question –
which is the main contribution of this paper. We push the empirical investigation in two
directions. First, a broader array of performance indicators than the previous literature are
examined: follow-up care after hospitalization within seven days and 30 days, avoidable
hospitalizations due to CHF, and mortality risk. These four indicators present a better
picture of the impact of the physician remuneration on patient outcomes in the area of
CHF. Second, we employ a longitudinal data set which is able detect changes in
physician behaviour over time, while accounting for potential biases present in previous
cross-sectional study designs.
4.2

Methods

Study design
We used a retrospective cohort design with an observation period spanning April
1st, 2006 and March 31st, 2016. Our sample consisted of physicians in FHOs and FHGs,
and their patients diagnosed with CHF; a schematic of the creation of our study
population is presented in Supplementary Appendix S1. FHG physicians who switched to
a FHO and remained in this model throughout the observation period were defined as
‘switchers’; ‘non-switchers’ were those physicians who remained in the FHG model
throughout our study period. All physicians were in the FHG model in the 1st year of our
study.
Data sources and ethics
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All our data were obtained from ICES (formerly known as the Institute for
Clinical Evaluative Sciences), which houses numerous healthcare administrative
databases for Ontario. Persons with CHF were identified using the ICES CHF database,
which contains all patients diagnosed with CHF since 1991 with high sensitivity and
specificity (Schultz et al., 2013). The client agency program enrollment database
identified patients enrolled to physicians in the FHG and FHO models. Physician
characteristics were obtained from the corporate provider database and ICES physician
database. Patient characteristics were obtained from the Registered Persons Database and
area-level census. These databases were linked using a unique anonymized patient
identifier.
The data for this study were used in accordance with section 45 of Ontario’s
Personal Health Information Protection Act: hence, a Research Ethics Board approval
was not required.
Outcome Variables
We investigated discharges due to CHF that were followed up with a physician
within seven days and 30 days, patients’ estimated mortality risk score, and avoidable
hospitalizations due to CHF. An avoidable hospitalization due to CHF is defined as a
hospital admission in persons aged below 75 years with the most responsible ICD-10-CA
(International Classification of Diseases and Disorders, 10th Revision Canadian
Modification codes) diagnosis codes being I50 (heart failure) and J81 (pulmonary
edema), excluding cardiac procedures (the details are provided in Table 2 in
Supplementary Appendix S1); such events are termed ‘avoidable’ because CHF-related
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admissions in persons aged below 75 years are potentially preventable if ambulatory care
is adequate and efficient (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2020a). The followup care outcomes were proportions: for each physician, the denominator was the total
number of physician’s patients discharged from a CHF hospitalization in the given year
and the numerator is those discharged patients with a follow-up with the physician within
seven or 30 days. MRS is an estimate of a person’s risk of all-cause death within one year
based on an algorithm by Austin and Walraven (2011). Using the patient-level MRS, we
constructed the average of CHF patients’ MRS in a physician’s practice. Avoidable CHFrelated hospitalization was a count variable: for each physician in a given year, we
counted the total number of CHF-related avoidable hospitalizations experienced by a
physician’s patients. More details on variable definitions are provided in Supplementary
Appendix S1.
Statistical analyses
We conducted all analyses at the physician-level; physicians not present in each
year were excluded, yielding a balanced panel-data for 10 years. For longitudinal
analyses, two models were initially considered: (1) single-group before-after, and (2)
before-and-after analysis with a control group. Model 1 comprises only physicians who
switched to FHO; however, a major drawback is the absence of a contemporaneous
control group. Model 2 entails switchers and non-switchers, allowing for difference-indifferences analyses; but model 2 does not account for potential systematic differences
between switchers and non-switchers (or selection bias). Thus, we implemented a
propensity score model and used the estimated propensity scores to construct inverse
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probability weights (Guo & Fraser, 2015) to ensure that both groups of physicians were
similar in terms of all covariates and outcomes at the baseline. Thus, any change in
outcomes over the baseline is most likely due to the effect of remuneration, after
adjusting for potential confounders.
One further issue could be the presence of physician-specific time-invariant
confounding (essentially an omitted variable bias arising due to this type of
confounding). To account for such bias, we performed an inverse probability weighted
fixed-effects regression analysis, detailed in Supplementary Appendix S2A. A fractional
weighted fixed-effects regression model was used for the follow-up indicators (Papke,
1996), a linear weighted fixed-effects regression model was used for mortality risk scores
(Sarma et al., 2018) and a weighted fixed-effects Poisson regression model was used for
avoidable CHF-related hospitalization.
Propensity score model
A physician’s propensity score is their probability of being in the exposed group or
control group, given a set of explanatory variables (Faries et al., 2010). Propensity scores
are estimated using a logistic regression that regresses the probability of exposure
assignment on covariates (Faries et al., 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The general
guideline is to include variables in the propensity score model that can plausibly affect
outcome and exposure (Faries et al., 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Following the
previous literature, we include physician characteristics (age, country of medical
education (Canada/US or international), group size and number of patients enrolled,
patient characteristics in physicians’ practice (proportion of females, average age of
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patients in the physician’s practice, proportion of female patients in the practice, patients’
average comorbidity score based on the Johns Hopkins Aggregated Diagnosis Groups,
proportion of patients from low income quintile (based on census dissemination arealevel income) and the proportion of patients living in rural areas), and expected income
gain from switching from FHG to FHO at the baseline in our propensity score model
(Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013; Sarma et al., 2018; Somé et al., 2019). We excluded
physicians from the switcher and non-switcher groups if the range of their propensity
scores did not overlap (were outside the range of common support), which is necessary in
order to make inferences about treatment (here switching) effects. We then derived
inverse probability weights for physicians from their estimated propensity scores using
kernel matching (i.e. kernel weighting). Regressions that are weighted by the inverse
probability weights allow for the estimation of the average effect of switching to FHOs
on outcomes in switchers (our point estimate of interest). Here, a weight of one was
assigned to FHO physicians (switchers); non switchers were given a weight that
corresponded to the distance between the non-switcher’s and switcher’s propensity scores
within a bandwidth of 0.06 (Garrido et al., 2014; Guo & Fraser, 2015).
Balance in the covariate distribution between switcher and non-switcher physicians at
baseline was assessed using t-tests and standardized bias tests (Guo & Fraser, 2015;
Harder et al., 2010). We also used two alternatives to kernel weighting procedure to
address bias due to covariate imbalance: the covariate balancing propensity score(Imai &
Ratkovic, 2014) and entropy balancing weights (Hainmueller, 2012). Given differences
in patients’ eligibility criteria for indicators of follow-up care and health outcomes, the

131

propensity score model was run on two separate samples: one for follow-up care, and the
other for health outcomes.
To see whether the impact of switching to FHO varied across subgroups, separate
analyses were conducted on: (1) males, (2) females, (3) those aged 55 years or higher at
the baseline, (4) those aged below 55 years at the baseline, and (5) by timing of switch to
FHO as previous research found that switchers in the 2006-2009 period and 2010
onwards were different with regards to referrals to specialists (Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013;
Sarma et al., 2018). The statistical software Stata version 15.1 (StataCorp, 2017) was
used for all analyses.
4.3

Results

We observed a total of 749 physicians for follow-up care analysis, comprising
7,490 physician-year observations: 478 switchers and 271 non-switchers. In the sample
for the MRS and CHF-related avoidable hospitalizations, we observed 2,639 physicians
(26,390 physician-year observations): 1,596 switchers and 1,043 non-switchers. Mean
values for follow-up care and health-related outcomes are provided in Appendix S2B. A
simple schematic for derivation of the final sample size of physicians is provided in
Supplemental Figure S0.
Before applying propensity score weights, all the covariates in the follow-up care
sample were significantly different between switchers and non-switchers except for sex;
non-significant p-values were reported for all covariates after applying inverse
probability weighting (Supplementary Table S1). Likewise, our alternative weighting
procedures also produced non-significant p-values for all covariates after weighting
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(Supplementary Tables S2 and S3). For the other two indicators (i.e., MRS and avoidable
hospitalization), there was no significant difference between the covariates after applying
CBPS and entropy balancing weights (Supplementary Tables S4 – S6). In both groups of
performance indicators, non-significant p-values, and standardized bias of no greater than
7% were reported for all variables after applying inverse probability weighting.
Furthermore, visual representation for the distribution of propensity scores, and the
standardized difference in means and variance ratios confirmed that there was reasonable
balance in the distribution of covariates between switchers and non-switchers after
weighting (Supplemental Figures S1 – S4).
Regression results
We reported estimates from unweighted and weighted pooled and fixed-effects
regressions; fixed-effects estimates account for unobservable time-invariant physician
factors, while pooled estimates do not. Unweighted estimates are from regressions that
did not incorporate inverse probability weights (model 2 described in the methods
section), while weighted regressions incorporated such weights. Model 1 results are
reported in the Supplementary Appendix S6. The inverse probability weighted
regressions are reported here. We found that switching to FHO had no significant impact
on all four performance indicators.
Switching was non-significantly associated with a reduction in physicians’ postdischarge follow-up visit within seven days by 0.57% (95% CI: -3.38%, 2.24%);
similarly, a non-significant reduction by 0.31% (95% CI: -3.7%, 3.1%) was observed for
physician’ post-discharge follow-up visit within 30 days (Table 4.1). Switchers’ patients,
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on average, had non-significantly lower MRS by 0.143 (95% CI: -0.412, 0.127), and nonsignificantly lower risk of avoidable CHF-related hospitalizations (relative risk = 0.76,
95% CI: 0.42 – 1.38) (Table 4.1). These findings were corroborated using CBPS and EB
weights (Supplementary Appendix S4). Similarly, switching did not have any differential
impact for physicians who were male, female, aged below 55 years and aged at least 55
years (Table 4.2); the robustness of these subgroup analyses was corroborated with CBPS
and EB weights (Supplementary Appendix S4). The impact of switching to FHO was not
significantly different across physicians who switched to the FHO model in any of the
four timeframes (Table 4.3), and the robustness of this finding was confirmed with CBPS
and EB weights (Supplementary Appendix S5).
4.4

Discussion

We found that family physicians who switched from FHGs to FHOs were not
significantly different in terms of following up with their patients with CHF within seven
and 30 days post-discharge from avoidable hospitalization compared to their counterparts
who remained in the FHG. We also found that switchers’ and non-switchers’ patients
with CHF, on average, were not different in terms of their estimated mortality risk scores
and risk of avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF. For all four outcomes, results from
one-group before-and-after analysis produced similar conclusions (Supplementary
Appendix S6).
Our study has several strengths. Our statistical approach, which used inverse
probability weighted fixed-effects regressions with longitudinal data over ten years leads
to robust conclusions and improves upon the two existing cross-sectional studies
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(Jaakkimainen et al., 2011; Russell et al., 2009). Employing a long follow-up period after
the introduction of the FHO model adds to the credibility of our results. One limitation of
our study is that we cannot rule out hidden bias arising from the fact that the switchers
and non-switchers were not randomized. Nonetheless, the repertoire of covariates
included in our propensity score model (including physicians’ expected income gain) and
inverse probability weighted fixed-effects regressions should limit the influence of
hidden bias. The drug-prescribing, evidence-based, care processes required by the Heart
Failure Management Incentive are exclusive to persons with CHF who have a reduced
ejection fraction. Given that information on ejection fraction is currently unavailable
through the ICES databases, we could not examine prescription-based indicators. Like
our study, a previous study (Esse et al., 2013) also pointed out that quality of physicians’
care practices in CHF management is not necessarily affected by remuneration schemes
in the United States.
Continuity and coordination of care are major hallmarks of primary care—a
process whereby family physicians, specialists and patients work collaboratively to
ensure effective management of patients’ health condition (Jaakkimainen et al., 2011;
Russell et al., 2009). Post-discharge follow-up care by family physicians is a relevant
performance indicator for the management of CHF as up to 57% of persons with CHF
discharged from a hospitalization are often readmitted within 90 days (Sezgin et al.,
2017). Receiving appropriate care during a transition (e.g., between seven to 30 days
after a hospital discharge) is prognostically relevant because the timing of care can
intercept adverse events. According to the World Health Organization, only 50% of
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persons with chronic diseases adhere to their medication (Eduardo Sabaté
(WHO/NMH/CCH), 2001). Thus, patient counselling on the importance of following
first-line pharmacological therapies can result in an increased likelihood of medication
adherence, and counselling can be provided during post-discharge follow-up.
Conclusions
There seems to be no effect arising from the physician’s mode of remuneration on
our four CHF performance indicators. Interestingly and importantly, our conclusions
basically echo those of these two previous papers (Jaakkimainen et al., 2011; Russell et
al., 2009).
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Table 4.1. Effect of switching to FHO on performance indicators for persons with congestive heart failure
Outcome Variable
Pooled
Fixed effects
Unweighted

Kernel

Unweighted

Kernel

Follow-up visit within 7 days of discharge

-0.0243**

-0.0043

-0.0142

-0.0057

(n=7,490)

(-0.0445 –

(-0.0267 -

(-0.0396 -

(-0.0338 -

-0.0041)

0.0181)

0.0111)

0.0224)

Follow-up visit within 30 days of discharge

-0.0258**

-0.0153

-0.0010

-0.0031

(n=7,490)

(-0.0492 - -

(-0.0423 -

(-0.0390 -

(-0.0371 -

0.00247)

0.0117)

0.0210)

0.0309)

Mean mortality risk score

-0.167

-0.222

-0.126

-0.143

(n=26,390)

(-0.466 - 0.132)

(-0.572 - 0.128)

(-0.371 - 0.119)

(-0.412 - 0.127)

Avoidable hospitalizations

0.941

0.965

0.766

0.755

(n=26,390)

(0.629 - 1.409)

(0.614 - 1.516)

(0.425 - 1.381)

(0.417 - 1.367)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Supplementary Appendix S2A, 95% confidence
interval in parentheses; n: number of physician-year observations
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Table 4.2. Effect of switching to FHO on performance indicators: Subgroup Analysis by Age and Sex
Outcome variable
Overall
Male
Female
Younger
Follow-up visit within
7 days of discharge

n
Follow-up visit within
30 days of discharge

n
Mean mortality risk
score

n
Avoidable
hospitalizations

n

Older

-0.00571

-0.0176

⁑

(-0.0338 - 0.0224)

(-0.0458 - 0.0105)

⁑

7,490

6,640

850

4,100

3,390

-0.00308

-0.00939

⁑

-0.026

0.0257

(-0.0371 - 0.0309)

(-0.0448 - 0.0261)

⁑

7,490

6,640

850

4,100

3,390

-0.143

-0.261*

0.0779

-0.106

-0.186

(-0.412 - 0.127)

(-0.541 - 0.0199)

(-0.479 - 0.635)

(-0.448 - 0.235)

(-0.565 - 0.193)

26,390

17,140

9,250

18,050

8,340

0.755

0.773

0.75

0.506*

1.471

(0.417 - 1.367)

(0.433 - 1.379)

(0.146 - 3.857)

(0.227 - 1.124)

(0.651 - 3.327)

26,390

17,140

9,250

18,050

8,340
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-0.0224
(-0.0631 0.0183)

(-0.0731 0.0211)

0.0172

(-0.0196 - 0.0540)

(-0.0222 - 0.0737)

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Supplementary Appendix S2A, 95%
confidence interval in parentheses; n: number of physician-year observations; ⁑ Insufficient sample size
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Table 4.3. Effect of switching to Family Health Organization on performance indicators: Subgroup Analysis by timing of switching
switched between 2008 switched between 2010 switched between 2012
switched in 2014
Outcome variable

& 2009

& 2011

& 2013

&2015

-0.00127

-0.0162

-0.0534

-0.0346

(-0.0309 - 0.0283)

(-0.0613 - 0.0289)

(-0.175 - 0.0687)

(-0.206 - 0.137)

6,174

3,878

1,950

966

0.0216

-0.0133

-0.0909

-0.0405

(-0.0140 - 0.0572)

(-0.0732 - 0.0466)

(-0.219 - 0.0372)

(-0.226 - 0.145)

n

6,174

3,878

1,950

966

Mortality risk score

-0.116

-0.269

0.0604

0.0667

(-0.360 - 0.129)

(-0.605 - 0.0680)

(-0.489 - 0.609)

(-0.701 - 0.835)

n

23,832

14,161

7,300

3,759

Avoidable hospitalizations

0.946

0.755

1.914

1.696

(0.471 - 1.902)

(0.225 - 2.533)

(0.308 - 11.90)

(0.0128 - 224.0)

23,832

14,161

7,300

3,759

Follow-up visit within 7
days of discharge

n
Follow-up visit within 30
days of discharge

n

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Supplementary Appendix S2A, 95% confidence
interval in parentheses; n: number of physician-year observations
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Appendix (for Chapter 4)
Supplementary Appendix S1
Schematic for creation of study population

We identified all Ontario primary care physicians (PCPs) (also referred to as family physicians) in FHGs as of April 1st, 2006
and followed these physicians and their enrolled patients diagnosed with congestive heart failure; physicians and patients were
followed until March 31st, 2016 (i.e., followed for 10 fiscal years). Within this observation period of ten years, we identified the
PCPs who remained in FHGs throughout the study period (i.e., non-switchers) and those who switched FHOs, and remained in
it after switching (i.e., switchers)
Exclusion for patients with CHF:

Exclusion for PCPs:

-Missing/
invalid
IKNpatients diagnosed
-Missing/
invalid
We
identified
all IKN
Ontario PCPs in FHGs as of April 1st, 2006 and followed these doctors
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Data sources for variables
The Client Agency Program Enrollment is a centralized database that contains
information on patients enrolled to a physician practicing under any of the patient enrolment
models (Glazier, Zagorski, & Rayner, 2012). The Ontario CHF database contains Ontarians
diagnosed with congestive heart failure since1991. The algorithm used for identifying patients
with CHF in this database was validated by Schultz, Rothwell, Chen, & Tu (2013), where the
algorithm is based on any of the following within one year: at least one hospitalization record
with CHF diagnosis (or at least one ambulatory record with a CHF diagnosis) in addition to at
least one record of CHF diagnosis from any source. This algorithm has a sensitivity of 84.4%, a
specificity of 97.0% and positive predictive value of 55.6% (Schultz, Rothwell, Chen, & Tu,
2013). We used the CHF database to identify patients with CHF. CAPE combined with CHF
database were used to identify persons diagnosed with CHF who are either enrolled with a FHG
or FHO physician in each year. The Corporate Provider Database provides information on
healthcare providers (Lofters, Gozdyra, & Lobb, 2013; Ontario Ministry of Health and Long
Term Care, 2017), and this database was used to identify a family physician’s payment model
type. Information on inpatients are available in the Canadian Institute for Health Information Hospital Discharge Abstract Database; this database uses ICD-10 as of 2002 (Gandhi, 2016;
Glazier et al., 2012), was used to identifying avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF. The ICES
Physician Database entails demographic information on physicians including data on physicians’
practice; this database was used to identify doctors’ sex, age, and country of medical education
(i.e., international or Canadian/ United States medical graduate). The Canadian Institutes for
Health Information-National Ambulatory Care Reporting System holds information for
outpatients in hospital and ambulatory care settings (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012);
142

NACRS, DAD and OHIP were used for mortality risk score using the Algorithm of Austin and
Walraven (2011). In the Ontario Health Insurance Plan Database, claims data for services that
are insured—and delivered by licenced health professionals (such as family physicians)—are
provided. This database includes information pertaining to the service rendered and the
associated fee codes (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012); we used OHIP to identify physician
visits. Demographic information for Ontario residents who are eligible for provincial healthcare
coverage are contained in the Registered Persons Database (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012).
We used RPDB to identify patients’ age, sex, dates of birth and death; in addition, information
on income quintile was obtained using RPDB and census dissemination area-level data.
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Table 1 Indicator definitions
Quality indicator
Physician visit
within 7 days after
patients’ discharge
from an acute care
hospital due to
CHF

Physician visit
within 30 days
after patients’
discharge from an
acute care hospital
due to CHF

Risk of
hospitalization for
CHF as an
ambulatory care
sensitive condition
(i.e., risk of
avoidable
hospitalization)
Mortality risk score

Eligible patient population
(i.e., denominator)

Outcome (i.e., numerator)

For each year:
- include CHF patients who were
alive within that year
- include CHF patients who were
discharged from an acute care
hospital stay with a most
responsible diagnosis of CHF

For each year, identify
proportion of discharges that
were followed up with
patients’ enrolled physicians
within 7 days

Data sources: CHF, RPDB, DAD, OHIP, IPDB
For each year:
For each year, identify
-include CHF patients who were
proportion of discharges that
alive within that year
were followed up with
-include CHF patients who were
patients’ enrolled physicians
discharged from an acute care
within 30 days
hospital stay with a most
responsible diagnosis of CHF
Data sources: CHF, RPDB, DAD, OHIP, IPDB
For each year:
-identify inpatients records from acute care hospitals with CHF as the
most responsible diagnosis; patients must be alive and aged below 75
years
Data sources: CHF, RPDB, DAD

For each year, calculate CHF patients’ mortality risk score as per the
algorithm developed by Austin and Walraven (2011)(Austin &
Walraven, 2011)
Data sources: RPDB, OHIP, DAD, NACRS
Abbreviations: CAPE: Client Agency Program Enrollment Registry, CPDB: Corporate Provider Database, DAD:
Canadian Institute for Health Information - Hospital Discharge Abstract Database, IPDB: ICES Physician Database,
NACRS: National Ambulatory Care Reporting System, OHIP: Ontario Health Insurance Plan Database, RPDB:
Registered Persons Database, ACSC: ambulatory care sensitive condition,
Note: CHF (under column ‘Quality indicator’): congestive heart failure; CHF (under ‘Data sources’): Ontario congestive
heart failure database.
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Table 2 ICD-10-CA codes for avoidable CHF-related hospitalization
Codes*

I50, J81

Abbreviation: ICD-10-CA: Canadian modification for International Classification of Diseases and
Related Health Problems (10th Revision Canadian Modification codes). CHF: congestive heart failure
*We excluded cases with cardiac procedures.
The following are the list of cardiac procedure codes (in CCP, ICD-9-CM and CCI) for exclusion:
CCP:47^^, 480^-483^, 489.1, 489.9, 492^-495^, 497^ ,498^
ICD-9-CM: 336, 35^^,36^^,373^,375^,377^,378^,379.4-379.8
CCI: 1.HA.58.^^, 1.HA.80.^^, 1.HA.87.^^, 1.HB.53.^^, 1.HB.54.^^, 1.HB.55.^^, 1.HB.87.^^,
1.HD.53.^^, 1.HD.54.^^, 1.HD.55.^^, 1.HH.59.^^, 1.HH.71.^^, 1.HJ.76.^^, 1.HJ.82.^^, 1.HM.57.^^,
1.HM.78.^^, 1.HM.80.^^, 1.HN.71.^^, 1.HN.80.^^, 1.HN.87.^^, 1.HP.76.^^, 1.HP.78.^^, 1.HP.80.^^,
1.HP.82.^^, 1.HP.83.^^, 1.HP.87.^^, 1.HR.71.^^, 1.HR.80.^^, 1.HR.84.^^, 1.HR.87.^^, 1.HS.80.^^,
1.HS.90.^^, 1.HT.80.^^, 1.HT.89.^^, 1.HT.90.^^, 1.HU.80.^^, 1.HU.90.^^, 1.HV.80.^^, 1.HV.90.^^,
1.HW.78.^^, 1.HW.79.^^, 1.HX.71.^^, 1.HX.78.^^, 1.HX.79.^^, 1.HX.80.^^, 1.HX.83.^^, 1.HX.86.^^,
1.HX.87.^^, 1.HY.85.^^, 1.HZ.53 rubric (except 1.HZ.53.LA-KP), 1.HZ.54.^^, 1.HZ.55 rubric (except
1.HZ.55.LA-KP), 1.HZ.56.^^, 1.HZ.57.^^, 1.HZ.59.^^, 1.HZ.80.^^, 1.HZ.85.^^, 1.HZ.87.^^,
1.IF.83.^^, 1.IJ.50.^^, 1.IJ.54.GQ-AZ, 1.IJ.55.^^, 1.IJ.57.^^, 1.IJ.76.^^, 1.IJ.80.^^, 1.IJ.86.^^,
1.IK.50.^^, 1.IK.57.^^, 1.IK.80.^^, 1.IK.87.^^, 1.IN.84.^^, 1.LA.84.^^, 1.LC.84.^^, 1.LD.84.^^,
1.YY.54.LA-NJ, 1.YY.54.LA-FS, 1.YY.54.LA-NM
Source: Canadian Institute for Health Information. Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions. Indicator
Library(Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2018)
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Supplementary Appendix S2A: Detailed information on statistical analyses

Inverse probability weighting, balancing diagnostics after propensity score based
weighting, and robustness checks

In inverse probability weighting for estimation of average effect of intervention on the
exposed group is used. Here, a weight of one is assigned to FHO physicians (i.e., switchers); non
switchers were given a weight that corresponded to the distance between the non-switcher’s and
switcher’s propensity scores within a bandwidth of 0.06 (Garrido et al., 2014; Guo & Fraser,
2015).
Balance in covariate distribution between switcher and non-switcher physicians was
assessed using t-tests and standardized bias tests (Guo & Fraser, 2015; Harder et al., 2010); the
literature suggests that a standardized bias of 10% or less after applying inverse probability
weighting is indicative of reasonable balance (Austin, 2009; Garrido et al., 2014).
We also used inverse probability weights from two other alternative techniques that are
robust to covariate imbalance, namely, covariate balancing propensity score (Imai & Ratkovic,
2014) and entropy balancing weights (Hainmueller, 2012). Model misspecification—which
results in biased estimates—occurs when the estimated propensity score is different from the true
propensity score (Drake, 1993), and misspecification can occur even when there is balance in
covariate distribution using kernel weighting. However, CBPS and EB weighting are
demonstrated to be doubly robust (Imai & Ratkovic, 2014; Q. Zhao & Percival, 2015), meaning
that if either the propensity score model or the outcome model is correctly specified the
estimated results are reliable. Obtaining similar results from all three weighting would support
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that our conclusions are robust to either model misspecification. Moreover, recent studies have
used CBPS and EB as robustness checks (Sarma et al., 2018; Somé et al., 2019).
Regression equation
Fractional correlated random effects models (equivalent to the weighted fixed-effects
regressions in the context of fractional outcomes) were used for outcomes that were proportions
(Papke, 1996); linear weighted fixed-effects regression was used for mortality risk scores (Sarma
et al., 2018); and weighted Poisson fixed-effects regression was used for avoidable CHF-related
hospitalization. The equation below represents the statistical model for our fixed-effects
regression:
Yit = αi + δFHOit + βXit + εit
Here, the outcome variable of interest in time t is represented by Yit; αi captures physicianspecific time-invariant factors; FHO represents the switcher vs. non-switcher dichotomous
variable; δ is the point estimate of interest (i.e., effect of switching to FHO on outcome). The
vector Xit included age, age squared, international medical graduate status, physicians’ group
size, number of enrolled patients, proportion of female patients, average age of patients in
physicians’ practice, proportion of patients living in rural areas, proportion of patients in low
income quintile and average ADG score of patients; εit is the error term. To account for the
fraction of time a switcher was in a FHO during the first year of switching, we used fractional
year.
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Total number of switchers and non-switchers across the observation period of 10 years = 3,716
All 3,716 physicians are in the Family Health Group model at the baseline.
Overtime, 1942 of 3716 physicians switched to Family Health Organization and remained in a FHO.

Sample for analyses of follow up care

Sample for analyses of health outcomes (i.e., mortality and avoidable
hospitalizations)

Of the 3,716 physicians, 3630 physicians have at least
one patient who is discharged from a hospitalization

Analyses were conducted on a balanced panel; and only physicians present in
every year were included. Of the 3,716 physicians, 2649 are present every year

Analyses were conducted on a balanced panel; and
only physicians present in every year were included.
Thus, 2867 physicians were excluded to achieve a
balanced panel.

Of 2649 physicians, 10 are off the range of common support

Of the 3630 physicians,763 physicians are present
every year.
2639 physicians included in analyses
Of the 763 physicians, 14 are off the range of
common support

749 physicians included in analyses

Supplemental Figure S0. A simple flow chart depicting derivation of the final sample sizes of physicians.
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Supplementary Appendix S2B Descriptive statistics for follow up care, avoidable hospitalizations and mortality risk scores

Table 1 Mean values of outcomes and covariates for switchers (n=478) and non-switchers (n=271) in the sample for follow-up care
Fiscal year

Switcher/Non
-switcher a

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

0

0.271

0.269

0.291

0.286

0.294

0.304

0.247

0.293

0.286

0.268

1

0.304

0.27

0.274

0.274

0.277

0.254

0.244

0.257

0.231

0.221

0

0.561

0.549

0.577

0.614

0.592

0.615

0.56

0.594

0.562

0.558

1

0.595

0.586

0.589

0.581

0.567

0.548

0.554

0.561

0.529

0.52

0

53.691

54.691

55.691

56.691

57.691

58.691

59.691

60.691

61.691

62.691

1

51.917

52.917

53.917

54.917

55.917

56.917

57.917

58.917

59.917

60.917

0

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

0.137

1

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0

45.953

46.056

56.181

58.377

57.34

51.137

47.052

45.724

41.823

40.388

1

39.827

37.118

48.402

44.641

37.153

24.442

18.622

18.814

17.383

16.164

0

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

0.174

1

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

0.126

Outcome variable
7-day follow up
(proportion)

30-day follow up
(proportion)

Physicians’ characteristics b
Age (years)

Female (proportion)

Group size

IMG
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Number of enrollees

0

1946.6

2024.62

2044.1

2045.3

2007.83

1979.27

1951.07

1903.80

1875.72

1832.9

1

1995.3

2055.18

2051.64

1991.1

1953.48

1913.33

1872.2

1830.46

1787.78

1740.715

0

0.487

0.486

0.484

0.483

0.481

0.48

0.48

0.481

0.48

0.478

1

0.484

0.483

0.481

0.482

0.48

0.48

0.48

0.48

0.479

0.477

0

0.066

0.064

0.065

0.065

0.065

0.065

0.065

0.065

0.065

0.065

1

0.107

0.105

0.105

0.104

0.102

0.102

0.101

0.101

0.101

0.101

0

41.892

42.385

42.934

43.413

43.91

44.444

44.987

45.653

46.202

46.757

1

42.73

43.16

43.595

44.191

44.725

45.304

45.89

46.456

47.017

47.543

0

0.408

0.403

0.398

0.395

0.393

0.39

0.39

0.388

0.387

0.384

1

0.387

0.383

0.379

0.376

0.373

0.372

0.371

0.37

0.368

0.364

0

3.458

3.442

3.383

3.446

3.483

3.478

3.527

3.479

3.449

3.481

1

3.402

3.361

3.297

3.356

3.337

3.304

3.319

3.229

3.195

3.214

Patients’ characteristics
Female (proportion)

Rural areas
(proportion)

Average age (in years)

Low income quintile
(proportion)

Average ADG

Abbreviations: Aggregated Diagnosis Group (Johns Hopkins), IMG: International Medical Graduate
a 0=non-switchers,
b

1=switchers

Switchers’ and non-switchers’ expected income gain in the baseline year were $155,490 and $124,425 respectively

Percentages are expressed as proportions
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Table 2 Mean values of outcomes and covariates for the switchers (n=1,596) and non-switchers (n=1,043) in the sample for mortality risk scores, and avoidable CHF-related
hospitalizations.
Fiscal year
Switcher a

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

0

66.645

66.28

66.502

66.619

66.679

66.926

67.045

67.162

67.467

66.966

1

67.066

67.068

66.858

67.245

67.062

67.272

67.325

67.406

67.752

67.211

0

0.009

0.0077

0.0096

0.014

0.0124

0.0029

0.0086

0.0048

0.0058

0.0086

1

0.014

0.0088

0.0081

0.0088

0.0050

0.0056

0.0087

0.0069

0.0069

0.0056

0

50.87

51.87

52.87

53.87

54.87

55.87

56.87

57.87

58.87

59.87

1

48.743

49.743

50.743

51.743

52.743

53.743

54.743

55.743

56.743

57.743

0

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

1

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0.364

0

48.393

48.678

60.548

62.813

61

55.024

50.878

49.25

45.257

43.039

1

37.15

36.443

46.99

44.576

37.368

24.852

20.815

20.558

18.19

17.053

0

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

0.219

1

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0.117

0

1689.948

1770.188

1784.469

1785.185

1755.718

1738.964

1718.32

1683.034

1659.118

1621.94

1

1656.992

1716.416

1720.539

1681.295

1651.425

1625.038

1596.587

1563.706

1538.805

1501.079

Outcome Variables
mortality risk score

Avoidable CHF

Physicians’ characteristics b
Age (years)

Female (proportion)

Group size

IMG (proportion)

Number of enrolled patients

Patients’ characteristics
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Female (proportion)

Rural areas (proportion)

Average age (in years)

0

0.528

0.526

0.524

0.522

0.52

0.518

0.517

0.517

0.515

0.513

1

0.539

0.538

0.536

0.535

0.534

0.533

0.533

0.532

0.53

0.528

0

0.055

0.053

0.053

0.053

0.053

0.053

0.054

0.054

0.054

0.054

1

0.099

0.099

0.099

0.098

0.098

0.098

0.098

0.098

0.098

0.097

0

38.292

38.741

39.234

39.701

40.179

40.732

41.285

41.902

42.487

43.033

1

39.153

39.586

40.04

40.586

41.102

41.659

42.238

42.842

43.408

43.937

0

0.398

0.392

0.386

0.382

0.379

0.377

0.375

0.374

0.372

0.366

1

0.355

0.35

0.346

0.342

0.339

0.337

0.336

0.335

0.333

0.327

0

3.377

3.352

3.283

3.348

3.384

3.372

3.415

3.35

3.311

3.34

1

3.322

3.282

3.217

3.264

3.251

3.211

3.222

3.126

3.078

3.092

Low income quintile
(proportion)

Average ADG

Abbreviations: Aggregated Diagnosis Group (Johns Hopkins), IMG: International Medical Graduate, CHF: congestive heart failure
a 0=non-switchers,
b

1=switchers

Switchers’ and non-switchers’ expected income gain in the baseline year were $125,041 and $ 94,658 respectively

Percentages are expressed as proportions
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Supplementary Appendix S3. Balancing diagnostics

Results of propensity score-based weighting are presented in Tables S1 to S6; a standardized bias of no greater than 7% were reported
for all variables after applying inverse probability weighting. Furthermore, visual representation of the distribution of propensity
scores, and the standardized difference in means and variance ratios confirmed that there was reasonable balance in the distribution of
covariates between switchers and non-switchers after weighting (Figures S1 – S4).
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Supplementary Table S1. Results from kernel weighting for follow-up care
Mean and standardized bias prior to kernel weighting

Covariate

Switcher

Physicians’ characteristics
Expected income gain (in
thousand $)
155.49
Expected income gain
squared
31641
Age (years)
56.416
Age squared
3258.8

Mean and standardized bias after kernel weighting

Non-switcher

Biasa

tstatistic

pvalue

Switcher

Nonswitcher

Biasa

tstatistic

p-value

124.42

33.2

14.11

0

155.49

154.33

1.2

0.21

0.836

25483

15.8

6.71

0

31641

31177

1.2

0.2

0.84

58.19

-19.7

-8.28

0

51.916

52.149

-2.6

-0.44

0.663

3471.4

-20.8

-8.78

0

2763.1

2788.2

-2.5

-0.46

0.648

Female (proportion)

0.10042

0.13653

-11.2

-4.74

0

0.10042

0.09994

0.1

0.02

0.98

IMG (proportion)

0.12552

0.17343

-13.5

-5.71

0

0.12552

0.12643

-0.3

-0.04

0.966

Group size
Number of enrolled
patients
Patients’ characteristics

30.256

49.003

-31.4

-13.57

0

39.826

41.057

-2.1

-0.33

0.74

1919.1

1961.1

-5.4

-2.33

0.02

1995.3

1982.5

1.7

0.26

0.792

Female (proportion)

0.48001

0.48144

-1.9

-0.8

0.423

0.48331

0.48455

-1.7

-0.27

0.788

Rural areas (proportion)

0.10247

0.06426

20.8

8.49

0

0.10609

0.10975

-2

-0.26

0.799

Average age (in years)
Low income quintile
(proportion)
Average ADG

45.061

44.257

14

5.81

0

42.729

42.72

0.2

0.03

0.979

0.37383

0.3931

-14.2

-5.97

0

0.38674

0.38747

-0.5

-0.08

0.933

3.3009

3.4621

-36.4

-15.23

0

3.4016

3.4143

-2.9

-0.44

0.661

Outcome Variables
Proportion of discharges
that were followed up
within 7 days
0.2601
0.28052
-7.3
-3.04
0.002
0.30359
0.29489
3.1
0.48
0.631
Proportion of discharges
that were followed up
within 30 days
0.56243
0.57772
-4.7
-1.94
0.052
0.59468
0.58626
2.6
0.41
0.682
Abbreviations: IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (Johns Hopkins), CHF: congestive heart failure, aStandardized bias
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Supplementary Table S2. Results from CBPS weighting for CHF follow-up care.
Covariate

Means and standardized bias after CBPS weighting
Switcher

Non-switcher

Biasa

t-statistic

p-value

Expected income gain (in thousand $)

155.49

155.49

0

0

1

Expected income gain squared

31641

31641

0

0

1

Age (years)

51.916

51.916

0

0

1

Age squared

2763.1

2763.1

0

0

1

Female (proportion)

0.10042

0.10042

0

Group size

39.826

39.826

0

0

1

IMG (proportion)

0.12552

0.12552

0

0

1

Number of enrolled patients

1995.3

1995.3

0

0

1

Female (proportion)

0.48331

0.48331

0

0

1

Rural areas (proportion)

0.10609

0.1061

0

0

1

Average age (in years)

42.729

42.729

0

0

1

Low income quintile (proportion)

0.38674

0.38675

0

0

0.999

Average ADG

3.4016

3.4016

0

0

1

Proportion of discharges that were followed up within 7 days

0.30359

0.30359

0

0

1

Proportion of discharges that were followed up within 30 days

0.59468

0.59468

0

0

1
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Supplementary Table S3. Results from EB weighting for follow-up care.
Covariate

Means and standardized bias after EB weighting
Switcher
155.49

Non-switcher
155.53

Biasa
0

t-statistic
-0.01

p-value
0.994

Expected income gain squared

31641

31643

0

0

1

Age (years)

51.916

51.92

0

-0.01

0.995

Expected income gain (in thousand $)

Age squared

2763.1

2763.3

0

0

0.996

Female (proportion)

0.10042

0.10022

0.1

0.01

0.992

Group size

39.826

39.829

0

0

0.999

IMG (proportion)

0.12552

0.12525

0.1

0.01

0.99

Number of enrolled patients

1995.3

1995.4

0

0

0.997

Female (proportion)

0.48331

0.48335

0

-0.01

0.993

Rural areas (proportion)

0.10609

0.1061

0

0

1

Average age (in years)

42.729

42.732

-0.1

-0.01

0.992

Low income quintile (proportion)

0.38674

0.38677

0

0

0.997

Average ADG

3.4016

3.4019

-0.1

-0.01

0.992

Proportion of discharges that were followed up within 7 days

0.30359

0.30361

0

0

0.999

Proportion of discharges that were followed up with within 30 days

0.59468

0.59472

0

0

0.998
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Supplementary Table S4. Results from kernel weighting for mortality and avoidable hospitalizations.
Covariate

Means and standardized bias prior to kernel weighting

Means and standardized bias after kernel weighting

Switcher

Non-switcher

Biasa

t-statistic

p-value

Switcher

Non-switcher

Biasa

t-statistic

p-value

Expected income gain (in thousand $)

125.04

94.657

34.8

28.13

0

125.04

124.96

0.1

0.03

0.977

Expected income gain squared

22028

17792

14.7

11.73

0

22028

22564

-1.9

-0.52

0.601

Age (years)

53.242

55.37

-22.8

-18.2

0

48.742

48.944

-2.2

-0.66

0.512

Age squared

2917.6

3157

-23.4

-18.73

0

2450.5

2470.9

-2

-0.67

0.502

Female (proportion)

0.36341

0.33078

6.9

5.43

0

0.36341

0.3543

1.9

0.54

0.592

IMG (proportion)

0.11654

0.2186

-27.6

-22.5

0

0.11654

0.11668

0

-0.01

0.991

Group size

30.399

52.487

-36.1

-29.63

0

37.15

38.813

-2.7

-0.88

0.376

Number of enrolled patients

1625.2

1720.7

-12.4

-10.03

0

1657

1648.1

1.1

0.33

0.743

Female (proportion)

0.53334

0.5195

12.1

9.55

0

0.53882

0.53623

2.3

0.61

0.545

Rural areas (proportion)

0.09767

0.05305

25.3

19.6

0

0.09871

0.09908

-0.2

-0.05

0.962

Average age (in years)

41.455

40.558

14.4

11.55

0

39.153

39.204

-0.8

-0.25

0.806

Low income quintile (proportion)

0.33948

0.3797

-26.1

-20.99

0

0.35443

0.35826

-2.5

-0.72

0.473

Average ADG

3.206

3.3527

-34.1

-27.36

0

3.322

3.3238

-0.4

-0.12

0.906

67.226

66.829

7.2

5.76

0

67.066

67.173

-1.9

-0.53

0.597

Physicians’ characteristics

Patients’ characteristics

Outcome variable
Mean mortality risk score

Abbreviations: IMG: International Medical Graduate, ADG: Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (Johns Hopkins), CHF: congestive heart failure,
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aStandardized

bias

Supplementary Table S5. Results from CBPS weighting for mortality risk scores and avoidable hospitalizations.
Covariate

Switcher

Means and standardized bias after CBPS weighting
Non-switcher
Biasa
t-statistic

p-value

Expected income gain (in thousand $)

125.04

125.04

0

0

1

Expected income gain squared

22028

22028

0

0

1

Age (years)

48.742

48.742

0

0

1

Age squared

2450.5

2450.5

0

0

1

Female (proportion)

0.36341

0.36341

0

0

1

37.15

37.15

0

0

1

0.11654

0.11654

0

0

1

1657

1657

0

0

1

Female (proportion)

0.53882

0.53882

0

0

1

Rural areas (proportion)

0.09871

0.09872

0

0

1

Group size
IMG (proportion)
Number of enrolled patients

Average age (in years)

39.153

39.153

0

0

1

Low income quintile (proportion)

0.35443

0.35443

0

0

1

Average ADG

3.322

3.322

0

0

1

Mean mortality risk score

67.066

67.066

0

0

1
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Supplementary Table S6. Results from EB weighting for CHF avoidable hospitalizations.
Covariate

Means and standardized bias after EB weighting
Switcher

Expected income gain (in thousand $)
Expected income gain squared
Age (years)
Age squared
Female (proportion)
Group size
IMG (proportion)
Number of enrolled patients
Female (proportion)
Rural areas (proportion)
Average age (in years)
Low income quintile (proportion)
Average ADG
Mean mortality risk score

Biasa

Non-switcher

125.04
22028
48.742
2450.5
0.36341
37.15
0.11654
1657
0.53882
0.09871
39.153
0.35443
3.322
67.066

125.04
22029
48.743
2450.5
0.36331
37.15
0.1165
1657
0.53883
0.09872
39.153
0.35444
3.322
67.067
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

t-statistic
0
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

p-value
0.999
0.999
0.998
0.999
0.996
1
0.997
1
0.999
1
0.998
0.998
0.997
0.996

Supplemental Figure S1. Distribution of propensity scores before and after kernel weighting for follow-up care.
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Supplemental Figure S2. Standardized mean difference and variance ratio for covariates from the unweighted (i.e., raw) and
weighted (i.e., matched) samples for follow-up care.
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Supplemental Figure S3. Distribution of propensity scores before and after kernel weighting, for mortality and avoidable
hospitalizations.
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Supplemental Figure S4. Standardized mean difference and variance ratio for covariates from the unweighted (i.e., raw) and
weighted (i.e. matched) samples for mortality and avoidable hospitalizations.
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Supplementary Appendix S4
Table 1. Effect of switching to FHO on CHF performance indicators.
Pooled
Variables

Proportion of discharges that were
followed up with a physician visit within 7
days
Proportion of discharges that were
followed up with a physician visit within
30 days
Mean mortality risk score

Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF

Fixed

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Unweight
ed

Kernel

CBPS

EB

-0.0243**
(-0.0445 - 0.00411)
-0.0258**
(-0.0492 - 0.00247)
-0.167

-0.00429
(-0.0267 0.0181)
-0.0153
(-0.0423 0.0117)
-0.222

-0.00628
(-0.0287 0.0161)
-0.017
(-0.0433 0.00924)
-0.156

-0.012
(-0.0357 0.0116)
-0.0165
(-0.0463 0.0133)
-0.0744

-0.0142
(-0.0396 0.0111)
-0.00896
(-0.0390 0.0210)
-0.126

-0.00571
(-0.0338 0.0224)
-0.00308
(-0.0371 0.0309)
-0.143

-0.00565
(-0.0333 0.0220)
-0.00204
(-0.0362 0.0321)
-0.142

-0.0127
(-0.0410 0.0156)
-0.014
(-0.0491 0.0210)
-0.0973

(-0.466 - 0.132)

(-0.572 0.128)
0.965
(0.614 1.516)

(-0.504 0.191)
0.973
(0.621 1.526)

(-0.450 0.301)
1.014
(0.668 1.540)

(-0.371 0.119)
0.766
(0.425 1.381)

(-0.412 0.127)
0.755
(0.417 1.367)

(-0.423 0.139)
0.754
(0.411 1.384)

(-0.396 0.201)
0.792
(0.439 1.429)

0.941
(0.629 - 1.409)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization; FHO: Family Health Organization,
CHF: congestive heart failure.
Number of observations for follow up care and health outcome indicators were 7,490 and 26,390, respectively.
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Table 1. Effect of switching to FHO on CHF performance indicators, for male physicians.
Variables

Pooled
Kernel
CBPS

Unweighte
d
-0.0286***

-0.00939

-0.0114

(-0.0503 - 0.00699)
-0.0279**

(-0.0333 0.0146)
-0.0168

Mean mortality risk score

(-0.0523 - 0.00354)
-0.183

Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF

Proportion of discharges that were followed up
with a physician visit within 7 days
Proportion of discharges that were followed up
with a physician visit within 30 days

Fixed
EB
-0.0173

Unweighte
d
-0.0205

Kernel

CBPS

EB

-0.0176

-0.0158

-0.0205

(-0.0354 0.0126)
-0.0189

(-0.0427 0.00813)
-0.0185

(-0.0469 0.00585)
-0.0121

(-0.0458 0.0105)
-0.00939

(-0.0442 0.0127)
-0.00681

(-0.0497 0.00862)
-0.0163

(-0.0453 0.0116)
-0.156

(-0.0466 0.00881)
-0.0885

(-0.0499 0.0129)
-0.0267

(-0.0432 0.0189)
-0.251**

(-0.0448 0.0261)
-0.261*

(-0.0426 0.0290)
-0.241

(-0.0532 0.0206)
-0.199

(-0.506 0.140)
0.916

(-0.534 0.222)
1.004

(-0.468 0.292)
1.012

(-0.452 0.399)
0.977

(-0.496 - 0.00591)
0.72

(-0.541 0.0199)
0.773

(-0.545 0.0630)
0.786

(-0.527 0.129)
0.781

(0.611 1.371)

(0.664 1.520)

(0.668 1.533)

(0.629 1.519)

(0.390 1.331)

(0.433 1.379)

(0.438 1.413)

(0.431 1.414)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
FHO: Family Health Organization, CHF: congestive heart failure
Number of observations for follow up care and health outcome indicators were 6,640 and 17,140, respectively.
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Table 2. Effect of switching to FHO on CHF performance indicators for female physicians.
Pooled

Fixed

Variables
Unweight
ed

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Unweight
ed

Kernel

CBPS

EB

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

⁑

Mean mortality risk score

-0.339
(-0.941 0.263)

-0.564
(-1.275 0.147)

-0.465
(-1.170 0.239)

-0.338
(-1.058 0.382)

0.0823
(-0.440 0.605)

0.0779
(-0.479 0.635)

0.0386
(-0.518 0.595)

0.0696
(-0.502 0.641)

Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF

1.079
(0.326 3.571)

0.945
(0.246 3.634)

0.952
(0.252 3.596)

1.27
(0.410 3.931)

1.004
(0.213 4.743)

0.75
(0.146 3.857)

0.713
(0.134 3.794)

0.866
(0.170 4.407)

Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a
physician visit within 7 days
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a
physician visit within 30 days

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
FHO: Family Health Organization, CHF: congestive heart failure
Number of observations for follow up care and health outcome indicators were 850 and 9,250, respectively.
⁑ Insufficient sample size
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Table 3. Effect of switching to FHO on CHF performance indicators for physicians aged below 55 years
Pooled
Variables

Fixed

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Proportion of discharges that were

-0.0308**

-0.0102

-0.0121

-0.0223

-0.0341*

-0.0224

-0.0242

-0.0329

followed up within 7 days

(-0.0581 - -

(-0.0405 -

(-0.0428 -

(-0.0536 -

(-0.0692 -

(-0.0631 -

(-0.0638 -

(-0.0733 -

0.0034)

0.0201)

0.0187)

0.00903)

0.000935)

0.0183)

0.0155)

0.0075)

Proportion of discharges that were

-0.0255

-0.0187

-0.0186

-0.029

-0.0302

-0.026

-0.0279

-0.0443*

followed up within 30 days

(-0.0568 -

(-0.0533 -

(-0.0532 -

(-0.0644 -

(-0.0719 -

(-0.0731 -

(-0.0751 -

(-0.0920 -

0.00577)

0.0160)

0.0160)

0.00639)

0.0114)

0.0211)

0.0193)

0.00348)

-0.136

-0.236

-0.156

-0.128

-0.0963

-0.106

-0.0936

-0.0644

(-0.511 -

(-0.678 -

(-0.593 -

(-0.601 -

(-0.410 -

(-0.448 -

(-0.446 -

(-0.444 -

0.239)

0.205)

0.282)

0.344)

0.217)

0.235)

0.259)

0.315)

Avoidable hospitalizations due to

0.78

0.874

0.887

0.898

0.542

0.506*

0.495*

0.542

CHF

(0.450 -

(0.473 -

(0.480 -

(0.518 -

(0.227 -

(0.218 -

(0.249 -

1.352)

1.615)

1.638)

1.555)

1.124)

1.124)

1.182)

Mean mortality risk score

(0.249 - 1.180)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least
squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization; FHO: Family Health
Organization, CHF: congestive heart failure
Number of observations for follow up care and health outcome indicators were 4,100 and 18,050, respectively.
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Table 4. Effect of switching to FHO on CHF performance indicators, for physicians aged 55 years and above
Variables

Pooled

Fixed

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Proportion of discharges that were

-0.0169

0.000282

-0.00155

-0.000156

0.0112

0.0172

0.0197

0.0172

followed up with a physician visit within

(-0.0462 -

(-0.0315 -

(-0.0331 -

(-0.0342 -

(-0.0255 -

(-0.0196 -

(-0.0172 -

(-0.0210 -

7 days

0.0125)

0.0321)

0.0300)

0.0339)

0.0479)

0.0540)

0.0566)

0.0554)

Proportion of discharges that were

-0.0275

-0.0151

-0.0186

-0.00464

0.017

0.0257

0.0307

0.0252

followed up with a physician visit within

(-0.0618 -

(-0.0544 -

(-0.0566 -

(-0.0506 -

(-0.0268 -

(-0.0222 -

(-0.0177 -

(-0.0253 -

30 days

0.00684)

0.0243)

0.0194)

0.0413)

0.0608)

0.0737)

0.0791)

0.0757)

Mean mortality risk score

-0.135

-0.153

-0.115

0.116

-0.156

-0.186

-0.239

-0.144

(-0.614 -

(-0.696 -

(-0.653 -

(-0.427 -

(-0.565 -

(-0.614 -

(-0.559 -

0.345)

0.390)

0.423)

0.658)

(-0.507 - 0.195)

0.193)

0.136)

0.271)

1.29

1.289

1.266

1.421

1.335

1.471

1.505

1.691

(0.736 -

(0.744 -

(0.730 -

(0.822 -

(0.651 -

(0.662 -

(0.732 -

2.261)

2.235)

2.194)

2.456)

3.327)

3.419)

3.907)

Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF

(0.553 - 3.218)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: OLS: ordinary least squares, FE: fixed effects, CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
FHO: Family Health Organization, CHF: congestive heart failure
Number of observations for follow up care and health outcome indicators were 3,390 and 8,340, respectively.
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Supplementary Appendix S5
Table 1. Effect of switching to FHO on CHF performance indicators, for physicians who switched in 2007, 2009, 2011 and
2013
Variables

Fixed effects
Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

-0.00547
(-0.0331 - 0.0222)
-0.00301
(-0.0357 - 0.0297)
-0.145
(-0.389 - 0.0996)
0.819
(0.420 - 1.596)

-0.00127
(-0.0309 - 0.0283)
0.0216
(-0.0140 - 0.0572)
-0.116
(-0.360 - 0.129)
0.946
(0.471 - 1.902)

-0.00719
(-0.0374 - 0.0231)
0.0106
(-0.0257 - 0.0469)
-0.127
(-0.370 - 0.116)
0.878
(0.431 - 1.787)

0.00107
(-0.0283 - 0.0304)
0.0102
(-0.0275 - 0.0480)
-0.151
(-0.405 - 0.104)
0.985
(0.472 - 2.056)

-0.0202
(-0.0633 - 0.0230)
-0.0139
(-0.0670 - 0.0391)
-0.156
(-0.475 - 0.162)
0.757
(0.263 - 2.184)

-0.0162
(-0.0613 - 0.0289)
-0.0133
(-0.0732 - 0.0466)
-0.269
(-0.605 - 0.0680)
0.755
(0.225 - 2.533)

-0.0185
(-0.0636 - 0.0267)
-0.0162
(-0.0762 - 0.0438)
-0.269
(-0.610 - 0.0718)
0.752
(0.224 - 2.524)

-0.00904
(-0.0548 - 0.0367)
-0.00734
(-0.0677 - 0.0531)
-0.286*
(-0.626 - 0.0542)
0.792
(0.233 - 2.694)

-0.0128
(-0.0975 - 0.0719)
-0.0299
(-0.124 - 0.0640)
-0.14
(-0.623 - 0.343)
0.957
(0.194 - 4.722)

-0.0534
(-0.175 - 0.0687)
-0.0909
(-0.219 - 0.0372)
0.0604
(-0.489 - 0.609)
1.914
(0.308 - 11.90)

-0.061
(-0.183 - 0.0610)
-0.0838
(-0.212 - 0.0444)
0.149
(-0.410 - 0.708)
2.011
(0.317 - 12.76)

-0.0599
(-0.182 - 0.0624)
-0.0838
(-0.212 - 0.0447)
0.0515
(-0.509 - 0.612)
1.808
(0.281 - 11.64)

2007
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 7
days
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 30
days
Mean mortality risk score
Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF
2009
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 7
days
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 30
days
Mean mortality risk score
Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF
2011
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 7
days
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 30
days
Mean mortality risk score
Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF
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2013
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 7
days
Proportion of discharges that were followed up with a physician visit within 30
days
Mean mortality risk score
Avoidable hospitalizations due to CHF

-0.0442
(-0.194 - 0.106)
-0.0497
(-0.209 - 0.110)
0.426
(-0.275 - 1.126)
0.231
(0.000656 - 81.44)

-0.0346
(-0.206 - 0.137)
-0.0405
(-0.226 - 0.145)
0.0667
(-0.701 - 0.835)
1.696
(0.0128 - 224.0)

-0.0604
(-0.225 - 0.105)
-0.0715
(-0.252 - 0.109)
0.0217
(-0.746 - 0.789)
1.7
(0.0120 - 240.9)

-0.0699
(-0.240 - 0.100)
-0.0742
(-0.261 - 0.113)
0.0803
(-0.718 - 0.879)
1.935
(0.00768 - 487.5)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in X it, 95% confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization; FHO: Family Health Organization, CHF:
congestive heart failure
Number of observations for follow-up care indicators were 6174, 3878, 1950, 966 for physicians who switched between 2008 & 2009, switched between 2010 &
2011, switched between 2012 & 2013, and switched in 2014 &2015 respectively.
Number of observations for health outcome indicators were 23832, 14161, 7300 and 3759 for physicians who switched between 2008 & 2009, switched between 2010
& 2011, switched between 2012 & 2013, and switched in 2014 &2015 respectively.
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Supplementary Appendix S6

Table 1. Results from simple before and after analysis
Outcome variable

Pooled

Fixed effects

Follow-up visit within 7 days of discharge
(n=4,920)

-0.0144
(-0.0441 - 0.0153)

0.00627
(-0.0244 - 0.0369)

Follow-up visit within 30 days of discharge
(n=4,920)

-0.00481
(-0.0380 - 0.0284)

0.0162
(-0.0163 - 0.0487)

-0.0943
(-0.484 - 0.295)

-0.0857
(-0.341 - 0.170)

Mean mortality risk score
(n=16,060)

0.751
0.723
Avoidable hospitalizations
(n=16,060)
(0.428 - 1.317)
(0.341 - 1.534)
Notes:
-all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xit, 95% confidence interval in parentheses; n: number of observations
-The before-after analyses are based on only switchers. In our main analyses (i.e., inverse probability weighted fixed effects
regression), there were 478 and 1,596 switchers for follow-up care and health outcomes, respectively. However, in our
simple before-after analysis, there were 492 and 1,606 switchers for follow-up care and health outcomes, respectively. Fewer
physicians in the main analyses were due to the exclusion of physicians outside the range of common support.
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Chapter 5
5

The relationship between family physicians’ remuneration mechanism and
quality of care for persons with chronic kidney disease
5.1

Introduction

Healthcare systems in many developed nations have been endeavoring to improve
the quality of care provided to patients with chronic diseases (Li et al., 2014). Like in
many jurisdictions, the government of Ontario introduced primary care reform in the
early 2000s (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014). To improve quality of primary care, the
provincial government’s plan of action included restructuring the compensation
mechanism of primary care physicians in Ontario and introducing pay-for-performance
incentives (Marchildon & Hutchison, 2016). A reason for employing this tactic was the
realization of a link between physicians’ behaviour and their remuneration mechanism;
findings from various studies support a correlation between the two (Chami & Sweetman,
2019; Kantarevic & Kralj, 2013; Kiran et al., 2014; Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013; Liddy,
Singh, et al., 2011), but some studies do not find any association (Jaakkimainen et al.,
2011; Russell et al., 2009). Furthermore, P4P programs have been found to improve the
quality of CKD care (Karunaratne et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2018; Richardson, 2013).
Though many studies have investigated some aspects of the relationship between
physicians’ compensation and the quality of care, there is a paucity of research on the
relationship between primary care physicians’ mode of remuneration and quality of CKD
management with the exception of one study by Liddy, Singh, et al. (2011).
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Prior to Ontario’s primary care reform, 90 per cent of the province’s primary care
physicians received the vast majority of their income through pure FFS (Sweetman &
Buckley, 2014), a payment mechanism where the unit of payment is a service (Quinn,
2015). The reform introduced blended payment systems where physicians obtain their
income from multiple modes of payment (Marchildon & Hutchison, 2016). Family
Health Group and Family Health Organization are the two dominant post-reform primary
care models that remunerate family physicians through blended FFS (introduced July
2003) and blended capitation (introduced November 2006), respectively (Sweetman &
Buckley, 2014). Physicians in these two models are entitled to the same P4P incentives
for the management of diabetes ($60 per enrolled patient per annum) and congestive
heart failure ($125 per enrolled patient per annum) (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014), but no
such incentives for chronic kidney disease currently exist.
We used Ontario’s FHG and FHO models to investigate the relationship between
physicians’ remuneration mechanism and quality of CKD management using four
process indicators and mortality risk score. These care processes were identified through
a literature search, and are relevant to the primary care setting; they were: testing of (1)
serum creatinine and (2) urine ACR, (3) prescriptions for angiotensin converting enzyme
inhibitors or angiotensin II receptor blockers, and (4) prescriptions for statins (Tu et al.,
2017). A person’s mortality risk score is an estimate of their 1-year risk of all-cause
mortality according to the algorithm of Austin & Walraven (2011).
The aim of our study was to determine whether patients received different quality
of CKD management across FHO and FHG physicians. We hypothesized that persons
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with CKD receive better management for their condition if their family physician is
remunerated through blended capitation relative to blended FFS. Compared to a FFSbased scheme, patients are more likely to receive better health management under a
capitation-based system because capitation incentivizes physicians to retain their
enrollees—which can be achieved by keeping them as healthy as possible (Blomqvist &
Busby, 2012; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013). Some empirical
evidence suggests that capitation payment is associated with better care quality than FFS
in the management of chronic conditions such as diabetes mellitus and asthma (Kiran et
al., 2014; Kralj & Kantarevic, 2013; To et al., 2015).
Our study found that patients in FHG received slightly more care than their
counterparts in FHO; furthermore, our findings showed that patients in the blended FFS
model had slightly higher mortality risk scores. These findings could be explained by the
fact that patients in one model, on average, may be more (or less) healthy than patients
under the other model. Due to data limitations, our findings were based on two years of
observations and analyses were cross-sectional. Our study is the first to compare quality
of CKD management in capitation- and FFS-based remuneration schemes for a primary
care context.
5.2

Methods

Study design
All data were obtained through ICES (formerly known as the Institute for Clinical
Evaluative Sciences), a not-for-profit organization that holds various administrative
healthcare databases in Ontario. The use of data in this project was authorized under
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section 45 of Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act, which does not
require review by a Research Ethics Board. We used a cross-sectional study design for
two observation periods, namely, the 2014 and 2015 fiscal years (April to March). We
observed FHG and FHO physicians and their enrolled patients diagnosed with CKD
(diagnosis confirmed by two eGFR laboratory test results of below 60mL/min/1.73m2
separated by at least 3 months but fewer than 18 months); the schematic for our cohort
creation is presented in Appendix A for Chapter 5. Patients who were receiving dialysis
or had a kidney transplant were excluded.
For each observation period, five quality indicators were investigated: (1) serum
creatinine testing, (2) urine ACR measurement, prescription of (3) ACEIs/ARBs and (4)
statins, and (5) mortality risk sore—which are used to estimate a person’s risk of allcause mortality within a year. Estimation is through a logistic regression model where
explanatory variables include the individual’s age, sex and comorbidity (the Johns
Hopkins Aggregated Diagnoses Group (ADG) was used to quantify comorbidity) (Austin
& Walraven, 2011; The Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health,
2011).
We examined patients’ receipt of the process indicators (1-4 above) at least once
in each year, and information on data sources and variable definitions are provided in the
Appendix (Sections A3.2 and A3.3 of Appendix A for Chapter 5).
Statistical analyses
Inverse probability weighted multivariable regressions
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Analyses were conducted at the physician level; all patient-level information were
aggregated to the level of the physician. The main explanatory variable was the primary
care model (i.e., FHG or FHO). Given that a physician’s choice to be in either payment
model is voluntary, there would be systematic differences between physicians in the two
models. Such differences result in selection bias, which we addressed by employing
multivariable regressions with inverse probability weights derived from propensity
scores;
Our inverse probability weights were derived from the propensity scores
estimated through kernel matching—as it is a matching technique that is widely used in
the health economics literature (Bamimore et al., 2020; Sarma et al., 2018; Somé et al.,
2019; Vu et al., 2020).In addition to using weights derived from kernel matching, we also
used two alternative weighting procedures as robustness checks, namely, covariate
balancing propensity scores (Imai & Ratkovic, 2014) and entropy balancing weighting
(Hainmueller, 2012); these two alternative methods are virtually robust to model
misspecification in simulation studies.
A physician’s propensity score refers to their probability of being in either of two
groups, given a set of observable explanatory variables. Such scores are estimated from
logistic regressions whereby the probability of group assignment is regressed on a set of
independent variables (Faries et al., 2010; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The general
guideline is to include independent variables in a propensity score model that are likely to
be related to both the outcome of interest and group assignment. Furthermore, a
propensity score model is said to be covariate-balanced when the distribution of each
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independent variable is balanced between the two groups after matching on the
propensity score (Garrido et al., 2014); absolute value of the standardized difference is a
common metric to quantify imbalance. If such value is 0% for a given covariate, the
distribution of that covariate is said to be completely balanced; an imbalance between
10% and 25% is acceptable (Garrido et al., 2014). The explanatory variables of our
propensity score model included physician’s characteristics (age, sex, group size, number
of enrolled patients, and country of medical education (United States/Canada or
international)). We also included characteristics of patients in physicians’ practice such as
the proportion of patients’ who are female, proportion of patients who live in rural areas,
the average age of patients, and the proportion of patients in high income quintile.
Physicians outside the range of common support were excluded. For our analyses,
we refer to the FHO group as the treated, and the FHG group as the control or the
untreated. When using inverse probability weighting to estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT), the treated are given a weight of one; control subjects are
given a weight that corresponds to the distance between them and treated subjects’
propensity scores within a bandwidth of 0.06 (Garrido et al., 2014). In ATT estimation,
the treated correspond to the FHO physicians and the inverse probability weights for the
FHG group creates a synthetic sample where distribution of the observable covariates is
similar to the FHO physicians (Austin & Stuart, 2015).
The comparison of CKD care quality between the FHG and FHO models was also
conducted for four subgroups: physicians who were male, female, aged 55 years and
above, and aged below 55 years. We conducted these subgroup analyses to observe
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whether CKD care quality under FHG and FHO is similar—or different—in various
subgroups of physicians. The literature is filled with inconsistent evidence on the impact
of gender on care delivery (Berthold et al., 2008; Henderson & Weisman, 2001; Kim et
al., 2005; Schmittdiel et al., 2000). While some studies found no relationship between
physicians’ gender and care quality (Schmittdiel et al., 2000), others concluded that care
provision varies according to gender; for example, Kim et al. (2005) found that female
primary care physicians were more likely to provide lipid assessment for their patients
with diabetes compared to their male counterparts. Some have explained that female
physicians involve more positive talk, information-giving and question-asking in their
practice style relative to their male peers (Bertakis et al., 1995). There literature is
inconclusive about the relationship between a physician’s and their care quality (Tsugawa
et al., 2017). Some argue that older physicians may provide better care than their younger
peers as the older ones, on average, have practiced medicine longer; others propound that
care delivery of younger physicians could be better than that of their older counterparts
because the junior clinicians’ knowledge would be based on more current medical
literature (Tsugawa et al., 2017). As the medical literature expands over time, older
physicians’ knowledge may become outdated; furthemore, physicians may find it
burdensome to update clinical practice with current the clinical literature (Tsugawa et al.,
2017). Moreover, the effect of continuing medical education (CME) is—according to
literature—mixed: some studies found that CME impacts performance, while other s
found that it is ineffective at improving physicians’ care practices (Cervero & Gaines,
2015).
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The equation below describes the multivariable regression:
Yi = δFHOi + βXi + εit.
Yi corresponds to the outcome of interest for physician i, FHO is a dummy variable
which takes a value of one if physician i is in FHO and zero if in a FHG; δ is the
estimated coefficient of interest capturing the association between a physician being in
FHO (relative to being in a FHG) and Y; Xi is the vector of explanatory variables
previously listed; εi is the error term. Fractional regressions were used for outcomes that
were proportions (i.e., the four care processes) (Papke, 1996); linear regression was used
for mortality risk score (as it is a continuous variable) (Sarma et al., 2018).
All analyses were conducted with the statistical software Stata version 15.1
(StataCorp, 2017).
5.3

Results

For 2014, we identified 4,008 physicians—1,085 in FHGs and 2,923 in FHOs; in
2015, we identified 4,572 physicians, 1,195 in FHGs and 3,377 in FHOs. Figure 1 of
Appendix B for Chapter 5 provides a flow chart depicting the derivation of the final
sample sizes of physicians for our two observation periods.
Covariate balance and descriptive statistics
For the observation periods, all three weighting techniques (i.e., kernel, CBPS and
EB weighting) yielded balance in distribution of observable covariates. Balancing
diagnostics for kernel weighting are provided in Figure 5.1 and Tables 5.1 and 5.2;
absolute standardized mean difference was under 15% for all covariates in both years.
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Balancing diagnostics for the two alternative weighting procedures are provided in
Appendix B (Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix B).
In both observation periods, more physicians were in FHOs, and were mostly
males (Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Mean values for the four process indicators show that, by and
large, care was slightly higher for patients in FHGs compared to those in FHOs.
Association between FHO and CKD care quality for 2014
Our inverse probability weighted regression results revealed that FHO compared
to FHG was associated with 1.98% (95% CI: -2.81%,-1.16%) less serum creatinine
testing at least once each year, and 7.18% (95% CI: -8.78%,-5.57%) less urine ACR
testing at least once a year (Table 5.5). We also found that FHO model was associated
with patients, on average, having lower mortality risk scores by 0.905 (95% CI: -1.103, 0.706). Our results showed no difference between the two models for prescription of
ACEI/ARB and statins. Our results support that fewer patients were receiving care from
FHO physicians in 2014: based on 170,494 total CKD patient-year observations in FHOs
in our 2014 data (where 153,246 of the patients over 65 years), there were 3,376 (CI:
4,791, 1,978) less patients receiving testing for serum creatinine, and 12,241 (CI:14,969,
9,497) less patients receiving urine ACR measurement. Our results also suggest that risk
of all-cause mortality within one year was reduced by approximately 0.0131% (CI:
0.0129%, 0.0133%). All results under CBPS and EB weighting were qualitatively similar
(Table 5.5).
For physicians who were male, female, younger (aged below 55 years), and older
(55 years and above), being in a FHO (vs. FHG) was associated with less urine ACR
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measurement at least once a year (Table 5.6). Of these four subgroups, point estimate of
the absolute difference between FHO vs. FHG was highest in younger physicians (9.89%), and most attenuated in older physicians (-4.72%). In all subgroups excepts older
physicians, FHO (vs. FHG) was associated with less serum creatinine testing at least once
annually (Table 5.6). On average, patients’ mortality risk score was lower under FHO
physicians of all four subgroups (Table 5.6). Results of subgroup analyses were mostly
corroborated by CBPS and EB weights (Tables 3 to 7 in Appendix B).
Association between FHO and CKD care quality for 2015
Our inverse probability weighted regression results showed that FHO was
associated with 2.40% (95% CI: -3.17%,-1.63%) less serum less serum creatinine testing
at least once each year and 6.59% (95% CI: -8.08, -5.09%) less urine ACR measurements
at least once a year (Table 5.7). On average, patients under FHO physicians had 0.809
lower mortality risk score (95% CI: -1.009, -0.608). All results under CBPS and EB
weighting were qualitatively similar (Table 5.7). Unlike for 2014, we found a significant
difference for ACEI/ARB prescription: FHO was associated with more prescription of
ACEIs/ARBs by 1.19% (95% CI: 0.402%, 1.98%); this finding was corroborated by only
CBPS weights (Table 5.7). Our results support that fewer patients were receiving care
from FHO physicians in 2015: based on 206,535 total CKD patient-year observations in
FHOs in our 2015 data (where 185,270 of the patients are over 65 years), there are 4,957
(CI: 6,547, 3,367) less patients receiving testing for serum creatinine, and 13,611 (CI:
16,688, 10,513) less patients receiving urine ACR measurement. Our results also suggest
that risk of all-cause mortality within one year was reduced by approximately 0.0130%
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(CI: 0.0128%, 0.0132%); our results also suggest that 2,205 (CI: 745, 3,668) more
patients receive ACEI/ARB prescription in FHO (vs. FHG).
For physicians who were male, female, younger, and older, being in a FHO (vs.
FHG) was associated with less serum creatinine testing, and less urine ACR
measurement, at least once a year (Table 5.8). On average, patients’ mortality risk score
was lower under FHO physicians of all four subgroups (Table 5.8). The FHO model was
associated with increased ACEI/ARB prescription only for the subpopulation of
physicians who were female and older (Table 5.8). Results of subgroup analyses were
mostly corroborated by CBPS and EB weights (Tables 8 to 12 in Appendix B).
5.4

Discussion

We examined the association between primary care physicians’ payment
mechanisms and the quality of primary care for persons with chronic kidney disease
using four process indicators and a mortality risk score for 2014 and 2015. For 2014 and
2015, inverse probability weighted regressions showed that persons with CKD are less
likely to receive serum creatinine testing and urine ACR measurements in a FHO than in
a FHG. However, we found that patients’ mortality risk scores were, on average, lower
under FHO, and this finding could result from FHO physicians rostering healthier
patients; this finding could also be explained by the possibility that patients under FHO
are being kept healthier. Statin prescription did not differ under FHG and FHO for both
years. For only 2015, our results revealed that patients in FHO are slightly more likely to
receive ACEI or ARB prescriptions.
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Our findings are at odds with our original hypothesis, namely that patients with
CKD would receive better management for their condition if their family physician were
remunerated through blended capitation relative to blended FFS. However, we need to
be cautious in interpreting our results because they are based on only two years of crosssectional data. Data unavailability at the time of our analyses deterred us from employing
statistical techniques that address some of the potential bias that is present. Fixed-effects
regressions would permit stronger conclusions.
Another limitation of our study pertains to our binary analyses of CKD process
measures (e.g., ‘no’ vs. ‘at least one’ ACR measurement): in our study, quality of care
process pertained to the provision vs. non provision of care. Given that the Ontario Drug
Benefit program covers Ontarians aged 65 years and over (Cheung et al., 2017;
Government of Ontario, 2020), we could not study individuals below this age group. The
Ontario Laboratories Information System (OLIS) database was used to identify persons
with CKD, as well as the laboratory-based process indicators (i.e., serum creatinine
testing and urine ACR measurement). The OLIS database holds information from various
laboratories across Ontario, including hospital laboratories, community laboratories and
public health laboratories (eHealth Ontario, 2018a). The goal of OLIS is to have a 100
per cent coverage for laboratory records in Ontario; the coverage has been increasing
annually since 2006 (eHealth Ontario, 2012, 2016). The inconsistency in percent
coverage across years deterred us from conducting longitudinal analysis to control for
unobservable time-invariant confounding.
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In the existing literature, there is limited research on the relationship between
primary care physicians’ remuneration mechanism and quality of care for CKD patients.
Our result pertaining to serum creatinine testing is different from that of the study by
Liddy, Singh, et al. (2011); the previous study found that blended capitation and FFS
were similar in terms of measuring estimated glomerular filtration rate. This discrepancy
could be due to the previous study using data from the Eastern part of Ontario only;
moreover, the authors’ comparison was between a mixed and pure payment models (i.e.,
blended capitation vs. FFS)—unlike ours that compared two mixed payment models (i.e.,
blended capitation vs. blended FFS).
While our study did not specifically investigate the impact of physicians’ switch
from FHG to FHO, our conclusion for urine ACR measurement resonates with findings
from Chami & Sweetman (2019) who found that switching physicians from FHGs to
FHOs was associated with a reduction in laboratory requisitions. Moreover, the FHG and
FHO models do not have financial incentives specifically for CKD care (Ontario Medical
Association, 2015).
Our study was the first to examine whether quality of CKD care varies between
FFS-based and capitation-based schemes in the primary care setting. While we found that
blended FFS can be associated with some better care processes for CKD, future studies
could investigate the complexities of the relationship between physicians’ mode of
remuneration and care quality for persons with this health condition using longitudinal
analyses that accounts for more bias than cross-sectional approaches. Nonetheless,
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findings from our study have contributed to the knowledge base on payment scheme and
quality of primary care for persons with chronic kidney disease.
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of propensity scores before and after kernel weighting for 2014 (top) and 2015 (bottom)
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Table 5.1 Means and standardized bias before and after kernel weighting for 2014
Means and standardized bias prior to kernel
Means and standardized bias after kernel
weighting
weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias
FHO
FHG
Bias
Physicians’ characteristics
Age (years)
53.923
56.6
-26.1
53.923
54.874
-9.3
Female
0.35888
0.33548
4.9
0.35888
0.32427
7.3
(proportion)
Group size
18.043
23.672
-29.7
18.043
15.563
13.1
Number of enrolled
1513.4
1687.6
-25.1
1513.4
1495.2
2.6
patients
IMG (proportion)
0.15327
0.28848
-33.0
0.15327
0.1575
-1.0
Patients’ characteristics
Age, (years)
77.078
76.484
20.7
77.078
77.221
-5.0
Female
0.58417
0.57175
9.6
0.58417
0.58251
1.3
(proportion)
Rural area
0.14039
0.04745
42.4
0.14039
0.10928
14.2
(proportion)
High income
quintile
0.3879
0.39853
-6.6
0.3879
0.39762
-6.0
(proportion)
Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate
Note: FHO represents all physicians in the FHO model in 2014; FHG represents all physicians in the FHG model in 2014
Covariate
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Table 5.2 Means and standardized bias before and after kernel weighting for 2015
Covariate
Physicians’ characteristics
Age (years)
Female (proportion)
Group size
Number of enrolled
patients
IMG (proportion)
Patients’ characteristics
Age (years)
Female (proportion)
Rural area (proportion)
High income quintile
(proportion)

Means and standardized bias prior to kernel
weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias

Means and standardized bias after kernel
weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias

53.534
0.39147
17.834

56.635
0.35146
26.18

-29.4
8.3
-38.2

53.534
0.39147
17.834

54.422
0.35947
15.582

-8.4
6.6
10.3

1462.9
0.16908

1639.1
0.30377

-25.4
-32.1

1462.9
0.16908

1441.1
0.173

3.2
-0.9

76.938
0.58373
0.13669

76.442
0.57307
0.0456

17.4
8.2
42.1

76.938
0.58373
0.13669

77.083
0.58403
0.10636

-5.1
-0.2
14

0.38514

0.39868

-8.1

0.38514

0.39443

-5.6

Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate
FHO represents all physicians in the FHO model in 2015; FHG represents all physicians in the FHG model in 2015
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Table 5.3 Mean values of outcome and explanatory variables for 2014
Variables

FHG (n=1,085)

Model
FHO (n=2,923)

Physicians’ characteristics
Age, in years (mean ± SD)
56.6 ± 10.2
53.9 ± 10.3
Female (proportion)
0.34
0.36
Group size (mean ± SD)
24 ± 23
18 ±14
Number of enrolled patients (mean ± SD)
1687 ± 807
1413 ± 559
IMG (proportion)
0.29
0.15
Patients’ characteristics
Age, in years (mean ± SD)
76.5 ± 3.1
77.1 ± 2.6
Female (proportion)
0.57
0.58
Rural area (proportion)
0.047
0.14
High income quintile (proportion)
0.40
0.39
Outcome
Serum creatinine testing (proportion)
0.85
0.83
Urine ACR measurement (proportion)
0.51
0.40
ACEI/ARB prescription (proportion)
0.58
0.58
Statin prescription (proportion)
0.65
0.63
Mortality risk score (mean)
67.1 ± 4.4
67.0 ± 3.6
Abbreviation: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, ACR: albumin-to-creatinine ratio, ACEIs:
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors, ARBs: and angiotensin II receptor blockers, IMG: international medical graduate
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Table 5.4 Mean values of outcome and explanatory variables for 2015
Variables

FHG (n=1,195)

Model
FHO (n=3,377)

Physicians’ characteristics
Age, in years (mean ± SD)
56.6 ± 10.5
53.5 ± 10.6
Female (proportion)
0.35
0.39
Group size (mean ± SD)
26 ± 27
18 ± 14
Number of enrolled patients (mean ± SD)
1639 ± 799
1463 ± 566
IMG (proportion)
0.30
0.17
Patients’ characteristics
Age, in years (mean ± SD)
76.4 ± 3.1
76.9 ± 2.6
Female (proportion)
0.57
0.58
Rural area (proportion)
0.05
0.14
High income quintile (proportion)
0.40
0.39
Outcome
Serum creatinine testing (proportion)
0.85
0.83
Urine ACR measurement (proportion)
0.50
0.39
ACEI/ARB prescription (proportion)
0.56
0.57
Statin prescription (proportion)
0.65
0.62
Mortality risk score (mean)
67.3 ± 4.3
67.1 ± 3.6
Abbreviation: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, ACR: albumin-to-creatinine ratio, ACEIs:
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors, ARBs: and angiotensin II receptor blockers, IMG: international medical graduate

190

Table 5.5 Effect of FHO on quality of chronic kidney disease care for 2014
Outcome variablea

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Serum creatinine
testing

-0.0168***

-0.0198***

-0.0220***

-0.0141**

(-0.0234 - -0.0101)

(-0.0281 - -0.0116)

(-0.0303 - -0.0136)

(-0.0250 - -0.00320)

-0.0715***

-0.0718***

-0.0742***

-0.0666***

(-0.0858 - -0.0572)

(-0.0878 - -0.0557)

(-0.0911 - -0.0574)

(-0.0880 - -0.0452)

0.00153

0.00178

0.00315

0.00133

(-0.00587 - 0.00894)

(-0.00636 - 0.00992)

(-0.00490 - 0.0112)

(-0.00943 - 0.0121)

-0.00409

-0.00386

-0.00618

-0.00611

(-0.0126 - 0.00447)

(-0.0134 - 0.00567)

(-0.0158 - 0.00344)

(-0.0177 - 0.00549)

-0.822***

-0.905***

-0.841***

-0.740***

(-1.000 - -0.643)

(-1.103 - -0.706)

(-1.042 - -0.639)

(-0.960 - -0.521)

Urine ACR
measurement
ACEI/ARB
prescription
Statin prescription
Mortality risk score

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker, CBPS: covariate
balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization; FHG: Family Health Group
Total number of observations = 4,008
a
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease. For example,
physicians in FHO, relative to their counterparts in FHG, are less likely to provide serum creatinine testing by 1.98% in
2014. This table also reports patients’ mean mortality risk score of under FHO—relative to FHG.
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Table 5.6 Effect of FHO on quality of chronic kidney disease care across various subgroups of physicians for 2014
Outcome variablea
Serum creatinine testing

Urine ACR measurement

ACEI/ARB prescription

Statin prescription

Mortality risk score

All
(n=4,008)
-0.0198***
(-0.0281 - 0.0116)
-0.0718***
(-0.0878 - 0.0557)
0.00178
(-0.00636 0.00992)
-0.00386
(-0.0134 0.00567)
-0.905***
(-1.103 - 0.706)

Male
(n=2,595)
-0.0189***
(-0.0290 - 0.00879)
-0.0715***
(-0.0910 - 0.0520)
-0.00341
(-0.0133 0.00644)
-0.00192
(-0.0133 0.00946)
-1.082***
(-1.319 - 0.845)

Female
(n=1,413)
-0.0208***
(-0.0347 - 0.00702)
-0.0718***
(-0.1000 - 0.0437)
0.0102
(-0.00418 0.0245)
-0.0113
(-0.0287 0.00616)
-0.653***
(-1.024 - 0.282)

Young
(n=1,923)
-0.0284***
(-0.0383 - 0.0184)
-0.0989***
(-0.123 - 0.0746)
-0.00369
(-0.0158 0.00840)
-0.00942
(-0.0231 0.00431)
-0.971***
(-1.285 - 0.658)

Old
(n=2,085)
-0.0119*
(-0.0239 6.35e-05)
-0.0472***
(-0.0684 - 0.0261)
0.0056
(-0.00521 0.0164)
-0.00091
(-0.0140 0.0122)
-0.797***
(-1.047 - 0.547)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker, CBPS: covariate
balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
a
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease for various
subgroup of physicians. For example, male physicians in FHO, relative to their counterparts in FHG, are less likely to
provide serum creatinine testing by 1.89% in 2014. This table also reports patients’ mean mortality risk score of under
FHO—relative to FHG—for various subgroup of physicians.
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Table 5.7 Effect of FHO on quality of chronic kidney disease care for 2015
Outcome variablea

Unweighted

Kernel

CBPS

EB

Serum creatinine testing

-0.0194***

-0.0240***

-0.0266***

-0.0215***

Urine ACR measurement

(-0.0258 - -0.0130)
-0.0718***

(-0.0317 - -0.0163)
-0.0659***

(-0.0345 - -0.0187)
-0.0674***

(-0.0316 - -0.0114)
-0.0592***

ACEI/ARB prescription

(-0.0853 - -0.0583)
0.00824**

(-0.0808 - -0.0509)
0.0119***

(-0.0818 - -0.0529)
0.0130***

(-0.0796 - -0.0388)
0.0063

Statin prescription

(0.00121 - 0.0153)
-0.00661*

(0.00402 - 0.0198)
-0.00488

(0.00515 - 0.0208)
-0.00668

(-0.00400 - 0.0166)
-0.0101*

Mortality risk score

(-0.0145 - 0.00125)
-0.732***

(-0.0141 - 0.00436)
-0.809***

(-0.0156 - 0.00228)
-0.776***

(-0.0217 - 0.00158)
-0.809***

(-0.899 - -0.565)
(-1.009 - -0.608)
(-0.973 - -0.578)
(-1.062 - -0.556)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker, CBPS: covariate
balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
Total number of observations = 4,572
a
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease. For example,
physicians in FHO, relative to their counterparts in FHG, are less likely to provide serum creatinine testing by 2.40% in
2015. This table also reports patients’ mean mortality risk score of under FHO—relative to FHG.
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Table 5.8 Effect of FHO on quality of chronic kidney disease care across various subgroups of physicians for 2015
Outcome variable
Serum creatinine testing

Urine ACR measurement

ACEI/ARB prescription

Statin prescription

Mortality risk score

All
(n=4,572)
-0.0240***
(-0.0317 - 0.0163)
-0.0659***
(-0.0808 - 0.0509)
0.0119***
(0.00402 0.0198)

Male
(n=2,830)
-0.0205***
(-0.0305 - 0.0104)
-0.0616***
(-0.0801 - 0.0431)
0.00674
(-0.00277 0.0163)

Female
(n=1,742)
-0.0318***
(-0.0433 - 0.0203)
-0.0754***
(-0.101 - 0.0496)
0.0197***
(0.00566 0.0337)

Young
(n=2,222)
-0.0301***
(-0.0407 - 0.0195)
-0.0861***
(-0.109 - 0.0636)
0.00884
(-0.00272 0.0204)

Old
(n=2,350)
-0.0169***
(-0.0279 - 0.00596)
-0.0442***
(-0.0636 - 0.0249)
0.0134**
(0.00292 0.0239)

-0.00488
(-0.0141 0.00436)
-0.809***
(-1.009 - -0.608)

-0.00211
(-0.0136 0.00939)
-0.920***
(-1.161 - -0.679)

-0.00976
(-0.0254 0.00592)
-0.684***
(-1.034

-0.0109
(-0.0243 0.00245)
-0.774***
(-1.074 - -0.475)

0.00193
(-0.0106 0.0145)
-0.821***
(-1.084 - -0.558)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
Abbreviations: ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker, CBPS: covariate
balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
a
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease for various
subgroup of physicians. For example, male physicians in FHO, relative to their counterparts in FHG, are less likely to
provide serum creatinine testing by 2.05% in 2015.This table also reports patients’ mean mortality risk score of under
FHO—relative to FHG—for various subgroup of physicians.
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Appendix A (for Chapter 5)
A3.1 Schematic of Cohort Creation
Identify all Ontario primary care physicians (PCPs) in Family Health Groups and Family Health Organizations, and follow these physicians and their enrolled
patients
Exclusion for PCPs:
-Missing/ invalid unique physician
identifier
-Missing age
-Missing sex
Physicians who switched multiple
times

Exclusion for patients:
-Missing/ invalid IKN
-Missing age
-Missing sex
-Individuals who died on or before
April 1st, 2007
-Non-Ontario residents

PCPs and enrolled CKD patients
-Identify PCPs’ patients who have two eGFR laboratory test results of below 60mL/min/1.73m2, where the two eGFR test results are separated by at
least 3 months but less than 18 months.
-The date of the second eGFR test result will serve as the CKD cohort entry date (that will be referred to as CKD cohort entry date)
-The time frame for 1st and 2nd test dates will be within the time period of March 31 st, 2007 to April 1st 2016
-Exclusions for CKD cohort (follow arrow below):

Exclusions for CKD cohort:
-Exclude individuals who are below 40 years of age on CKD
Entry Date
-Exclude individuals receiving ≥ 1 dialysis treatment within
the 1 year prior to either of the 2 test dates (i.e., the first test
date or CKD Entry Date):
-Exclude individuals who had renal transplant prior to either
of the test dates

For the 2014 and 2015 fiscal years, identify the following for CKD patients:
(1) patients who received creatinine testing, (2) patients who received ACR testing (3) patients who received prescription of ACEI or ARBs (4) patients who
received prescription of statins, and (5) annual mortality risk (i.e., mortality risk score by algorithm from Austin et al. (2011) ).
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Abbreviations: eGFR: estimated glomerular filtration rate; CKD: chronic kidney disease, IKN: ICES Key number; ACR: albumin-to-creatinine ratio; ACEI:
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors; ARB: angiotensin II receptor blockers
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A3.2 Data sources for variables
We used data from the following nine ICES databases: Client Agency Program Enrollment Registry, Canadian Institute
for Health Information-Hospital Discharge Abstract Database, National Ambulatory Care Reporting System (NACRS),
Ontario Laboratories Information System, Canadian Organ Replacement Registry (CORR), Ontario Health Insurance Plan
Database, Registered Persons Database, and Ontario Drug Benefit Claims; these databases were linked using a unique patient
identifier known as the ICES key number (IKN).
CAPE is a registry which constitutes centralized information on individuals registered with doctors practicing in any of
the patient enrolment models including Family Health Groups and Family Health Organizations (Glazier et al., 2012); this
registry was used to identify patients in FHGs and FHOs. CAPE was also used to identify physicians’ information such as their
date of birth, sex, and primary care model (i.e., FHG or FHO) (Lofters et al., 2013; Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term
Care, 2017). Information on persons undergoing organ transplant in Canada can be obtained through CORR (Canadian
Institute for Health Information, 2020b; Nash et al., 2017); hence we used this database to exclude persons with end-stage
kidney disease as per exclusion criteria in Section A3.1. Inpatient information (including diagnosis, length of stay, and
patient’s sex) as from 1988 is obtainable through CIHI-DAD (or simply DAD) (Canadian Institute for Health Information,
2020c). Persons with chronic kidney disease were identified using OLIS, a centralized information system containing data
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pertaining to laboratory test orders (such as patient’s serum creatinine level, white blood count, etc.) from laboratories all
across Ontario (eHealth Ontario, 2018b; ICES, 2016). We used OLIS to identify some of the process indicators for CKD care
Information pertaining to outpatient care in facilities like kidney dialysis clinics and emergency departments are obtainable
through NACRS (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2020d; Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012). Both NACRS and
DAD were used for identifying CKD process indicators (more details in Section A3.3). Information on claims for prescription
drugs financially covered by the Ontario Drug Benefit Program are available in ODB (Gandhi, 2016), and this database was
used for the identification of prescription process indicators; ODB has coverage for individuals aged 65 years and above and
special populations (e.g., persons on government-funded disability support). Information on medical services insured by
Ontario’s single-payer healthcare insurance plan are available in the OHIP database (Gandhi, 2016; Glazier et al., 2012).
Demographic information of Ontarians including sex, date of birth and death, and postal code are recorded in RPDB (Gandhi,
2016; Glazier et al., 2012); we used RPDB to obtain patients’ demographic information. Computation of mortality risk score
was based on information from NACRS, DAD and OHIP.
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A3.3 Definition of outcome variables
Table A3.1 Definition of outcome for each quality indicator
Quality indicator
Eligibility criteria for patients
Receipt of at least one
For each year:
serum creatinine testing -persons who are confirmed to have
CKD before start of fiscal yeara
-only identify patients who are alive
within that year

Receipt of at least one
urine ACR measurement

Outcome definition
For each year:
-receipt of at least one serum creatinine
testing, and
• exclude if date of serum creatinine
tests = date of a hospital (or an
emergency department)
admission,
• exclude patients whose date of
serum creatinine test = date of a
hospital (or an emergency
department) discharge,
• exclude patients whose date of
serum creatinine test falls between
a hospital (or ED) admission and a
hospital (or ED) discharge
Data sources: OLIS, RPDB, CORR, DAD, NACRS
For each year:
For each year:
-persons who are confirmed to have -receipt of at least one ACR tests,
CKD before start of fiscal yeara
and
-only identify patients who are alive
• exclude patients whose date of
within that year
ACR tests = date of a hospital (or
an emergency department)
admission,
• exclude patients whose date of
serum creatinine test = date of a
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Prescription of ACEI or
ARBs

Prescription of statins

Mortality risk

a

hospital (or an emergency
department) discharge,
• exclude patients whose date of
serum creatinine test falls between
a hospital (or ED) admission and a
hospital (or ED) discharge
Date sources: OLIS, RPDB, CORR, DAD, NACRS
For each year:
For each year:
-persons who are confirmed to have -identify patients who received a
CKD before start of fiscal yeara
prescription for ACEI or ARB
-only identify patients who are alive
within that year
-only include patients who are aged
65 years or older
Data sources: ODB, RPDB, CORR
For each year:
-persons who are confirmed to have For each year:
CKD before start of fiscal yeara
-identify patients who received a
-only include patients who are alive
prescription for statin
within that year
-only include patients who are aged
65 years or older
Data sources: ODB, RPDB, CORR
Patients’ mortality risk score as per the algorithm by Austin et al. (2011)

Data sources: RPDB, OHIP, DAD, NACRS
Refer to Section A3.1 for schematic of cohort creation for more explanation on CKD cohort
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Appendix B (for Chapter 5)
2014 cross-sectional year

2015 cross-sectional year

In 2014, there are 6398 physicians in FHG
and FHO

In 2015, there are 6705 physicians in FHG
and FHO
(FHG=2208, FHO=4497)

(FHG= 2274, FHO=4124)
Of these 6398 physicians, 4211 have at least
20 patients eligible for prescription and labbased indicators

Of these 4211, there are 4209 within the
common support
There were 201 physicians for whom kernel
weights could not be computed; two
physicians were off common support.
Hence 4008 physicians included analyses

Of the 6705 physicians, 4748 have at least 20
patients eligible for prescription and lab-based
indicators

There were 176 physicians for whom kernel
weights could not be computed, hence 4,572
physicians included in analyses. These 4,572
physicians were on common support

Figure 1 Simple schematic for derivation of final sample size
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Table 1. Results from Covariate Balancing Propensity Score weighting and Entropy Balancing weighting for 2014
Means and standardized bias after CBPS
Means and standardized bias after EB
weighting
weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias
FHO
FHG
Bias
Physicians’ characteristics
Age (years)
53.923
53.923
0
53.923
53.923
0
Female
0.35888
0.35887
0
0.35888
0.35871
0
(proportion)
Group size
18.043
18.043
0
18.043
18.043
0
Number of enrolled
1513.4
1513.4
0
1513.4
1513.4
0
patients
IMG (proportion)
0.15327
0.15326
0
0.15327
0.15314
0
Patients’ characteristics
Age (years)
77.078
77.078
0
77.078
77.077
0
Female
0.58417
0.58417
0
0.58417
0.58417
0
(proportion)
Rural area
0.14039
0.1404
0
0.14039
0.14039
0
(proportion)
High income
quintile
0.3879
0.3879
0
0.3879
0.38789
0
(proportion)
Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate
FHO represents all physicians in the FHO model in 2014; FHG represents all physicians in the FHG model in 2014
Covariate
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Table 2. Results from Covariate Balancing Propensity Score weighting and Entropy Balancing weighting for 2015
Means and standardized bias after CBPS
Means and standardized bias after EB
weighting
weighting
FHO
FHG
Bias
FHO
FHG
Bias
Physicians’ characteristics
Age (years)
53.534
53.534
0
53.534
53.533
0
Female
0.39147
0.39148
0
0.39147
0.39134
0
(proportion)
Group size
17.834
17.834
0
17.834
17.834
0
Number of enrolled
1462.9
1462.9
0
1462.9
1462.9
0
patients
IMG (proportion)
0.16908
0.16909
0
0.16908
0.16896
0
Patients’ characteristics
Age (years)
76.938
76.938
0
76.938
76.937
0
Female
0.58373
0.58373
0
0.58373
0.58372
0
(proportion)
Rural area
0.13669
0.1367
0
0.13669
0.13669
0
(proportion)
High income
0.38514
0.38514
0
0.38514
0.38514
0
quintile
(proportion)
Abbreviations: FHG: Family Health Group, FHO: Family Health Organization, IMG: International Medical Graduate
FHO represents all physicians in the FHO model in 2015; FHG represents all physicians in the FHG model in 2015
Covariate
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Table 3. Effect of FHO on serum creatinine testing at least once a year, across various physician subgroups for 2014
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.0143***
-0.0189***
-0.0207***
-0.0118*
(-0.0225 - -0.00612)
(-0.0290 - -0.00879)
(-0.0314 - -0.00994)
(-0.0257 - 0.00218)
Female
-0.0235***
-0.0208***
-0.0236***
-0.0189**
(-0.0357 - -0.0114)
(-0.0347 - -0.00702)
(-0.0362 - -0.0109)
(-0.0337 - -0.00408)
Younger
-0.0199***
-0.0284***
-0.0304***
-0.0200**
(-0.0296 - -0.0103)
(-0.0383 - -0.0184)
(-0.0409 - -0.0200)
(-0.0353 - -0.00470)
Older
-0.0142***
-0.0119*
-0.0138**
-0.00887
(-0.0234 - -0.00512)
(-0.0239 - 6.35e-05)
(-0.0263 - -0.00130)
(-0.0229 - 0.00514)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per serum
creatinine testing—for various subgroup of physicians.
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 4. Effect of FHO on urine albumin-to-creatinine ratio testing at least once a year, across various physician subgroups
for 2014
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.0706***
-0.0715***
-0.0732***
-0.0657***
(-0.0881 - -0.0531)
(-0.0910 - -0.0520)
(-0.0937 - -0.0527)
(-0.0914 - -0.0400)
Female
-0.0726***
-0.0718***
-0.0760***
-0.0683***
(-0.0979 - -0.0473)
(-0.1000 - -0.0437)
(-0.104 - -0.0479)
(-0.103 - -0.0338)
Younger
-0.0946***
-0.0989***
-0.101***
-0.0879***
(-0.116 - -0.0732)
(-0.123 - -0.0746)
(-0.128 - -0.0753)
(-0.120 - -0.0561)
Older
-0.0536***
-0.0472***
-0.0467***
-0.0471***
(-0.0728 - -0.0344)
(-0.0684 - -0.0261)
(-0.0674 - -0.0261)
(-0.0750 - -0.0191)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per urine
albumin-to-creatinine ratio testing—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 5. Effect of FHO on ACEI/ARB prescription at least once a year, across various physician subgroups for 2014
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.00156
-0.00341
-0.00215
0.00125
(-0.0105 - 0.00736)
(-0.0133 - 0.00644)
(-0.0119 - 0.00763)
(-0.0121 - 0.0146)
Female
0.00622
0.0102
0.0118*
-0.00034
(-0.00737 - 0.0198)
(-0.00418 - 0.0245)
(-0.00218 - 0.0258)
(-0.0161 - 0.0155)
Younger
-0.00508
-0.00369
-0.00063
-0.00538
(-0.0164 - 0.00621)
(-0.0158 - 0.00840)
(-0.0123 - 0.0110)
(-0.0232 - 0.0124)
Older
0.00578
0.0056
0.00564
0.00779
(-0.00405 - 0.0156)
(-0.00521 - 0.0164)
(-0.00536 - 0.0166)
(-0.00443 - 0.0200)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per
ACEI/ARB prescription—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker; CBPS: covariate
balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 6. Effect of FHO on statin prescription at least once a year, across various physician subgroups for 2014
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.00332
-0.00192
-0.00436
-0.00152
(-0.0133 - 0.00671)
(-0.0133 - 0.00946)
(-0.0158 - 0.00705)
(-0.0161 - 0.0131)
Female
-0.00927
-0.0113
-0.0132
-0.0170*
(-0.0256 - 0.00707)
(-0.0287 - 0.00616)
(-0.0309 - 0.00451)
(-0.0351 - 0.00113)
Younger
-0.00731
-0.00942
-0.0119*
-0.0177**
(-0.0200 - 0.00533)
(-0.0231 - 0.00431)
(-0.0258 - 0.00190)
(-0.0341 - -0.00131)
Older
-0.00149
-0.00091
-0.0022
0.00463
(-0.0133 - 0.0103)
(-0.0140 - 0.0122)
(-0.0154 - 0.0110)
(-0.0118 - 0.0210)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per statin
prescription—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 7. Effect of FHO on patients’ mortality risk score across various physician subgroups for 2014
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.931***
-1.082***
-1.017***
-0.988***
(-1.144 - -0.717)
(-1.319 - -0.845)
(-1.250 - -0.784)
(-1.249 - -0.726)
Female
-0.676***
-0.653***
-0.605***
-0.330*
(-1.006 - -0.346)
(-1.024 - -0.282)
(-0.983 - -0.227)
(-0.704 - 0.0436)
Younger
-0.976***
-0.971***
-0.871***
-0.765***
(-1.261 - -0.691)
(-1.285 - -0.658)
(-1.191 - -0.551)
(-1.097 - -0.433)
Older
-0.675***
-0.797***
-0.776***
-0.683***
(-0.905 - -0.445)
(-1.047 - -0.547)
(-1.019 - -0.533)
(-0.955 - -0.410)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports patients’ mean mortality risk score of under FHO—relative to FHG—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 8. Effect of FHO on serum creatinine testing at least once a year, across various physician subgroups for 2015
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.0147***
-0.0205***
-0.0213***
-0.0133*
(-0.0228 - -0.00669)
(-0.0305 - -0.0104)
(-0.0316 - -0.0110)
(-0.0274 - 0.000845)
Female
-0.0298***
-0.0318***
-0.0362***
-0.0352***
(-0.0410 - -0.0187)
(-0.0433 - -0.0203)
(-0.0480 - -0.0244)
(-0.0470 - -0.0234)
Younger
-0.0257***
-0.0301***
-0.0340***
-0.0293***
(-0.0356 - -0.0158)
(-0.0407 - -0.0195)
(-0.0448 - -0.0232)
(-0.0432 - -0.0154)
Older
-0.0138***
-0.0169***
-0.0174***
-0.0137**
(-0.0222 - -0.00531)
(-0.0279 - -0.00596)
(-0.0290 - -0.00578)
(-0.0265 - -0.000957)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per serum
creatinine testing—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 9. Effect of FHO on urine albumin-to-creatinine ratio testing at least once a year, across various physician subgroups
for 2015
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.0681***
-0.0616***
-0.0636***
-0.0519***
(-0.0848 - -0.0513)
(-0.0801 - -0.0431)
(-0.0815 - -0.0457)
(-0.0762 - -0.0276)
Female
-0.0800***
-0.0754***
-0.0748***
-0.0705***
(-0.103 - -0.0568)
(-0.101 - -0.0496)
(-0.0996 - -0.0500)
(-0.104 - -0.0365)
Younger
-0.0906***
-0.0861***
-0.0832***
-0.0889***
(-0.111 - -0.0704)
(-0.109 - -0.0636)
(-0.105 - -0.0617)
(-0.118 - -0.0599)
Older
-0.0552***
-0.0442***
-0.0473***
-0.0286**
(-0.0734 - -0.0370)
(-0.0636 - -0.0249)
(-0.0662 - -0.0285)
(-0.0547 - -0.00256)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per urine
albumin-to-creatinine ratio testing—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization
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Table 10. Effect of FHO on ACEI/ARB prescription at least once a year, across various physician subgroups for 2015
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
0.00429
0.00674
0.00801
0.00246
(-0.00425 - 0.0128)
(-0.00277 - 0.0163)
(-0.00166 - 0.0177)
(-0.00984 - 0.0148)
Female
0.0144**
0.0197***
0.0206***
0.0114
(0.00184 - 0.0270)
(0.00566 - 0.0337)
(0.00703 - 0.0341)
(-0.00502 - 0.0278)
Younger
0.00339
0.00884
0.0106*
0.00453
(-0.00735 - 0.0141)
(-0.00272 - 0.0204)
(-0.000737 - 0.0220)
(-0.0109 - 0.0200)
Older
0.0112**
0.0134**
0.0129**
0.00748
(0.00191 - 0.0205)
(0.00292 - 0.0239)
(0.00211 - 0.0236)
(-0.00457 - 0.0195)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per
ACEI/ARB prescription—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
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Table 11. Effect of FHO on statin prescription at least once a year, across various physician subgroups for 2015
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
EB
Male
-0.00495
-0.00211
-0.00451
-0.00394
(-0.0146 - 0.00470)
(-0.0136 - 0.00939)
(-0.0157 - 0.00670)
(-0.0186 - 0.0107)
Female
-0.00995
-0.00976
-0.0105
-0.0209**
(-0.0237 - 0.00375)
(-0.0254 - 0.00592)
(-0.0257 - 0.00474)
(-0.0382 - -0.00360)
Younger
-0.0084
-0.0109
-0.0108
-0.0219**
(-0.0203 - 0.00354)
(-0.0243 - 0.00245)
(-0.0238 - 0.00227)
(-0.0387 - -0.00520)
Older
-0.00425
0.00193
-0.00115
0.00238
(-0.0148 - 0.00627)
(-0.0106 - 0.0145)
(-0.0137 - 0.0114)
(-0.0125 - 0.0173)
Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports the average marginal effects of FHO on physicians’ care quality for chronic kidney disease—as per statin
prescription—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
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Table 12. Effect of FHO on patients’ mortality risk score across various physician subgroups for 2015
Subgroup
Unweighted
Kernel
CBPS
Male
-0.795***
-0.920***
-0.858***
(-0.997 - -0.593)
(-1.161 - -0.679)
(-1.101 - -0.615)
Female
-0.653***
-0.684***
-0.689***
Younger
Older

EB
-0.901***
(-1.207 - -0.595)

(-0.949 - -0.358)

(-1.034 - -0.334)

(-1.024 - -0.354)

-0.663***
(-1.083 - -0.244)

-0.738***
(-0.999 - -0.477)
-0.708***
(-0.926 - -0.490)

-0.774***
(-1.074 - -0.475)
-0.821***
(-1.084 - -0.558)

-0.728***
(-1.018 - -0.438)
-0.795***
(-1.066 - -0.524)

-0.894***
(-1.266 - -0.522)
-0.719***
(-1.038 - -0.399)

Notes:
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1, all regressions include all the covariates defined in Xi for the respective year; 95%
confidence interval in parentheses
This table reports patients’ mean mortality risk score of under FHO—relative to FHG—for various subgroup of physicians
Abbreviations: CBPS: covariate balancing propensity score, EB: entropy balancing, FHO: Family Health Organization;
ACEI: angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, ARB: angiotensin II receptor blocker
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Chapter 6
6

Conclusions
6.1

Summary of findings

The literature suggests that physicians’ mode of remuneration can be associated with
their behaviour; through three studies, we made some extension to this literature. While
there exists a substantial body of literature for the impact of pay-for-performance
incentives on physicians’ performance, far fewer studies have specifically examined the
effect of physicians’ mode of remuneration on the delivery of care quality. Our studies on
the effect of physicians’ switch from blended FFS to blended capitation on several aspects
of care quality—as per the management of major chronic conditions—are novel
contributions to the existing literature.
Family physicians in Ontario’s Family Health Group and Family Health
Organization models are eligible for the same P4P incentives for diabetes and congestive
heart failure management; the main difference between the two models is that the base
remuneration is FFS in a FHG and capitation in a FHO. Over time, many family physicians
in Ontario switched from the FHG to FHO model (Sweetman & Buckley, 2014), we
referred to these physicians as ‘switchers’; ‘non-switchers’ corresponded to those who
remained in the FHG model. The vast majority the province’s primary care physicians
currently practice in either of these two (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2018).
In our first study, we investigated the impact of this switch on family physicians’
quality of care for diabetes management. The effect of switching on follow-up care and
health outcomes for persons with congestive heart failure were examined in our second
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study. In these two studies, we employed a two-stage estimation approach of propensity
score-based weighting methods (that balances observable covariates at baseline) and fixedeffects regression (that accounts for physician-specific time-invariant unobservable
factors). Ontario-wide data with an observation period spanning a decade was used for the
first two studies. For our third study, we compared family physicians’ quality of care for
the management of chronic kidney disease. Given some data limitations, this study did not
use fixed-effects estimation approach like the first two studies. Our last study conducted
cross-sectional analyses on two recent time periods: the 2014 and 2015 fiscal years. As
mentioned earlier, binary analyses were conducted for the care processes investigated in
the first and third studies (i.e., ‘provision’ vs. ‘non-provision’ of care (e.g., HbA1c testing));
we acknowledged this limitation in our definition of care quality as per process measures.
Our findings reveal that physicians under blended capitation provide better quality
of diabetes management than their counterparts under blended FFS; family physicians’
switch from blended FFS to blended capitation moderately increased physicians’ testing
for HbA1c, lipid profile, and nephropathy screening; switchers were more likely to
prescribe statins than non-switchers. While the risk of avoidable hospitalization due to
diabetes mellitus did not differ between patients of switchers’ and non-switchers’, patients
under blended capitation had moderately lower mortality risk scores. Physicians in blended
capitation and blended FFS were not different in terms of eye examination and prescription
of ACEIs or ARB. Our two-stage estimation results showed that primary care physicians’
switch from the FFS- to capitation-based payment scheme did not impact follow-up care
for persons with CHF. The risk of avoidable hospitalization due to CHF was not different

215

between switchers’ and non-switchers’ patients; mortality risk scores did not differ as well.
Our last study found that quality of CKD care received by patients under the FHG and FHO
model differed; patients in blended capitation were less likely to receive testing for serum
creatinine and albumin-to-creatinine ratio in the two observation periods; however, in
2015, patients in blended capitation were more likely to receive ACE/ARB prescription;
for the two observation periods, patients under FHO had slightly lower mortality risk
scores.
6.2

Discussion

Ontario’s natural experiment permitted us to examine the impact of family
physicians’ switch from a blended FFS to blended capitation model on several dimensions
of care for persons with diabetes mellitus, congestive heart failure, and chronic kidney
disease. The observation period of our first two studies was the longest ever used to
investigate the impact of family physicians’ switch from FHG to FHO on outcomes
compared to previous studies (Jaakkimainen et al., 2011; Kiran et al., 2014; Kralj &
Kantarevic, 2013). By virtue of using a longer panel, we argue that our conclusions have
high internal validity and hence relatively stronger than that of previous studies based on
cross-sectional design or shorter follow-up periods. The benefit of using longer timeframes
is evident throughout the literature; for example, when Campbell and colleagues (2007,
2009) investigated the impact of the QOF using an observation period of one vs. three
years, the conclusions varied. The authors found greater improvement in care quality in the
short term than in the longer term (Campbell et al., 2007, 2009).

216

Our measures of care were chiefly process measures. Compared to outcome
measures, process indicators are more sensitive to differences in care quality that result
from differential use of evidence-based interventions (Mant, 2001). For instance, if
mortality is used to determine whether quality of care varies between two hospitals or
jurisdictions, it would take longer time and larger sample size to detect minimum difference
with 20% probability of a Type II error. However, with process measures, it would take
less time and require smaller sample size to detect an effect (Kyeremanteng, 2015; Mant,
2001; Smith et al., 2008). Furthermore, compared to outcome measures, process indicators
are better measures of quality as they are under a clinician’s direct control (Mant, 2001;
Shekelle et al., 2001) and process measures are amendable through direct action for quality
improvement initiatives.
As mentioned earlier, the secondary sources of income in the FHG and FHO models
are by and large similar (e.g., physicians in both models are entitled to the same financial
incentives, such as the Diabetes Management Incentive); base payment is the main
difference between the FHG (i.e., FFS) and FHO (i.e., capitation). Differences in outcome
observed between these two payment models can be driven by factors other than pay-forperformance incentives. For example, physicians in FHG and FHO could systematically
differ in their level of involvement with specialists when providing care to patients—and
such differences can influence care processes and health outcomes. Moreover, various
studies support that primary care with specialist involvement—compared to a lack
thereof—can be associated with an improvement in physicians’ care delivery and patients’
health outcomes (Datto et al., 2003; Katon et al., 2002). For instance, a randomized study
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by Datto et al. (2003) found that patients with depression were more likely to receive
guideline-adherent care when their management regimen involved both primary and
specialist care—relative to when they received care solely from primary care clinicians.
Furthermore, this specialist involvement—vs. a lack thereof—was associated with
improvement in depression symptoms (Datto et al., 2003). Similarly, factors other than
P4P schemes can also influence transitional care (such as post-discharge follow up). Using
2016 to 2019 data from Southwestern Ontario, Lien et al. (2020) investigated factors
associated with family physicians’ follow up of patients within 30 days after being
discharged from an emergency department (ED) visit; patients were rostered to physicians
in Family Health Networks. The authors’ retrospective chart review found that patients
were more likely to be followed up when ED physicians provided discharge instructions—
compared to if such were not provided (Lien et al., 2020). Hence system-level factors (e.g.,
hospital’s administrative system) can influence primary care delivery to patients—and,
consequently, health outcomes.
6.3

Directions for Future Research

Our results provide some evidence that care quality varies under blended capitation
and blended FFS linked to financial incentives. Future work could investigate the effect of
primary care reform on healthcare costs, especially since diabetes mellitus, CHF and CKD
are costly to the healthcare systems. At a population level, the improved health of patients
due to better provision of care may lead to reduced healthcare expenditures. As with
quality, identifying whether healthcare costs vary under different payment models would
be relevant to policymakers.
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Our findings from Ontario’s natural experiment highlight the importance of studies
that aim to determine whether remuneration models help improve outcomes in the
management of chronic conditions. Future studies investigating the impact of physician
payment on the quality of primary care for conditions, such as chronic respiratory diseases,
could have important policy implications for directing healthcare resources in the
management of such costly diseases. Extensions of our work can also include examining
whether long-term outcome of care measures, such as 5-year mortality risk, varies under
different payment schemes. And relatedly, whether patients under the care of FHO and
FHG physicians vary in quality of life, an important endpoint in medicine and health
services research (Haraldstad et al., 2019).
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7

Supplementary Material for the Introduction Chapter: Pathophysiology of
diabetes mellitus, chronic kidney disease and congestive heart failure
Herein, brief, and relevant, information on the pathophysiology of diabetes

mellitus, chronic kidney disease and congestive heart failure are provided.
7.1

Diabetes mellitus

Diabetes mellitus (or simply ‘diabetes’) is a very common chronic disease that is
characterized by hyperglycemia, which is the clinical term for a condition where an
individual’s blood glucose level is pathologically high. According to Diabetes Canada, an
individual can be diagnosed with diabetes if their level of HbA1c is least 6.5%. This
disease is generally asymptomatic in its early stages and, therefore, individuals are often
undiagnosed when they are in the early stage of diabetes. Furthermore, the
hyperglycemia-induced damage to various body tissues occurs during this symptomless
phase—albeit at a level not severe enough to be noticed (Naslafkih & Sestier, 2003).
This chronic condition is of three types, namely, type 1, type 2 and gestational. In
type 1 diabetes mellitus, hyperglycemia occurs because the body produces no (or very
little) insulin, and this form of the disease usually occurs in childhood or adolescence; the
age distribution for developing type 1 is typically known to be bimodal, wherein the first
and second peaks are between 4 to 6 years and 10 to 14 years, respectively (Al-Fifi,
2010). In type 2 of this disease, the pathologically elevated blood glucose level is a
consequence of the body either (1) not producing enough insulin, or (2) not being able to
utilize the insulin it produces (Diabetes Canada, 2015). Type 2 diabetes is typically
known to develop around middle age as individuals are likely to be diagnosed with the
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disease at age 45 years or above (National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney
Diseases, 2017). A transient form of diabetes that occurs in a woman who is pregnant and
has no history of the disease is referred to as gestational diabetes; this form of the disease
usually commences in late second trimester, and immediately disappears after delivery
(Alfadhli, 2015). While type 1 and type 2 diabetes have traditionally been known to occur
within a specific age range, it is important to note that such age conventions have recently
been inexact because pre-teen children are now being diagnosed with type 2 diabetes and
some individuals develop the type 1 form of the metabolic disorder in their adulthood
(American Diabetes Association, 2019). Notwithstanding the dissolution of the age
conventions in recent times, age is still a risk factor for developing type 2 diabetes
mellitus (Mayo Clinic, 2019). Furthermore, type 2 is the most common form of diabetes
as it accounts for 90% to 95% of all cases (Wu et al., 2014).
7.2

Congestive heart failure

The human heart is a hollow organ that is divided into four chambers. The
pumping of blood by the heart can be said to resemble the forcing of fluid from a bulb
syringe when it is compressed. The two top chambers are the right atrium and left atrium;
the two bottom chambers are the right ventricle and left ventricle. Because the ventricles
do the real work of pumping the blood, the walls of the ventricles are thicker than the
walls of the atria. The right atrium and right ventricle are sometimes referred to as the
right heart; likewise, the left atrium and left ventricle are sometimes referred to as the left
heart (Phibbs, 2007).
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Blood completes its course when it travels from the heart and back to the heart.
Blood enters the right heart through the superior vena cava and inferior vena cava; it
flows from the right atrium into the right ventricles. The right ventricle pumps blood to
the lungs through the pulmonary artery, which carries deoxygenated blood to the lungs.
Gaseous exchange occurs in the lungs, where deoxygenated blood becomes oxygenated;
the fresh blood is delivered to the left atrium through the pulmonary veins. Oxygenated
blood flows from the left atrium to the left ventricles. Blood is pumped from the left
ventricles, which pumps blood to the rest of the body. When any of the heart chambers
contracts to pump blood, the contraction is called a systole; diastole occurs when any of
the chambers relaxes to be filled with blood. A reliable measure of ventricular function is
the ejection fraction, which is defined as the percentage of blood in the ventricles pumped
out of the heart in each heart beat (Phibbs, 2007). The following equation is a simple way
of computing ejection fraction:

100% x (

Volume at the end of diastole−Volume at the end of systole
Volume at the end of diastole

)

Congestive heart failure is a chronic progressive condition where the pumping
ability of the heart is pathologically diminished; CHF is syndromic because the decreased
ability is polyetiological. The reduced contractibility ability of the heart consequently
leads to fluid build-up due to pulmonary and/or systemic congestion. The ejection
fraction, which is a measure of the heart’s pumping ability, is used to distinguish heart
failure with reduced ejection fraction and heart failure with preserved ejection fraction—
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where EF is at most and at least 40%, respectively. Though the signs, symptoms, and risk
profiles are somewhat different for the two, both fall under the term congestive heart
failure (Borlaug, 2013; Katz, 2011; Phibbs, 2007; Ponikowski et al., 2016; van
Heerebeek & Paulus, 2016).
7.3

Chronic kidney disease

Like congestive heart failure, chronic kidney disease is essentially a syndrome
because it is polyetiological. A clinical definition for chronic kidney disease is the
persistence of abnormal kidney function for at least three months, where an individual’s
kidney function is quantified by their estimated glomerular filtration rate. The estimate of
an individual’s glomerular filtration rate is a measure of the filtering capacity of their
kidney; in general, the higher an individual’s estimated glomerular filtration rate, the
better functioning are their kidneys. Chronic kidney disease is categorized into five stages
where higher stages correspond to worsening renal function (i.e., lower eGFR values). As
shown in the table below, the range of an individual’s eGFR value determines the stage
of their syndrome. The eGFR values in Stages 1 and 2 are above 90, and between 60 and
90 mL/min/1.73m2, respectively; in addition to the low eGFR values, the presence of
structural abnormality (e.g., overt proteinuria) is essential for a diagnosis of these two
stages. Stages 3 to 5 are defined by the occurrence of an estimated glomerular filtration
rate of less than 60mL/min/1.73m2; furthermore, the presence of a structural abnormality
is not necessary for a diagnosis of these three stages (Molony & Craig, 2009). Stage 5
includes end-stage renal disease, which is also known as kidney failure. Progression to
ESRD can be delayed with proper management of the syndrome.

223

Stages of CKD according to severity
Stage

eGFR value (mL/min/1.73m2)

1

>90 (with structural abnormalities)

2

60-90 (with structural abnormalities)

3

30-59

4

15-29

5

<15

Abbreviations: CKD=chronic kidney disease, eGFR=estimated
glomerular filtration rate Information to make this table was taken
from (Molony & Craig, 2009)
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